arctic – Over the Circle

‘Yet the Place is Fair Enough, Doubt it Not!’ Svalbard in a Tumultuous Arctic

July 4, 2025July 5, 2025 Over the Circle

^{Spitsbergen’s western coastline, Svalbard} ^{[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

With record-setting high temperatures being experienced in much of Europe since the month began, the word ‘coolcation’ is making a comeback as more tourists, and cruise liners, seek to take advantage of the temperate conditions of Nordic summers. This effect is being seen throughout northern Norway, including Svalbard, which is becoming a more popular off-the-beaten-path destination. The tourist season on the islands is taking place however at a time when Svalbard remains caught between several developing geopolitical f o rces, including ongoing attempts by Norway to clarify its sovereignty there in the face of outside pushback, especially from Russia.

Moscow has had a long history of presenting various challenges to the legal structure on Svalbard, starting with the Spitsbergen / Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which came into force five years later. The document stated that Norway would enjoy ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, while other signatories would have the right to engage is scientific and economic activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality’, and that the islands would not be used for ‘warlike purposes’.

However, since that time, Svalbard’s geography within the Atlantic-Arctic region, which is now becoming more open to maritime navigation due to climate change, as well as the worsening relationship between Russia and what is now commonly called the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’, all of which are now NATO members, has resulted in different varieties of tacit challenges to the Treaty, and Norway’s position within it.

^{Cruise vessel docked at Longyearbyen, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

As a recent comment in the Barents Observer explained, both Russia and the previous regimes of the Soviet Union sought to increase their influence on Svalbard, often through policies consistent with ‘bilateralisation’. This means that that Moscow has sought to engage Norway for one-to-one dialogues on Svalbard’s governance, with the longstanding argument that Russia has special historical rights in the archipelago which Oslo should acknowledge. In other words, Moscow does not see itself as on the same level as the Treaty’s other non-Norway signatories but rather being or close to being equal with Oslo. Yet, with the Arctic now being more widely seen as a place of strategic competition, these pressures have begun to be more visible in nature. The Norwegian government continues to rebuff any Russian calls for direct bilateral talks on Svalbard.

This past March, the Russian government again made an accusation that Norway was tacitly seeking to militarize the islands in contravention of the Treaty. Moscow had previously accused Oslo of attempting to skirt the Treaty by allowing both patrols by the Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as periodic visits by naval vessels.

The Norwegian government has argued that it is within its rights under international law to monitor the islands, including using civilian and military vessels, and in January this year Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre took the unusual step of reiterating Svalbard’s status as Norwegian, on the heels of a renewed, and still ill-conceived, campaign by the incoming Trump administration in the United States to annex Greenland for reasons never articulated.

^{China’s Yellow River facility at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Another sign of Norway seeking to clarify its authority on Svalbard took place in April this year when it was announced that all edifices in Ny-Ålesund needed to comply with a standardisation protocol which would include the removal of outside decoration, including the famous male and female lions standing guard in front of China’s Yellow River facility.

This decision followed an incident at Yellow River last July when tourists were photographed waving Chinese flags in front of the building, with one person being photographed in full Chinese military uniform. The event, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the building, was seen by Norwegian authorities as in breach of norms which discouraged both overt nationalism and military symbols on the site.

Since the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, displays of Russian patriotism have also been seen at both of the country’s settlements in Svalbard, including the erecting of an Orthodox Cross near Pyramiden in May 2023, flying the flag of the separatist ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in a makeshift military parade in Barentsburg that month, and an ‘Immortal Regiment’ march also in Barentsburg in May this year. Last summer, Soviet-era flags and slogans could also be viewed at both settlements, but this summer all of that appeared to have been removed.

^{No red flags this time.} ^{The Russian settlement at Pyramiden, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Also under the new regulations, in Ny-Ålesund all buildings there could no longer describe themselves as separate ‘stations’, with the argument that there was only one station present, namely the ‘Ny-Ålesund Station’.

In conversations with representatives from Kings Bay, the management body of the Ny-Ålesund site, when the author visited Ny-Ålesund last month, it was stated that the plans to standardize outside décor of the research facilities had been set in motion since 2019. As well, the incident at Yellow River last July did not affect these guidelines or the timeline in any way.

It was also stressed that none of the facilities management, had demonstrated any overt opposition to the new standards, although there had been incidents of previous criticism by Chinese officials about what was seen as Norwegian regulatory overreach. Moreover, the possibility of a Chinese firm possibly purchasing land in Svalbard last year also touched off debate, and ultimately resulted in Oslo’s decision to block any sale.

During the visit, the lions at Yellow River were still very much sitting in place, (along with the sign to the left of the front door identifying the two-floor building as ‘Yellow River Station – China / 中国北极黄河站’). There had been no noticeable changes to the other buildings, including those housing Indian and South Korean polar researchers. One change which was visible on site was that what had previously been ‘Sverdrup Station’, used by the Norwegian Polar Institute, at Ny-Ålesund was being referred to as a ‘unit’.

^{Sverdrup not-Station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Moscow has since continued to press the issue of Norwegian Svalbard sovereignty, including by recently seeking to expand educational and research projects in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, including possibly in cooperation with the BRICS+ group and countries which Russia considers ‘friendly’ partners. As well, cruise ship arrived in Barentsburg last month from Murmansk, the first in over a decade, in another show of Russian symbolism.

This trip coincided with a visit to Svalbard by Norway’s King Harald V, who also visited another part of the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), located between Svalbard’s main islands and the northern Norwegian coast,* for the first time. For now, the ‘clash of symbols’ in Svalbard shows little sign of abatment as the summer tourist season continues.

* Corrected on 5 July to be more specific about Bear Island’s status.

Canada’s Arctic Choices

April 20, 2025April 20, 2025 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

‘Assume nothing’ has became the de facto catchphrase to best describe the upcoming parliamentary elections in Canada, to be held on 28 April. Political fortunes of the competing parties have shifted rapidly since the beginning of this year, primarily due to one outstanding factor: the aggressive, (and regressive), foreign policies of the country’s southern neighbour, the United States under Donald Trump. As a result of the America’s president’s continuous calls, including on social media, for Canada to be absorbed by the United States, while simultaneously questioning the legitimacy of two states’ mutual borders, bilateral relations have deteriorated. This has resulted in various pro-Canada campaigns and a recent dramatic fall in Canadian visitor numbers to the US.

Canada has also been a frequent target of the Trump administration’s erratic and unfocused tariff policies, prompting a series of countermeasures by Ottawa. Although US-led global trade tensions have since been readjusted, as Washington turns its sights more fully on China, damage has still been done, and it remains to be seen whether the reformed Canada-US-Mexico trade agreement (CUSMA) can be maintained.

The main effect of Trump’s Canada ‘policies’ has been a swift resurgence of support for Prime Minister Mark Carney and the Liberal Party, which late last year had been written off as unsalvageable due to the unpopularity of Carney’s predecessor, Justin Trudeau. Current polling suggested a Liberal lead of more than five percent over the opposition Conservatives led by Pierre Poilievre. At the same time, support for smaller parties, namely the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Bloc Québécois, and the Green Party, has also dropped in recent weeks.

Both of the two leading parties have proposed programmes to address the challenges faced by the Canadian Arctic, reflecting the longer list of the far north’s security threats not only from Russia, and the possibility of greater Sino-Russian military cooperation, but also to a degree from the Trump government, which has not only questioned Canadian sovereignty but has also made repeated calls for the annexation of Greenland on vague ‘international security’ grounds.

In April of last year, the Trudeau government published the most recent governmental Arctic defence policy, ‘Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,’ which received much scrutiny from regional specialists for how the document represented a more diversified set of regional interests, many of which more closely reflected the new geo-strategic realities of the far north.

^{Members of the Advanced Naval Capabilities Unit, based in Victoria, British Columbia, pilot a G15 Sentinel drone to test interoperability in Arctic conditions as part of Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT in Inuvik, Northwest Territories on 27 February 2025. [Photo by Master Corporal Alana Morin, Joint Task Force – North, Yellowknife, via the Canadian Forces Imagery Gallery].}

In December 2024, Global Affairs Canada published its revised Arctic policy statement, a piece which also reflected the cold realism of changed security circumstances in the far north. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy described the pillars of Canada’s renewed northern strategies as the need to ‘assert Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Ottawa’s national interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leading on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.’ The statement pointed to ‘major powers that do not share Canadian interests’ as obstacles to peace in the region, and also referred to non-traditional or ‘grey zone’ Arctic threats in the form of malicious cyber activities, interference in local affairs and economic coercion.

This policy paper also advocated the appointment of an Arctic ambassador and the opening of Canadian consulates in Anchorage and Nuuk, while strengthening communications with like-minded Arctic states, another task since made more complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump.

There was also greater space given for engagement with ‘like-minded’ non-Arctic states to participate in regional dialogues and policymaking, including in the North Pacific as Canada seeks to improve relations with Japan and South Korea, two states with their own Arctic interests. This reflected Canadian concerns over China’s long-term goals in the current and the current challenges presented by Beijing’s ‘dual-use’ scientific interests in the Arctic which critics have argued could serve military purposes.

Within the Liberals’ policy document going into the election, promises included an upgrading of vital Arctic infrastructure, such as the Greys Bay Port and Road Project, as part of the revived local economy, as well as a new airstrip. There were also policies of improved cooperation with local actors to better identify regional risks, and a Canada-Europe agreement specifically tied to mutual Arctic interests.

In March of this year, Prime Minister Carney had previous announced a spending package of C$6.7 billion in spending for the Canadian Arctic, which would focus on infrastructure-building and monitoring, with the latter being bolstered by a radar technology purchase from Australia, further reflecting newfound Canadian unease about US cooperation. All of these policies reflected the underscoring by Ottawa that its Arctic sovereignty would not be challenged.

^{Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney meeting with his UK counterpart, Keir Starmer, in March this year. [Photo via Wikipedia]}

The Conservatives’ updated Arctic policies going into the election got off to a shaky start with a tin-eared posting on X/Twitter last December implying that the appointment of a Canadian Arctic Ambassador was a waste of funding as there was no one to speak to there, save for ‘Santa Claus’. Two months later, Mr Poilievre issued a statement in Iqaluit that his government would seek to open a military facility in the Nunavut capital, as well as bolstering the ranks of the Canadian Rangers in the Arctic and adding two more icebreakers for the Canadian Navy in addition to the ones promised for the country’s Coast Guard.

The previous Conservative government under Stephen Harper had also vowed to develop Arctic military facilities, but the promised base at Nanisivik announced by his government in 2007 remains unfinished and without a confirmed opening date.

Within a September 2023 Conservative policy document were promises of improved consultations with the country’s Arctic territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon), in preparation for greater economic activities prompted by climate change and demand for regional resources. A call for a strengthening of North American Air Defence (NORAD) in Arctic may also however be adversely affected by the current downturn in US-Canada relations. Mr Poilievre underscored the need for military infrastructure in the Canadian north in the candidates’ English language debate last week, saying that it was only a matter of time before Russian vessels would seek to enter Canadian Arctic waters, and therefore monitoring and response capabilities had to be upgraded.

Within the Canadian Arctic, major issues amongst voters included Indigenous rights, healthcare, socio-economic development, dealing with high prices and housing challenges, and also maintaining regional security and sovereignty. The eventual shape of the Canadian Arctic economy, and who would benefit, was another overarching question going into the final days of the campaigns.

^{Conservative Party Leader Pierre Poilievre meets with then-US President Joe Biden, March 2023 [Photo via Wikipedia]}

The next government in Ottawa will have a host of Arctic-related challenges to address in the coming months. On 12 May, the chair of the Arctic Council is due to be transferred from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, with Greenland taking on a paramount role in the chairship which will last until early 2027.

It had been decided earlier this month that the transfer of the chair would take place completely virtually, sidestepping what could have been an extremely difficult situation based on three factors. The first being the ongoing question of Russia’s downgraded role within the group, in the wake of its illegal 2022 full invasion of Ukraine. The second being the soured relationship between the United States and Canada as well as between Washington and Copenhagen and Nuuk over the Trump government’s land grab policy towards Greenland. The third being the high likelihood that the United States will decline to support any Council initiatives which mention climate change, which is still touted by the current occupant of the White House as fictional, despite mounting evidence to the contrary and it being the central concern in the Arctic.

Other Arctic-related questions facing the next Canadian government includes the future of strategic agreements ranging from NATO and NORAD to the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ‘ICE Pact’, agreement struck between Canada, Finland and the United States in July last year. Since re-assuming office, the Trump government’s icebreaker policy has been mercurial at best, including an odd promise this past February that the US would somehow produce ‘forty’ icebreakers for the American Coast guard, despite a lack of means or infrastructure for doing so. This month, it was reported that the US and Finland may strike a side deal for the American purchase of five Finnish icebreaking vessels, and where Canada might fit into that endeavour was unclear.

After a short (but unusual) election season in Canada, which has greatly galvanised the public thus far, the Arctic will be a major part of local, and regional, scrutiny over the policy directions taken by Ottawa in the coming months.

‘Awake, Chaos: We Have Napped’: Security Order and Disorder in the Arctic

February 1, 2025February 1, 2025 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

This year’s Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø began on a hopeful note, (as the city was spared the windstorms which plagued the event last year). The theme of the conference, ‘Beyond Borders’, had multiple meanings, given that many of the challenges facing the far north are not restricted to any one part of it, including climate change and development questions. The title though could also refer to the fact that more security risks in the region are not constrained by national sovereignty, and that boundaries actual and virtual are now being constantly tested and sometimes breached.

It was no surprise that although in previous years the conference had previously focused on business and economic development as well as scientific areas, like the Arctic Circle conference in October last year, this Arctic Frontiers event adopted a greater focus on regional security. Greenland, predictably, was a frequent topic both in panels and in hallway discussions. In late December last year, incoming US President Donald Trump revisited the failed ‘buy Greenland’ proposal from 2019 by posting that ‘the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity’. The statement, which was doubled down in a Christmas post sending greetings to Greenland, ‘which is needed by the United States for National Security purposes,’ further underscored that the island was to be viewed by the incoming American administration solely as a strategic asset.

Moreover, stress levels were raised when the new US president refused to rule out force to take not only Greenland but also the Panama Canal, which was also cited as being unfairly taken from US control in the 1970s. There was also a threat to use tariffs to coerce Denmark into agreeing to a potential transfer, a move which would likely invite a response by the whole of the European Union. The revival of the buy Greenland trope resulted in reminders from both the Greenlandic and Danish governments that the island was not for sale, along with sometimes vitriolic responses from elsewhere in Europe.

Since the prospect of the United States purchasing Greenland was first reported in 2019, the issue had gone on to represent two of the most negative aspects of American foreign policy during the first Trump administration, namely a glaringly transactional approach to diplomacy, at times veering into aggressive zero-sum calculations, and disdain for / ignorance of international laws and norms, (and in this case, Greenlandic history and ontological security concerns). By once again bringing up this hapless policy direction, a third facet of Trumpian foreign policy reappeared in the Arctic: an unwillingness to learn from previous mistakes.

Approaching the Danish government to buy Greenland was and is in contravention of the 2009 Self-Government Act between Copenhagen and Nuuk, which enshrined Greenland’s right of self-determination. Specifically, Section 21(1) in the document states that ‘Decisions regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland’.

As well, a specious but still oft-repeated argument that since Washington had attempted to procure Greenland in the past, by default it can do so again, fails to acknowledge the evolution of international law since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially relating to de-colonisation. This includes the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since the initial 2019 proposal, Greenlandic policymakers and the current government of Prime Minister Múte B. Egede, have frequently used the term ‘nothing about us, without us’ to stress the importance of including Greenlanders in affairs which directly impact them.

There have been numerous reasons mooted as to why the Greenland issue has reappeared, including ersatz imperialism (along with an odd nostalgia for the late nineteenth century expansionist period, aka the ‘Gilded Age’, in American history), an acknowledgement of the resource potential of the island (including strategic materials like rare earths), and a desire to create a strategic buffer zone for US interests in the Arctic to discourage incursions by great power adversaries, with Trump making vague references to ‘Russia and China boats’ in the region.

This latter argument waves aside the fact that the United States already has extensive monitoring capabilities in Greenland, including via the US Space Force base at Pituffik (formerly Thule). This facility has grown in importance given concerns about North Atlantic security, and especially the region’s GIUK Gap, which like during the cold war is seen as a vulnerable space for Russian maritime incursions. As well, NATO, including with the addition of new members Finland and Sweden, has also begun to focus more intensely on observing and securing the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

As Nuuk continues to pursue a policy of eventual independence from the Danish realm, relations with the US were seen as essential for a sovereign Greenland’s foreign policy. The Greenlandic government’s February 2024 foreign and security policy document called for a reduction of trade barriers with the US, enhanced cooperation in several key economic sectors including infrastructure, transportation, mining and tourism, and a revision of the 1951 Defence Agreement between Washington and Copenhagen to allow for a greater say by the Greenlandic government. Nuuk has also sought to diversify its trading partners, including the US, as a precursor to independence.

^{Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair Sara Olsvig speaking at a ‘Big Picture’ session at Arctic Frontiers [Photo via David Jensen / Arctic Frontiers]}

How these proposals will be reconciled with what appears to be an emerging maximalist approach towards Nuuk by the Trump government is now an open question. Unlike in 2019, the Trump government thus far has shown little sign of dropping the matter, with reports of a heated phone conversation between Trump and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen last month over the controversy, the 8 January introduction of a US House of Representatives bill ‘to secure the acquisition of Greenland by the United States,’ with no mention of the interests of Greenland’s 57,000 citizens. In an interview this week by the new Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, he said the plan to obtain Greenland was ‘not a joke’.

Despite arguments by the American leadership to the contrary, a poll released this week suggested that 85% of those surveyed in Greenland did not want to join the United States, and another poll indicated that 46% of Danes surveyed now viewed the US under Trump as a threat, a higher number than North Korea.

During the Arctic Fronters conference, Sara Olsvig, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, reiterated a point made in an ICC statement on 27 January: ‘There is no such thing as the better coloniser’.

Despite not yet taking office, Trump had previously declared that there would be reversals of previous Arctic-related policies, including in Alaska. The incoming administration had already expressed support for oil drilling in the state’s National Wildlife Refuge, (with the Republican governor of Alaska reportedly advocating the removal of fossil fuel extraction restrictions). Trump also called for a reversal of the 2015 decision under President Barack Obama to change the name of Alaska’s highest peak to its traditional Indigenous name, Denali. Trump called for the mountain to be renamed Mount McKinley in honour of the former US president, who was widely known as an avid economic protectionist as well as overseeing a considerable expansion of American overseas territory, (Hawai’i, for example, was annexed during his administration, in 1898).

The revisiting of the ‘buy Greenland’ controversy comes at a fraught time for the Arctic, given the potential for geopolitical spillover of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine into the far north, and the possibility of increased military activity in both the North Atlantic and North Pacific.

There have also been considerable strains between the Trump government and another NATO member, Canada. The US now threatens to implement a 25% tariff on Canadian goods, on unsound policy grounds, including even potentially on petroleum, in the aftermath of a series of taunts by the American leader that Canada should just become the ’51^st state’ of the US.

^{Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre speaking on regional geopolitics at the University of Tromsø campus, January 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

In May 2025, the Arctic Council chair will be passed from Norway to the Danish Kingdom. Earlier this month, after much debate, the Danish government agreed to appoint an Arctic Ambassador from Greenland, and it was decided that Greenlandic foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt would act as Council chair. Copenhagen has also expressed concern, including via the most recent threat assessment report published in December last year by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, about the deteriorating security situation in the North Atlantic, including Russian maritime incursions, espionage, and the opportunities for closer Sino-Russian cooperation. Cooled relations between the US and two NATO members critical to Arctic security have the potential to spill over into these deliberations.

The Arctic Council is already facing aftershocks from a reduced Russian role in the group’s deliberations, but now there is also the spectre of the US repeating its failed diplomacy at the 2019 Rovaniemi summit, which was effectively scuttled when the US delegation refused to support a final statement which mentioned climate change. In both previous and updated Trump policies, climate change has been falsely described as a fiction. Predictably, upon arrival in office the Trump government announced that it would again withdraw from the Paris global environmental accords.

^{The detained vessel Silver Dania (centre) docked in Tromsø [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

As strains on various areas of Arctic cooperation continue, another reminder of the nebulous nature of regional security, along with ‘grey zone’ threats, appeared in Tromsø just as the conference was wrapping up. In the latest in a string of undersea cable cutting incidents, a Norwegian-owned, Russian-crewed vessel, the Silver Dania, was impounded this week by the Norway Coast Guard on suspicion that it was involved in the recent damage to a fibre-optic cable in the Baltic Sea between the Swedish island of Gotland and the Latvian coast. The ship was briefly held in a Tromsø port before being released after a statement was made that no evidence of the ship’s complicity in the incident was found.

A Sharp Right Turn: The Arctic Faces Trump 2.0

November 9, 2024November 10, 2024 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

Much of the world is now bracing for yet another period of uncertainty and potential chaos in the wake of the election victory of Donald Trump in the United States last week. The incoming president’s previous foreign policy platforms were based on widespread disengagement and at times isolationism, questioning American multilateralism, while habitually praising autocratic leaders and criticising US friends and allies, while promising a more transactional approach to diplomacy. The twice-impeached President-elect’s return is likely to have global effects certain to spill over into the Arctic in many ways. This at time when the far north is facing some its most complex security challenges since the cold war along with the ongoing threat of climate change.

One of the most visible policy divides between the Democratic and Republican parties has been over climate change policies, especially after Trump became the dominant voice in the latter. Even before becoming a presidential candidate, Trump had derided climate change as a fiction, with efforts to curb carbon emissions framed as being directly against US political and economic interests. During his first term in office, several domestic environmental rules and protocols were overturned, and Trump pulled the United States out of the 2016 Paris Climate Accords. His government essentially derailed the Arctic Council’s now-notorious May 2019 Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi when the American delegation refused to support any joint declaration which even mentioned climate change.

President Joe Biden attempted to reverse these policies, bringing the US back to the Paris agreement upon assuming office in 2021, and making climate change one of four pillars in his administration’s Arctic policies announced in October 2022 (along with security, sustainable development and regional and international cooperation), while appointing Dr Michael Sfraga as the country’s first Arctic Ambassador at Large.

^{Michael Sfraga, US Arctic Ambassador at Large, speaking at the October 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly, October 2024 [Photo via the Arctic Circle]}

However, signs have already appeared that President-elect Trump is again seeking to push forward a denial policy, including once again removing the United States from the Paris agreement, and pursuing a fossil fuel-centred energy policy while downgrading clean energy policies. There are also worries that the incoming government could also pull the US out of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which would further ostracize Washington from global climate change dialogues and likely also diminish American policy voices in the Arctic. These possibilities may affect the dialogue about to begin this week at the COP29 environmental conference in Baku, which is expected to concentrate on climate finance matters, namely the allocation of funds for developing countries to address environmental threats.

Alaska, which voted solidly for Trump in this election, is likely to be another environmental front line, especially oil and gas drilling. After the first Trump government sought to open up protected areas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to fossil fuel extraction. Last week, the Biden administration started taking steps to ‘Trump-proof’ the refuge by complicating any attempts by the next government to open up drilling projects there.

The future of NATO under a Trump presidency is now clouded, given the incoming leader’s history of antipathy towards the alliance and the preference of some within his inner circle to downgrade Europe as an American security priority in favour of the Asia-Pacific. Trump had even weighed the possibility of the United States leaving NATO altogether, an option which may return despite attempts by the US Congress to set up a legal firewall against such a possibility.

In February this year, Trump in a speech openly called for Russia ‘to do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO member seen as lagging behind on increases to national defence spending. This year, six out of the seven NATO states in the Arctic have spent more than the preferred two percent of GDP minimum. Canada is the exception at about 1.34%, and with the Justin Trudeau government calling for the country to reach the two percent threshold only in 2032, a stance sure to raise ire with the incoming US administration.

^{Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels, October 2024 [Photo via NATO]}

A related concern is how the incoming Trump government will shift policies towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a candidate, Trump had vowed that he could end the conflict within twenty-four hours. Critics have worried that this would mean a peace deal which would validate Russian land seizures and possibly keep Ukraine out of NATO and thus perpetually vulnerable to future attacks, especially since Trump has consistently refused to openly condemn the Putin regime for seeking to annex Ukraine. There have also been suggestions that the incoming US government may ease sanctions on Russian Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG) projects. Even if the new administration does not follow through on its threat to leave the alliance, trans-Atlantic relations are likely to become more brittle, at the time when NATO is starting to pay much closer attention to Arctic regional threats.

During the first Trump government, the US sought a more unilateral Arctic policy which dismissed environmental concerns and placed emphasis on assuring great regional security and American economic interests. The results were mixed at best, starting with the tragicomic proposal in 2019 by the Trump government that the US should outright purchase the island of Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark, which would have been in contravention of the 2009 Greenland Self Government Act, especially Section 21(1) – ‘Decisions regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland.’ That affair further illustrated both the transactional and low information aspects of the first Trump administration.

^{The American Corner at Ilisimatusarfik – University of Greenland, Nuuk [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Under Trump, the long-muted disagreement between Ottawa and Washington over the legal status of the Northwest Passage spilled into the open during the Rovaniemi meeting, and there is now the possibility of that dispute again complicating cross-border relations. The Trudeau government is finalising a revised Arctic policy for publication by next month, which would include the naming of a new Canadian Arctic Ambassador.

The icebreaker debate is likely to be revived under the new administration, as well as a resumption of the at best erratic approach to the issue seen during the previous Trump government. In 2020, a memo released by the Trump government included orders for a ‘fleet’ of new icebreakers be in place by 2029. Thus far, no new icebreakers have been deployed, and of the two polar-capable ice vessels the US Coast Guard currently operates, the heavy icebreaker Polar Star was commissioned in the early 1970s, and the Healy had to undergo extensive repairs before resuming its work this October.

^{The nuclear-powered Russian icebreaker Chukotka, November 2024 [Photo via Wikipedia]}

Last July, the Biden government endeavoured to address this shortcoming, and promote greater cross-border Arctic cooperation, by cosigning the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, also known as the ICE Pact, with the governments of Canada and Finland to jointly build icebreakers for their use as well as potentially for sale to other regional allies. Balance of power was very much one goal in mind as Moscow continues to develop its own icebreaker fleet, with Russia’s newest nuclear-powered icebreaking ship, Chukotka (Чукотка) launching last week, and China’s fourth icebreaker, the Jidi (极地) / Polar Region, was completed in June of this year. Whether this agreement will withstand a Trump presidency’s derision for multilateral cooperation, especially in strategic matters, is an open question.

As the Rovaniemi summit illustrated, the incoming Trump government’s relationship with the Arctic Council may also be precarious. In 2025, the chair of the group will rotate from Norway to Denmark, (with debates ongoing as to what degree Greenland should participate), with the Russia question likely hovering over those proceedings. Russia engagement with the Council has been limited since early 2022, and reports surfacing last month that Russian climate change data was being purposefully withheld from elsewhere in the region has been a direct knock on the Council’s main mandate to promote far north environmental protection.

Meanwhile, since its full invasion of Ukraine two years ago, Russia has been more open to closer Arctic cooperation with China, India, and potentially other fellow members of the expanded BRICS group. American disengagement from the Council could place the group in a much weaker position, both in terms of its abilities to address Arctic environmental challenges and to act as a town hall for regional summitry.

There are still many uncertainties as to what degree the incoming US president’s bombastic and often undiplomatic rhetoric will ultimately become policy next year. Based on Trump’s previous tenure, the next term could nonetheless spell a difficult time for the Arctic, on several fronts. How the region, and not just its governments, will respond is a crucial question which will soon need to be answered.

Arctic Circle 2024: Days of Insecurity

November 2, 2024November 2, 2024 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

Since 2022, and arguably even before that, security and ‘hard politics’ issues have been growing in visibility amongst the myriad subjects covered by the Arctic Circle Assembly. This year however marked a watershed, as military affairs dominated many of the plenaries and panels in Reykjavík, with geopolitics and risk assessments being talked about at length in meeting rooms and hallways alike, along with concerns aired about which regional research areas may be ‘dual use’ (civilian / military) in nature. As Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stressed in his keynote speech [video], regional organisations, in the Arctic and beyond, were being severely tested, not least by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as he described the collisions being seen by the effects of Arctic ice loss and growing strategic and economic interests in the region.

As with last year, there were no representatives from the Russian Federation at the conference, but Moscow was not far from many deliberations, along with questions about spillover of Russia’s regional enmity with the expanded NATO and deepening contacts with China. The joint bomber manoeuvres between Russian and Chinese militaries off the Alaskan coast in July this year, the reported entry of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the Arctic Ocean earlier this month in cooperation with Russian counterparts, with calls for future such initiatives, and the possibility of a BRICS research station, overseen by Russia, on Svalbard, have only amplified questions about how close the two powers were becoming in the Arctic.

Admiral Robert Bauer of NATO, a returning speaker, nodded to his previous predictions about Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and also pointed to emerging cooperation in ‘minerals and shipping routes’ as potential strategic risks, (despite ongoing policy differences between the two powers which has hampered deeper collaboration, including in energy policy). He also suggested that China’s Arctic agenda remained opaque, and this at a time when Beijing is seeking to re-enter northern discourses after a pause in many regional activities caused by the pandemic and Chinese ‘zero-Covid’ policies.

Days before the start of the ACA, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) held a small seminar series in the University of Akureyri in Northern Iceland, which included a tour of the China-Iceland Science Observatory (CIAO), specialising in atmospheric and aurora research, in nearby Karhóll. Despite officially opening in 2018, the station remains only under partial operation, with monitoring equipment still to be installed. In recent months, the station has also been named, along with China’s Yellow River Station, as a potential dual use concern.

^{China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory, Kárhóll, Iceland [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

The CNARC conference itself placed a major focus on potential research partnerships between Chinese and Nordic sectors, including climate change research, agriculture, energy and tourism. There were numerous calls for improved cross-regional science diplomacy, with criticisms of a ‘cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) on the part of Western governments seen as blocking civilian cooperation, being common themes of the presentations.

In keeping with previous conference themes, as well as the initial aim of the ACA to open northern affairs to parts of world well beyond the far north, several non-Arctic states were placed in the spotlight, most prominently India and Italy. During an interview with the conference’s host, former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna, outlined Indian interests in the Polar Regions, (the country had published its Arctic governmental policy paper in early 2022, and has been an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013).

RADM Prasanna noted that the history of India’s interests in the Arctic stretched well back into the last century, with the country signing the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, adding that environmental conditions in the Arctic can and have had effects on local Indian climate, and that steps were being taken to better coordinate governmental offices in understanding the country’s relationships with the Polar Regions. It was confirmed that Delhi will host the next Arctic Circle Forum in April next year, (with Rome confirmed for December 2025).

^{Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]}

India’s fellow BRICS member, Brazil, which has been developing a stronger Arctic research presence in recent years, was also a featured non-Arctic state this year, spearheaded by a panel on ‘Brazil as a Polar Country’ hosted by the Polar and Climatic Centre, Universidad Federal de Río Grande del Sur, in Porto Alegre. One facet of the widening discussions about geopolitics in the Arctic has been that the number of non-Arctic actors seeking a regional presence continues to grow.

Following on from the Arctic Circle’s 2023 forum in Tokyo, which promised a future focus on Asia-Arctic diplomacy from the conference organisation, senior representatives from China, Japan and Singapore also presented updated policy statements, with Beijing’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, given a prominent spot in the opening keynote speeches. Mr Liu, appointed to the position in January this year, stated that the region was faces two challenges in the form of climate change and ‘geopolitical context’, called for the responsible economic development of the Arctic, including through the Polar Silk Road model, as well as for regional institutions to accelerate their agendas with help from non-Arctic actors.

These presentations by Chinese specialists and officials at both CNARC and the ACA further suggested that Beijing was taking a ‘back to basics’ approach as it returns to the Arctic, stressing the country’s developing scientific capabilities, especially in fields of climate change [in Chinese] research.

^{Chinese Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, and Arctic Circle Assembly Chair Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson}*^{[Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]}*

The busy schedule of the conference this year also included two adjacent initiatives, namely the Polar Dialogue, created to facilitate dialogues between experts in the Polar Regions and the Himalayas, the latter region being touted as the centrepiece of the ‘Third Pole’ initiative which the ACA has sought to develop, including at last January’s Forum in Abu Dhabi. The second set of concurrent sessions were held under the Business Forum, which featured speeches by regional CEOs and economic leaders and an emphasis on the regional green transition.

Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a frequent participant in the Assembly and oftentimes critic of Donald Trump, received [video] this year’s Arctic Circle Prize for playing ‘a pivotal role in shaping US national policies that address pressing challenges such as national security, food security, and infrastructure development’. The annual Frederik Paulsen Arctic Academic Action Award was given this year to the Biosink Project, which is seeking ways of reducing methane emissions in the far north, and overseen by AProf Alexander Tøsdal Tveit (UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø), Prof Lisa Stein (University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Fang Qian (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA).

^{Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland delivers a keynote speech at the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Political and strategic shifts in the Arctic are not being limited to the effects of the divisions between Russia and the West. In May next year there will be a transfer of the Arctic Council’s chair position from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, (with Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland [in Danish] tapped to take the lead in deliberations, in recognition of the island’s geography). Also significant will be the upcoming elections amongst Arctic states. Icelanders will be going to the polls at the end of this month, with at least ten parties contesting for parliamentary seats. Norway is heading into an election in September next year with the Conservative Party (Høyre) leading [in Norwegian] many polls at it seeks a political comeback. Canada must also hold a federal election by October 2025, (but it could now happen much earlier).

Finally, the ACA took place in waning days of a divisive election campaign in the United States, the results of which might soon drastically alter American foreign and security policy, including in the Arctic, going forward.