Over the Circle (OtC) is a site dedicated to news, politics and current affairs in the Arctic region.
Interview: Britain and Norway Sign an Atlantic-Arctic Security Agreement
Earlier in December, the governments of Britain and Norway announced that they had signed a bilateral security deal which would allow for joint operations to monitor regional Russian submarine activity, as well as oversee the construction of as many as thirteen Type-26 anti-submarine frigates, five for Norway and potentially eight for the United Kingdom.
These vessels would patrol the waters between the two countries, including the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is seen as an area increasingly vulnerable to Russian maritime incursions.
In addition to the warships, there would also be UK-Norwegian cooperation in the development of support vessels for mine-hunting and underwater surveillance, missile systems and torpedoes, as well as combined war game operations and opportunities for British forces to receive winter-temperature military training in Norway. The Lunna House Agreement was agreed to by Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his British counterpart, Keir Starmer, in recognition of the two countries’ concerns about expanded Russian maritime activity and espionage in Northern European waters.
This Agreement is the latest example of NATO states seeking to improve their defensive capabilities in the Arctic, as the far north and its adjacent waters become more militarised and contested.
Marc Lanteigne, Chief Editor for Over the Circle, commented [video] on the deal for TVP (Poland) last week.
Norway’s Arctic Policy and a Kaleidoscope Election
Election season has begun in earnest in Norway, as the country now faces a host of domestic and foreign issues in the run-up to the 8 September vote. Since the end of last year, the polls have indicated a seesaw effect between the left and right coalitions. The governing centre-left Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) under Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, was facing a slump in support a year ago, largely over economic frustrations. Yet, by this summer it was leading the polls, with the far-right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in second place.
Labour’s comeback had been partially credited to the hiring of popular politician, and former secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg as Minister of Finance, in February this year. He has since been viewed as a steady hand despite ongoing global trade tribulations and chilled relations between American and Europe. As it is extremely difficult for a single party to govern alone under Norway’s proportional representation system, the election will likely lead to a formal or informal coalition.
Local pocketbook concerns, including inflation and price increases, inequality, the value of the krone, and taxation policies, have dominated the discussions. One oddity has been the debate over the fate of Norway’s wealth tax, an especially divisive policy between the country’s left and right-wing political parties. Critics on the right have maintained that this tax, as it stands, was discouraging business expansion and innovation, and prompting the nation’s wealthiest individuals to decamp to Switzerland and elsewhere. As well, the use, or non-use, of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated worth now at US$1.9 trillion (the world’s largest in value), has traditionally been another source of intra-party debate during elections.
Norway is also facing additional economic pressures as a result of being hit with a fifteen percent tariff rate by the United States earlier this month, a rate similar to that of the European Union. Although only about 3.5% of Norwegian exports go to the US, there nonetheless remains concerns about a knock-on effect for Norway’s businesses.
The growing instability in world trade has also revived what was thought to be a lost issue in Norwegian political circles, namely EU membership. Norway is not an EU member, but does follow several Union policies, (Norway is a member of the Schengen agreement, for example). However, after two referendums on the subject, the most recent being in 1994, the country remained reluctant to pursue membership out of concerns about economic sovereignty, especially in relation to protecting the country’s keystone petroleum and fishing industries. The country’s participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) has allowed Norway access to Europe’s Single Market, but this arrangement does not give Oslo a say in the crafting of EU policy.
While public opinion is still soft on the matter, concerns about Norway being isolated in global markets has revived low-level discussion of EU membership since last year. The matter is still considered a hot potato by the mainstream political parties however, as illustrated by the fracturing of the minority government in January this year when the traditionally ‘Eurosceptic’ Centre Party (Senterpartiet) left the coalition, (prompting Labour to govern alone, albeit with support from the left bloc, going into this vote), over implementation of EU energy policies.
The Conservative Party (Høyre) has traditionally been more pro-European Union in political stance, while parties on the left such as the Greens (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and the Red Party (Rødt) have been much more skeptical of membership.
Security issues are also a major factor in current Norwegian political debates due to the ongoing attempted Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing spillover of European Russian disputes into the Arctic. In October last year, the Støre government announced that it was seeking an increase in military spending up to just over 110 billion NoK (US$10.9 billion) for 2025, and that it was committed to raising defence spending to five percent of gross national product, in keeping with NATO recommendations.
This month also saw the publication by the Norwegian government of a revised Arctic strategy, ‘Norge i Nord Nordområdepolitikken i en ny virkelighet,’ [in Norwegian], or ‘Norway in the North: High North Policy in a New Reality’, the first such policy upgrade since 2017. The document very much reflects the two biggest changes in Norwegian Arctic security policy in the last eight years, namely the post-2022 invasion of Ukraine and the addition of neighbours Finland and Sweden into NATO.
The five components elucidated in the revised policy included the protection of Norwegian Arctic sovereignty and the elaboration of security policies which reflect military and civilian interests, as well as scientific research needs, and which are compatible with international law and key organisations including the Arctic Council, the European Union, and NATO. These initiatives would take place in cooperation with Sámi and other Indigenous communities. Second, via a ‘total defence’ policy, there would be the development of local economic opportunities, including in key sectors like tourism, and improvements to general infrastructure, as well as improving northern expertise in the country.
Third, there is a call for strengthened northern communities, including through improved housing, better education and connectivity. Related to this area was the announcement earlier this month that the Støre government would support a landmark research initiative, Polhavet 2050 (Arctic Ocean 2050). This programme, worth 1 billion NoK (US$99.3 million) and dedicated to improving the understanding of the Arctic Ocean, would bring together several different research institutions. the programme will be chaired by UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, and would operate, starting next year, until 2036.
Fourth, and related, would be the building of better infrastructure between communities, while improving regional transportation options. Finally, there is a focus on business development which creates a positive multiplier effect for northern populations.
The strategy document noted that Norway’s high north had become the country’s ‘most important strategic focus area’, not only due to the winds of geopolitics but also the great impact of climate change including ice erosion. Improved military capabilities as well as strengthened external defence ties, with other Northern European governments and the United States and Canada, were seen as crucial to Norwegian security interests. Russia’s expanded Arctic interests, including maritime capabilities are now posing a challenge to Norwegian monitoring capabilities, and the document explains the country’s commitment to international law in the high north.
Moreover, Svalbard has suddenly found itself caught in the deteriorated security situation in the Arctic. The new Arctic strategy report reiterated that the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) would be the only accepted educational facility on the islands, and that a new research office would be established to regulate international actors. This at a time when Russia has been advocating for the founding of a completely separate Svalbard research facility at its settlement in Pyramiden which would be open to members of the expanded BRICS group, which includes large economies like China, Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates.
Regardless of the outcome of the September election, it is unlikely that there will be dramatic shift in Norwegian foreign and defence policy. However, the dialogues leading up to the vote have underlined how much has changed in the perceptions of Norway as an Arctic state with myriad regional responsibilities.
‘Yet the Place is Fair Enough, Doubt it Not!’ Svalbard in a Tumultuous Arctic
With record-setting high temperatures being experienced in much of Europe since the month began, the word ‘coolcation’ is making a comeback as more tourists, and cruise liners, seek to take advantage of the temperate conditions of Nordic summers. This effect is being seen throughout northern Norway, including Svalbard, which is becoming a more popular off-the-beaten-path destination. The tourist season on the islands is taking place however at a time when Svalbard remains caught between several developing geopolitical forces, including ongoing attempts by Norway to clarify its sovereignty there in the face of outside pushback, especially from Russia.
Moscow has had a long history of presenting various challenges to the legal structure on Svalbard, starting with the Spitsbergen / Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which came into force five years later. The document stated that Norway would enjoy ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, while other signatories would have the right to engage is scientific and economic activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality’, and that the islands would not be used for ‘warlike purposes’.
However, since that time, Svalbard’s geography within the Atlantic-Arctic region, which is now becoming more open to maritime navigation due to climate change, as well as the worsening relationship between Russia and what is now commonly called the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’, all of which are now NATO members, has resulted in different varieties of tacit challenges to the Treaty, and Norway’s position within it.
As a recent comment in the Barents Observer explained, both Russia and the previous regimes of the Soviet Union sought to increase their influence on Svalbard, often through policies consistent with ‘bilateralisation’. This means that that Moscow has sought to engage Norway for one-to-one dialogues on Svalbard’s governance, with the longstanding argument that Russia has special historical rights in the archipelago which Oslo should acknowledge. In other words, Moscow does not see itself as on the same level as the Treaty’s other non-Norway signatories but rather being or close to being equal with Oslo. Yet, with the Arctic now being more widely seen as a place of strategic competition, these pressures have begun to be more visible in nature. The Norwegian government continues to rebuff any Russian calls for direct bilateral talks on Svalbard.
This past March, the Russian government again made an accusation that Norway was tacitly seeking to militarize the islands in contravention of the Treaty. Moscow had previously accused Oslo of attempting to skirt the Treaty by allowing both patrols by the Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as periodic visits by naval vessels.
The Norwegian government has argued that it is within its rights under international law to monitor the islands, including using civilian and military vessels, and in January this year Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre took the unusual step of reiterating Svalbard’s status as Norwegian, on the heels of a renewed, and still ill-conceived, campaign by the incoming Trump administration in the United States to annex Greenland for reasons never articulated.
Another sign of Norway seeking to clarify its authority on Svalbard took place in April this year when it was announced that all edifices in Ny-Ålesund needed to comply with a standardisation protocol which would include the removal of outside decoration, including the famous male and female lions standing guard in front of China’s Yellow River facility.
This decision followed an incident at Yellow River last July when tourists were photographed waving Chinese flags in front of the building, with one person being photographed in full Chinese military uniform. The event, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the building, was seen by Norwegian authorities as in breach of norms which discouraged both overt nationalism and military symbols on the site.
Since the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, displays of Russian patriotism have also been seen at both of the country’s settlements in Svalbard, including the erecting of an Orthodox Cross near Pyramiden in May 2023, flying the flag of the separatist ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in a makeshift military parade in Barentsburg that month, and an ‘Immortal Regiment’ march also in Barentsburg in May this year. Last summer, Soviet-era flags and slogans could also be viewed at both settlements, but this summer all of that appeared to have been removed.
Also under the new regulations, in Ny-Ålesund all buildings there could no longer describe themselves as separate ‘stations’, with the argument that there was only one station present, namely the ‘Ny-Ålesund Station’.
In conversations with representatives from Kings Bay, the management body of the Ny-Ålesund site, when the author visited Ny-Ålesund last month, it was stated that the plans to standardize outside décor of the research facilities had been set in motion since 2019. As well, the incident at Yellow River last July did not affect these guidelines or the timeline in any way.
It was also stressed that none of the facilities management, had demonstrated any overt opposition to the new standards, although there had been incidents of previous criticism by Chinese officials about what was seen as Norwegian regulatory overreach. Moreover, the possibility of a Chinese firm possibly purchasing land in Svalbard last year also touched off debate, and ultimately resulted in Oslo’s decision to block any sale.
During the visit, the lions at Yellow River were still very much sitting in place, (along with the sign to the left of the front door identifying the two-floor building as ‘Yellow River Station – China / 中国北极黄河站’). There had been no noticeable changes to the other buildings, including those housing Indian and South Korean polar researchers. One change which was visible on site was that what had previously been ‘Sverdrup Station’, used by the Norwegian Polar Institute, at Ny-Ålesund was being referred to as a ‘unit’.
Moscow has since continued to press the issue of Norwegian Svalbard sovereignty, including by recently seeking to expand educational and research projects in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, including possibly in cooperation with the BRICS+ group and countries which Russia considers ‘friendly’ partners. As well, cruise ship arrived in Barentsburg last month from Murmansk, the first in over a decade, in another show of Russian symbolism.
This trip coincided with a visit to Svalbard by Norway’s King Harald V, who also visited another part of the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), located between Svalbard’s main islands and the northern Norwegian coast,* for the first time. For now, the ‘clash of symbols’ in Svalbard shows little sign of abatment as the summer tourist season continues.
* Corrected on 5 July to be more specific about Bear Island’s status.
Canada’s Arctic Choices
by Marc Lanteigne
‘Assume nothing’ has became the de facto catchphrase to best describe the upcoming parliamentary elections in Canada, to be held on 28 April. Political fortunes of the competing parties have shifted rapidly since the beginning of this year, primarily due to one outstanding factor: the aggressive, (and regressive), foreign policies of the country’s southern neighbour, the United States under Donald Trump. As a result of the America’s president’s continuous calls, including on social media, for Canada to be absorbed by the United States, while simultaneously questioning the legitimacy of two states’ mutual borders, bilateral relations have deteriorated. This has resulted in various pro-Canada campaigns and a recent dramatic fall in Canadian visitor numbers to the US.
Canada has also been a frequent target of the Trump administration’s erratic and unfocused tariff policies, prompting a series of countermeasures by Ottawa. Although US-led global trade tensions have since been readjusted, as Washington turns its sights more fully on China, damage has still been done, and it remains to be seen whether the reformed Canada-US-Mexico trade agreement (CUSMA) can be maintained.
The main effect of Trump’s Canada ‘policies’ has been a swift resurgence of support for Prime Minister Mark Carney and the Liberal Party, which late last year had been written off as unsalvageable due to the unpopularity of Carney’s predecessor, Justin Trudeau. Current polling suggested a Liberal lead of more than five percent over the opposition Conservatives led by Pierre Poilievre. At the same time, support for smaller parties, namely the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Bloc Québécois, and the Green Party, has also dropped in recent weeks.
Both of the two leading parties have proposed programmes to address the challenges faced by the Canadian Arctic, reflecting the longer list of the far north’s security threats not only from Russia, and the possibility of greater Sino-Russian military cooperation, but also to a degree from the Trump government, which has not only questioned Canadian sovereignty but has also made repeated calls for the annexation of Greenland on vague ‘international security’ grounds.
In April of last year, the Trudeau government published the most recent governmental Arctic defence policy, ‘Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,’ which received much scrutiny from regional specialists for how the document represented a more diversified set of regional interests, many of which more closely reflected the new geo-strategic realities of the far north.
In December 2024, Global Affairs Canada published its revised Arctic policy statement, a piece which also reflected the cold realism of changed security circumstances in the far north. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy described the pillars of Canada’s renewed northern strategies as the need to ‘assert Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Ottawa’s national interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leading on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.’ The statement pointed to ‘major powers that do not share Canadian interests’ as obstacles to peace in the region, and also referred to non-traditional or ‘grey zone’ Arctic threats in the form of malicious cyber activities, interference in local affairs and economic coercion.
This policy paper also advocated the appointment of an Arctic ambassador and the opening of Canadian consulates in Anchorage and Nuuk, while strengthening communications with like-minded Arctic states, another task since made more complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump.
There was also greater space given for engagement with ‘like-minded’ non-Arctic states to participate in regional dialogues and policymaking, including in the North Pacific as Canada seeks to improve relations with Japan and South Korea, two states with their own Arctic interests. This reflected Canadian concerns over China’s long-term goals in the current and the current challenges presented by Beijing’s ‘dual-use’ scientific interests in the Arctic which critics have argued could serve military purposes.
Within the Liberals’ policy document going into the election, promises included an upgrading of vital Arctic infrastructure, such as the Greys Bay Port and Road Project, as part of the revived local economy, as well as a new airstrip. There were also policies of improved cooperation with local actors to better identify regional risks, and a Canada-Europe agreement specifically tied to mutual Arctic interests.
In March of this year, Prime Minister Carney had previous announced a spending package of C$6.7 billion in spending for the Canadian Arctic, which would focus on infrastructure-building and monitoring, with the latter being bolstered by a radar technology purchase from Australia, further reflecting newfound Canadian unease about US cooperation. All of these policies reflected the underscoring by Ottawa that its Arctic sovereignty would not be challenged.
The Conservatives’ updated Arctic policies going into the election got off to a shaky start with a tin-eared posting on X/Twitter last December implying that the appointment of a Canadian Arctic Ambassador was a waste of funding as there was no one to speak to there, save for ‘Santa Claus’. Two months later, Mr Poilievre issued a statement in Iqaluit that his government would seek to open a military facility in the Nunavut capital, as well as bolstering the ranks of the Canadian Rangers in the Arctic and adding two more icebreakers for the Canadian Navy in addition to the ones promised for the country’s Coast Guard.
The previous Conservative government under Stephen Harper had also vowed to develop Arctic military facilities, but the promised base at Nanisivik announced by his government in 2007 remains unfinished and without a confirmed opening date.
Within a September 2023 Conservative policy document were promises of improved consultations with the country’s Arctic territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon), in preparation for greater economic activities prompted by climate change and demand for regional resources. A call for a strengthening of North American Air Defence (NORAD) in Arctic may also however be adversely affected by the current downturn in US-Canada relations. Mr Poilievre underscored the need for military infrastructure in the Canadian north in the candidates’ English language debate last week, saying that it was only a matter of time before Russian vessels would seek to enter Canadian Arctic waters, and therefore monitoring and response capabilities had to be upgraded.
Within the Canadian Arctic, major issues amongst voters included Indigenous rights, healthcare, socio-economic development, dealing with high prices and housing challenges, and also maintaining regional security and sovereignty. The eventual shape of the Canadian Arctic economy, and who would benefit, was another overarching question going into the final days of the campaigns.
The next government in Ottawa will have a host of Arctic-related challenges to address in the coming months. On 12 May, the chair of the Arctic Council is due to be transferred from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, with Greenland taking on a paramount role in the chairship which will last until early 2027.
It had been decided earlier this month that the transfer of the chair would take place completely virtually, sidestepping what could have been an extremely difficult situation based on three factors. The first being the ongoing question of Russia’s downgraded role within the group, in the wake of its illegal 2022 full invasion of Ukraine. The second being the soured relationship between the United States and Canada as well as between Washington and Copenhagen and Nuuk over the Trump government’s land grab policy towards Greenland. The third being the high likelihood that the United States will decline to support any Council initiatives which mention climate change, which is still touted by the current occupant of the White House as fictional, despite mounting evidence to the contrary and it being the central concern in the Arctic.
Other Arctic-related questions facing the next Canadian government includes the future of strategic agreements ranging from NATO and NORAD to the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ‘ICE Pact’, agreement struck between Canada, Finland and the United States in July last year. Since re-assuming office, the Trump government’s icebreaker policy has been mercurial at best, including an odd promise this past February that the US would somehow produce ‘forty’ icebreakers for the American Coast guard, despite a lack of means or infrastructure for doing so. This month, it was reported that the US and Finland may strike a side deal for the American purchase of five Finnish icebreaking vessels, and where Canada might fit into that endeavour was unclear.
After a short (but unusual) election season in Canada, which has greatly galvanised the public thus far, the Arctic will be a major part of local, and regional, scrutiny over the policy directions taken by Ottawa in the coming months.
Greenland’s Vote, Trump, and the Sovereignty Schism
It was widely predicted in local and international media that this month’s parliamentary elections in Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland would be the most widely watched in the island’s history, given the unwelcome spotlight placed on Nuuk after incoming US President Donald Trump not only returned to his hapless 2019 proposal to ‘purchase’ Greenland from Denmark, but also intensified his rhetoric. In speeches and his social media posts since the beginning of this year, he refused to rule out of the use of force in acquiring the island, and vowing during his recent speech to a joint session of the US Congress that ‘one way or the other, we’re going to get it’.
Trump also made vague claims that Greenland as US territory would be essential for ‘national security’, despite the fact that the American military already maintains a military facility at Pituffik with extensive monitoring capabilities. At times, the affair has veered into outright absurdity, with one example being a sycophantic bill introduced in Congress last month which would ‘authorise’ the President to enter into negotiations to acquire Greenland, and to also rename it ‘Red, White, and Blueland’.
Although on the eve of the Greenlandic election Trump appeared to soften his rhetoric, praising the vote but also promising that Greenland could become ‘RICH!’ if it agreed to be transferred to American sovereignty, the damage had more than been done. The renewal of the ‘buy Greenland’ fiasco has placed further strains on Washington’s relationship with Denmark, a NATO ally. Coupled with Trump’s increasing vitriol towards the government and economy of Canada, culminating in an erratic acceleration of the bilateral trade war this month, (which is now being called the ‘dumbest’ ever example of such a conflict), Arctic diplomacy and security, including via the NATO alliances, is now being placed in much greater doubt at a fraught time.
The delicate issue of Greenland’s independence from Denmark was also pushed into the forefront at a time when the legacies of Danish colonialism, which officially ended in the 1950s, were still affecting Greenlandic society. These issues included ongoing revelations surrounding an IUD policy in Greenland from the 1960s-70s, and the release (and subsequent removal) of a controversial documentary ‘Greenland’s White Gold’ / ‘Orsugiak – Grønlands hvide guld’ which detailed the appropriation of funds from the island by Danish cryolite mining in the century leading up the late 1980s.
The now-outgoing previous government coalition in Denmark, the once-unlikely alliance between two previous big party rivals, the centre-left Siumut (‘Forward’) and the left-green Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA – ‘Community of the People’) had the thankless job of trying to respond to this resurgence of American pressure, and it was widely expected that one of both parties would not fare as well in the vote. Outgoing Greenlandic Prime Minister Múte Bourup Egede has repeatedly stressed that the sale of Greenland was a non-starter, including saying that ‘We don’t want to be Americans, nor Danes; We are Kalaallit.’
Siumut had been dealing with internal party divisions long before the election was called, but then had to address, in the runup to the election, with high-profile defections from prominent party members to Naleraq (‘Point of Orientation’), a main opposition party which supports both faster-track independence from Denmark and a greater foreign policy alignment with the United States. Siumut’s chair, Erik Jensen, had called for an activation of Article 21 of the 2009 Greenland Self-Rule Act, which would jump-start the independence process, but that move did not appear to heal party rifts over the issue.
Naleraq, headed by Pele Broberg, had appeared to be positioning itself to be the potential kingmaker after this election, fielding 62 candidates, more than any other party, to vie for seats in the Inatsisartut (Parliament). Thirty-one seats were up for contention, and traditionally it has been difficult for a single party to govern alone, so there was also much initial speculation as to what sort of coalition may appear after the results were confirmed.
Initial vote results on 11 March did appear to suggest a commanding lead for Naleraq, with IA appearing to suffer the biggest losses. As the day progressed, however, the numbers began to shift, steadily favouring another opposition party, Demokraatit (‘Democrats’). At the end of the counting, Demokraatit had gathered the most votes, almost thirty percent (obtaining ten seats), with Naleraq finishing second at 24.5% (eight seats), and IA third at just over twenty-one percent (seven seats).
Siumut’s seat count was reduced to four, and after the results were confirmed, Erik Jensen announced that he would be stepping down as chair with former foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt named as his successor. The chair of Demokraatit, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, confirmed after the vote that he was open to coalition talks with any of the other parties, with a stress on political unity after what has been a stressful few months for the island. Coalition talks have continued, with discussions reported between Demokraatit and all of the other parties. On 13 March, all parties released a joint statement opposing ‘the repeated statements about annexation and control of Greenland.’
Demokraatit had experienced a political shift of its own before this election, as it had previous been based on a policy of maintaining the union with Denmark. Then the party’s views gradually shifted to support for independence but in a more measured fashion which would place emphasis on achieving self-determination, including first completing the process of transferring government portfolios from Copenhagen to Nuuk, and a more diverse and robust economy. The party’s platform stresses a combination of social liberalism and fiscal conservativism, with a focus on lower taxes and business promotion but also improving housing, education and family support.
As the largest party in the next government coalition, there will be numerous economic questions ahead facing Demokraatit, including policies involving the ongoing reform of the seafood sector, the question of mining and fossil fuels, which IA was sceptical of on environmental grounds, and emerging industries such as tourism.
These issues likely resonated with the electorate despite the long shadow cast by the American drama. As well, another contributing factor to the results could have been exhaustion with the chaos of American foreign policy since January, and a greater backlash against populism, which is helping the political fortunes of some centrist parties in Europe, and potentially in Canada as well.
As Ottawa prepares for an election on 28 April, Mark Carney was elected earlier this month as Liberal Party chief, replacing Justin Trudeau. The Liberals are currently experiencing an unlikely comeback in the polls, now running even with the opposition Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre, mainly out of concern for who the best leader would be to stand up to Trump.
In addition to the economic and domestic policy directions of the next Greenlandic government, what will also be closely watched how the thorny subject of an independence timetable will be addressed. This could likely be a major area of contention should Naleraq join, but either way there are likely to be changes in the relationship with Greenland and a rethinking of US relations, especially as pressure from the Trump administration resumes. Last week saw demonstrations in Greenland’s cities protesting the actions of the American government and reinforcing the fact that a majority of Greenlanders had no interest in becoming US territory, saying Naammaqaaq! (Enough!).
The pushback does not appear to have fazed Washington, as this week, a sudden announcement was made that the US government would shortly be sending another high-level delegation to Greenland. Framed as a ‘private visit,’ amongst the arrivals would be Second Lady Usha Vance, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and, traveling separately, US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz.
The timing of this event was criticised by Greenlandic officials, especially since negotiations to from the next coalition government in Nuuk are ongoing, and that the addition of such a high-level security official to the tour was a telling sign that the Trump government was continuing to wave off objections by Greenlanders to this attempted annexation.
On the eve of the announcement of the latest US delegation, Prime Minister Egede expressed frustration both at the visit, which he saw as American intimidation and that ‘the signal is not to be misunderstood’, and at the tepid responses from Greenland’s neighbours. He called for improved cooperation amongst the Greenlandic government to resist this pressure, and for Greenland’s allies to be more vocal in standing up to American actions. This view was echoed in a recent comment in the Norwegian news service Dagsavisen that Oslo and other Nordic governments needed to do more to show their support for Greenland and their rejection of ongoing US bombast. All of these matters are highly likely to affect the shaping of the next government in Nuuk, and its policy priorities going forward.
[Addendum – 26 March 2025: After an announcement was made yesterday that American Vice-President JD Vance would also be traveling to Greenland, it was then reported that the entire US delegation would no longer travel to Nuuk and Sisimiut as previously planned, and instead the visit would be limited to the US Pituffik Space Base.]
Over the Circle 
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