BRICS – Over the Circle

^{Harpa Concert Hall, site of the Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Since 2022, and arguably even before that, security and ‘hard politics’ issues have been growing in visibility amongst the myriad subjects covered by the Arctic Circle Assembly. This year however marked a watershed, as military affairs dominated many of the plenaries and panels in Reykjavík, with geopolitics and risk assessments being talked about at length in meeting rooms and hallways alike, along with concerns aired about which regional research areas may be ‘dual use’ (civilian / military) in nature. As Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stressed in his keynote speech [video], regional organisations, in the Arctic and beyond, were being severely tested, not least by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as he described the collisions being seen by the effects of Arctic ice loss and growing strategic and economic interests in the region.

As with last year, there were no representatives from the Russian Federation at the conference, but Moscow was not far from many deliberations, along with questions about spillover of Russia’s regional enmity with the expanded NATO and deepening contacts with China. The joint bomber manoeuvres between Russian and Chinese militaries off the Alaskan coast in July this year, the reported entry of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the Arctic Ocean earlier this month in cooperation with Russian counterparts, with calls for future such initiatives, and the possibility of a BRICS research station, overseen by Russia, on Svalbard, have only amplified questions about how close the two powers were becoming in the Arctic.

Admiral Robert Bauer of NATO, a returning speaker, nodded to his previous predictions about Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and also pointed to emerging cooperation in ‘minerals and shipping routes’ as potential strategic risks, (despite ongoing policy differences between the two powers which has hampered deeper collaboration, including in energy policy). He also suggested that China’s Arctic agenda remained opaque, and this at a time when Beijing is seeking to re-enter northern discourses after a pause in many regional activities caused by the pandemic and Chinese ‘zero-Covid’ policies.

Days before the start of the ACA, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) held a small seminar series in the University of Akureyri in Northern Iceland, which included a tour of the China-Iceland Science Observatory (CIAO), specialising in atmospheric and aurora research, in nearby Karhóll. Despite officially opening in 2018, the station remains only under partial operation, with monitoring equipment still to be installed. In recent months, the station has also been named, along with China’s Yellow River Station, as a potential dual use concern.

^{China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory, Kárhóll, Iceland [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

The CNARC conference itself placed a major focus on potential research partnerships between Chinese and Nordic sectors, including climate change research, agriculture, energy and tourism. There were numerous calls for improved cross-regional science diplomacy, with criticisms of a ‘cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) on the part of Western governments seen as blocking civilian cooperation, being common themes of the presentations.

In keeping with previous conference themes, as well as the initial aim of the ACA to open northern affairs to parts of world well beyond the far north, several non-Arctic states were placed in the spotlight, most prominently India and Italy. During an interview with the conference’s host, former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna, outlined Indian interests in the Polar Regions, (the country had published its Arctic governmental policy paper in early 2022, and has been an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013).

RADM Prasanna noted that the history of India’s interests in the Arctic stretched well back into the last century, with the country signing the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, adding that environmental conditions in the Arctic can and have had effects on local Indian climate, and that steps were being taken to better coordinate governmental offices in understanding the country’s relationships with the Polar Regions. It was confirmed that Delhi will host the next Arctic Circle Forum in April next year, (with Rome confirmed for December 2025).

^{Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]}

India’s fellow BRICS member, Brazil, which has been developing a stronger Arctic research presence in recent years, was also a featured non-Arctic state this year, spearheaded by a panel on ‘Brazil as a Polar Country’ hosted by the Polar and Climatic Centre, Universidad Federal de Río Grande del Sur, in Porto Alegre. One facet of the widening discussions about geopolitics in the Arctic has been that the number of non-Arctic actors seeking a regional presence continues to grow.

Following on from the Arctic Circle’s 2023 forum in Tokyo, which promised a future focus on Asia-Arctic diplomacy from the conference organisation, senior representatives from China, Japan and Singapore also presented updated policy statements, with Beijing’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, given a prominent spot in the opening keynote speeches. Mr Liu, appointed to the position in January this year, stated that the region was faces two challenges in the form of climate change and ‘geopolitical context’, called for the responsible economic development of the Arctic, including through the Polar Silk Road model, as well as for regional institutions to accelerate their agendas with help from non-Arctic actors.

These presentations by Chinese specialists and officials at both CNARC and the ACA further suggested that Beijing was taking a ‘back to basics’ approach as it returns to the Arctic, stressing the country’s developing scientific capabilities, especially in fields of climate change [in Chinese] research.

^{Chinese Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, and Arctic Circle Assembly Chair Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson}*^{[Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]}*

The busy schedule of the conference this year also included two adjacent initiatives, namely the Polar Dialogue, created to facilitate dialogues between experts in the Polar Regions and the Himalayas, the latter region being touted as the centrepiece of the ‘Third Pole’ initiative which the ACA has sought to develop, including at last January’s Forum in Abu Dhabi. The second set of concurrent sessions were held under the Business Forum, which featured speeches by regional CEOs and economic leaders and an emphasis on the regional green transition.

Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a frequent participant in the Assembly and oftentimes critic of Donald Trump, received [video] this year’s Arctic Circle Prize for playing ‘a pivotal role in shaping US national policies that address pressing challenges such as national security, food security, and infrastructure development’. The annual Frederik Paulsen Arctic Academic Action Award was given this year to the Biosink Project, which is seeking ways of reducing methane emissions in the far north, and overseen by AProf Alexander Tøsdal Tveit (UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø), Prof Lisa Stein (University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Fang Qian (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA).

^{Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland delivers a keynote speech at the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Political and strategic shifts in the Arctic are not being limited to the effects of the divisions between Russia and the West. In May next year there will be a transfer of the Arctic Council’s chair position from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, (with Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland [in Danish] tapped to take the lead in deliberations, in recognition of the island’s geography). Also significant will be the upcoming elections amongst Arctic states. Icelanders will be going to the polls at the end of this month, with at least ten parties contesting for parliamentary seats. Norway is heading into an election in September next year with the Conservative Party (Høyre) leading [in Norwegian] many polls at it seeks a political comeback. Canada must also hold a federal election by October 2025, (but it could now happen much earlier).

Finally, the ACA took place in waning days of a divisive election campaign in the United States, the results of which might soon drastically alter American foreign and security policy, including in the Arctic, going forward.

by Marc Lanteigne

Although there remains much conventional wisdom which still considers the Arctic to be only loosely situated within international law, and potentially subject to an inevitable competition over influence and resources, like any other body of water the legal framework of the Arctic, (including the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea) or UNCLOS, is extensive and robust. That does not, however, grant these frameworks freedom from complete immunity to challenges or reinterpretation. The islands of Svalbard, north of Norway, are fast becoming a case example of a collision between traditional laws and norms on one side, and modern strategic realities on the other.

The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty of 1920 recognized the islands as part of the Kingdom of Norway, granting the country sovereignty over the archipelago, but also permitting other Treaty signatories to engage in economic and scientific activities there. Actions taken for ‘warlike purposes’ in Svalbard are forbidden under Article IX of the Treaty, including a ban on naval bases. However, the specifics of that article have been open to interpretation, as according to the Norwegian government the need to protect the sovereignty of the islands necessitates defensive policies and civilian policing, including via the Norwegian Coast Guard. Under this legal structure, during the past century the islands have evolved as a hub for various areas of international civilian research on the Arctic and its environment.

There are currently forty-six parties to the Treaty, including the United States, China, Russia, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, Poland, South Korea and the United Kingdom. The government of Türkiye (Turkey) agreed [in Turkish] to become a party as of October 2023, although there were previous signs that local media were overestimating the rights the country had to access resources on the islands, given Norway’s right to regulate economic activities on environmental grounds. North Korea became an unlikely signatory in 2016.

Roughly every decade, of late, the Norwegian government has published a White Paper on Svalbard policy, with the previous document released in 2016. Much has changed, however, in the realm of Arctic security over the past eight years. The deteriorated relations between Russia and the West since the full Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022, the expansion of NATO into the Arctic with the membership of Finland and Sweden, and the slowdown of Arctic Council activities in light of the precarious state of communications with Moscow, have all contributed to concerns about the ‘return’ of hard power politics and zero-sum games in the far north. Thus, the publication of the newest Svalbard White Paper last month was sure to draw both national and international scrutiny.

This revised White Paper [pdf], ‘Meld. St. 26 (2023-2024) – Melding til Stortinget’ (‘Report to Parliament’) acknowledged, without specifics, the changed security milieu surrounding the islands, stating in Section 1.1 that ‘The security policy situation globally and in our immediate area is characterized by greater seriousness and greater unpredictability than when the previous Svalbard report was presented in 2016, and an increased geopolitical tension which originates outside the northern areas are now also felt in local areas.’

Accordingly, the overreaching tone of the document was stressing the need for Norway to strengthen its sovereignty over the islands. The main topics cited were improved government control over infrastructure and energy policies (with a focus on developing renewables), the need for population regulation to prevent further local environmental strains, and the wider issues of climate change threats. As the paper was being released, Norway’s Justice and Public Security Minister, Emilie Enger Mehl, commented that ‘the governance of Svalbard must continue to be predictable and maintain a steady course.’ This at a time when predictability is becoming rare coin in the far north.

Another theme in the latest Svalbard paper which, although seemingly very innocuous, carries a great deal of political weight, is the call for the Norwegian government to exercise greater sovereignty over research activities on the islands. For decades there have been extensive domestic and international research programmes in Svalbard, heavily concentrated in the community of Ny-Ålesund, including via facilities overseen by institutions including those from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The Polar Research Institute of China opened [in Chinese] its Yellow River Station [in Chinese] (Huanghe zhan 黄河站) at the site in late 2003, and India’s Himadri Station has been operational since 2008.

^{China’s Yellow River Station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

^{India’s Himadri Station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Although Arctic research in the physical sciences is permitted by Treaty parties, there have been differences between Oslo and other governments over whether research outside of the physical sciences should be allowed, and these rifts have started to become more pronounced.

In early 2019, The Norwegian Research Council, which advises the country’s governments on research strategy and planning, published a research strategy [pdf] for Ny-Ålesund. Amongst the plan’s statements was the point, in Section 4, that ‘research is to be within the natural sciences,’ with the one exception being research into local cultural heritage. This statement has since been interpreted in Norway as an informal rule that research at the site is to be restricted to the natural sciences, implying that Norwegian authorities have the right, based on sovereignty rights granted in the Treaty, to interdict social science research.

This stipulation is only loosely based on the original 1920 Treaty, however. Reflecting the times, Article V in that document affirmed that Treaty parties ‘recognise the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories.’ The Article also stated, ‘Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said territories.’

Some governments, including those of Russia and China, have been critical of these limitations, and have accused the Norwegian government of overstepping the Treaty by setting what they view as artificial restrictions on research parameters. The Norwegian government, for its part, has sought to better supervise research on Svalbard at a time when many questions regarding the rise of ‘dual use’ data gathering, (i.e. research which could be used for both civilian and military purposes, and also could be used in a manner representing a threat to national interests), are proliferating in security policy circles, including in the Arctic.

^{Flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics flying at the Barentsburg settlement in Svalbard}
^{[Photo by Claudia Cheng, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway]}

Russian authorities have pushed back on Norway’s stipulations regarding research, and this has been one factor of Moscow’s ongoing complaints that Russia’s legal rights regarding the islands were being curtailed [in Norwegian] by Norway. These differences were only magnified after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with one incident taking place in December last year when the Russian government protested restrictions on research activities by a Murmansk-based research vessel, the Dalniye Zelentsy (Дальние Зеленцы) near Svalbard, which resulted in the vessel being barred from the islands’ territorial waters out of concerns that its research could have dual use implications.

China’s Beijing-based Arctic and Antarctic Administration [in Chinese] (国家海洋局极地考察办公室 Guojia haiyang jujidi kaocha banggongshi) was quick to take exception [in Norwegian] to the de facto ban on social science research at Ny-Ålesund, arguing that this restriction was not compatible with the terms of the 1920 Treaty, especially the preamble which promises an ‘equitable regime’ amongst participating parties. Chinese assertiveness on this matter was seen in Norway as a shift away [in Norwegian] from the country’s more muted approach to Svalbard engagement, and also taking place at a time when Beijing was seeking to expand its own Arctic interests, including by commencing work since 2017 towards constructing a ‘Polar Silk Road’ as the northern tier of Beijing’s Belt and Road economic development initiatives.

As well, as a 2021 article in the journal Marine Policy explained, China’s development as a great power, and its growing presence in the Arctic, have made the country not only more interested in becoming a regional stakeholder, but also in developing as an overall ‘interpretive power’, with the capability to construe international laws more in line with its own interests. China’s pushing back on Norwegian interpretations of the Spitsbergen Treaty is an example of this. A more recent (September 2024) article in Marine Policy described China’s concerns about Norwegian rule-setting over Svalbard as a reaction to Oslo seeking to ‘improve research coordination’ on the islands. However, contemporary Chinese studies have suggested a more specific set of grievances in Beijing regarding Norwegian Svalbard regulations.

For example, a 2020 article in Pacific Journal (太平洋学报) argued that Norway was using its role as guarantor of Svalbard to restrict activities of other signatories, as well as the tendency of Norway to assume a literal interpretation of the 1920 Treaty which restricts activities of other signatories. The study instead called upon Norway to take an ‘evolutionary approach’ (进化解释 jinhua jieshi) to the Treaty which reflects modern concerns. A 2021 study in the journal Contemporary Law Review (当代法学) called into question whether Norway was using environmental regulations as a way of micromanaging economic policies on Svalbard, as well as using restrictions on scientific activities to disadvantage other parties. All of which were seen by this study as contravening the ‘equitable system’ (公平制度 gongping zhidu) structure promised in the original Treaty. China’s 2018 government White Paper on the Arctic also noted that as a Treaty signatory, the country gained ‘the right under conditions of equality,’ to engage in both research and commercial activities.

^{Entrance to the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), Longyearbyen [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Attempts by the Norwegian government to increase regulation of research activities in Svalbard is not a new phenomenon. Oslo had been concerned about ensuring that it had proper oversight of research on the islands. Article 3.2.6 of the 2016 White Paper stressed that ‘Nationals of the parties to the Treaty have neither a right nor equal right to conduct research activities in the archipelago,’ and that ‘research activities in Svalbard must be conducted in line with relevant Norwegian regulations, including the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act’.

Article 8.2.2 of the document also noted ‘the growing international interest in research in Svalbard contributes to knowledge development in the Arctic. The objective is for this to happen in accordance with Norwegian research policy, which places emphasis on international research and infrastructure cooperation and on open access to data and publications.’

The follow-up 2024 paper only doubled down on these regulations, with the report (Article 5.4.1), stating ‘Research activity and educational provision must be based on the natural advantages that Svalbard’s location provides, i.e. that climate, nature and the environment must be focus areas. The activity must be of such a nature that it can only or best be carried out on Svalbard.’

The paper’s section on research activities [in Norwegian] confirmed that higher education in the islands would be continue to provided solely by the Norwegian state-owned University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), which has operated in the capital of Longyearbyen since 1993. As well, the White Paper announced the planned creation of a dedicated Svalbard research office directed by the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian Polar Institute in order to facilitate ‘clearer’ research activities on the islands and to provide annual reporting on local research endeavours.

While Norway has been seeking to clarify and assert its rights in Svalbard, since last year Russia has been seeking, as part of its larger plan to develop alternative Arctic partners to potentially open an alternative scientific base at the sparsely populated Russian town of Pyramiden on Svalbard, perhaps as early as the end of 2024 [in Russian], with possible branches elsewhere, including the other main Russian town on Svalbard, Barentsburg.

Moscow has invited its partners within the recently expanded BRICS group to potentially join this project, and it was underscored that education and training would be offered there, thus potentially pushing against Norwegian regulations that UNIS be the sole provider of higher education on the islands, and that disciplines beyond natural sciences could also be studied.

^{Russian settlement at Pyramiden [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

In addition to the original members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the group added [pdf] new members at the beginning of this year (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and potentially Saudi Arabia), with other governments such as Malaysia and Thailand now also expressing interest in joining. In mid-June, a BRICS+ working group meeting was held in Murmansk, with scientists from member states discussing [in Russian] maritime and polar research, which could act as a precursor to the Pyramiden plans, and Moscow’s turning towards the BRICS group as an alternative set of regional partners is in keeping with the Vladimir Putin regime’s March 2023 foreign policy concept paper, which included [in Russian] a call for ‘mutually beneficial cooperation with non-Arctic states pursuing a constructive policy towards Russia and interested in international activities in the Arctic.’

It is not yet certain which countries will ultimately take part in the Russia research plans from Svalbard, or the eventual timetable for the opening of the facilities. Nonetheless, these potential facilities underscore the fragile nature of the legal and political structures on the islands, and the fact that Svalbard can no longer be as insulated from the growing geopolitical stresses facing the Arctic as it once was.

[The author wishes to express warm thanks to UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, and to the crew of the FF Helmer Hanssen, for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.]

Tag: BRICS

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