‘Meet Me in the Middle’: Iceland’s Next Government Coalesces

The Government House (Stjórnarráðshúsið) in Reykjavík [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

After close to seven years of an unusual left-right coalition governing Iceland, voters on 30 November decided on an extensive political housecleaning, (many after braving harsh winter weather). The outcome of the election was in some ways predictable, as the three parties which had made up the previous coalition, namely the Left-Greens (Vinstri græn) and the centre-right, longstanding Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) and Progressives (Framsóknarflokkurinn), were facing political exhaustioninfighting, and voter antipathy. Although the government had managed to navigate the country through the pandemic and resulting economic rebuilding, policy strains began to become too difficult to ignore over the past year. After being chosen to the lead the outgoing coalition in 2017, Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir stepped down from the position in April this year, and then made an unsuccessful attempt to instead run for president.

Her successor, Bjarni Benediktsson of Independence, and a former finance minister, tried in vain to keep the coalition together despite unpopularity and growing splits with the Left-Greens over several policy directionsincluding green energy, restrictions on whaling, and immigration policy, including asylum procedures. Unable to go forward under such circumstances, PM Benediktsson requested, and was granted, the option of dissolving parliament and calling for an unusual wintertime snap election.

Campaigns began at a time when Icelanders were facing questions about the health of the country’s economy, including inflation rates, and the financial aftershocks and displacement costs of the volcanic eruptions at Sundhnúkur since late 2023, (the latest eruption, the seventh thus far, began on 20 November). Polling also indicated voter concerns about housing availability, education, immigration, and transportation. 

If the Independence Party was hoping to be at the forefront of more agreeable coalition after the vote, things did not go according to plan. Eleven parties (in a country with a population of just under 400,000), were serious contenders this year. By far, the biggest winner was the Social Democratic Party (Samfylkingin) led by Kristrún Frostadóttir. The last time that party experienced such a successful election result was in 2009, when it formed a government under Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir. This in the wake of popular anger over the banking collapse and financial crisis (kreppa) which had paralysed the economy the year before and eventually brought down the previous administration of PM Geir Haarde.

The other major opposition parties also experienced significant boosts, including the centrist, pro-business, and pro-European cooperation Liberal Reform Party (Viðreisn), the populist People’s Party (Flokkur Fólksins), and the conservative Centre Party (Miðflokkurinn); all of which picked up seats in the 63-seat Alþingi. The Independence Party lost much of its previous popular vote (dropping to about 19%), but lost only two seats from its previous total. The outcome was less rosy for its erstwhile partners, however, as the Left-Greens walked away with no seats at all, while the Progressives fell from thirteen seats to five. 

As the head of the party with the most seats, as per tradition Kristrún Frostadóttir was asked by Icelandic President Halla Tómasdóttir to attempt to form a coalition government of at least 32 seats in order to assure a majority. The Social Democrats then invited the leaders of Liberal Reform and the People’s Party for cooperation negotiations this week. Despite some policy platform differences between the three parties, for example over European policy, (the People’s Party has traditionally been more Eurosceptic than the others, while Viðreisn has previously called for an eventual referendum on European Union membership for Iceland), initial negotiations began with discussions on economic policies and proposals to reduce the number of government ministries. 

[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

After the initial discussions, Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, head of Liberal Reform, and her counterpart in the People’s Party, Inga Sæland, were expressing optimism that a formal coalition government could be finalised in short order. Should this government configuration be formalised, this would only be the third time in Icelandic history that a coalition to lead the country would not include parties from the previous administration. The incoming parliament will also include an unusually large number of newcomers.

The new government may be tested early. In addition to many domestic challenges, the next Icelandic government will also face a changed regional neighbourhood, as the Arctic and North Atlantic become more of a security milieu, and the country seeks to better balance its relations with Europe and North America.

Arctic Circle 2024: Days of Insecurity

Harpa Concert Hall, site of the Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

Since 2022, and arguably even before that, security and ‘hard politics’ issues have been growing in visibility amongst the myriad subjects covered by the Arctic Circle Assembly. This year however marked a watershed, as military affairs dominated many of the plenaries and panels in Reykjavík, with geopolitics and risk assessments being talked about at length in meeting rooms and hallways alike, along with concerns aired about which regional research areas may be ‘dual use’ (civilian / military) in nature. As Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stressed in his keynote speech [video], regional organisations, in the Arctic and beyond, were being severely tested, not least by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as he described the collisions being seen by the effects of Arctic ice loss and growing strategic and economic interests in the region. 

As with last year, there were no representatives from the Russian Federation at the conference, but Moscow was not far from many deliberations, along with questions about spillover of Russia’s regional enmity with the expanded NATO and deepening contacts with China. The joint bomber manoeuvres between Russian and Chinese militaries off the Alaskan coast in July this year, the reported entry of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the Arctic Ocean earlier this month in cooperation with Russian counterparts, with calls for future such initiatives, and the possibility of a BRICS research station, overseen by Russia, on Svalbard, have only amplified questions about how close the two powers were becoming in the Arctic. 

Admiral Robert Bauer of NATO, a returning speaker, nodded to his previous predictions about Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and also pointed to emerging cooperation in ‘minerals and shipping routes’ as potential strategic risks, (despite ongoing policy differences between the two powers which has hampered deeper collaboration, including in energy policy). He also suggested that China’s Arctic agenda remained opaque, and this at a time when Beijing is seeking to re-enter northern discourses after a pause in many regional activities caused by the pandemic and Chinese ‘zero-Covid’ policies. 

Days before the start of the ACA, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) held a small seminar series in the University of Akureyri in Northern Iceland, which included a tour of the China-Iceland Science Observatory (CIAO), specialising in atmospheric and aurora research, in nearby Karhóll. Despite officially opening in 2018, the station remains only under partial operation, with monitoring equipment still to be installed. In recent months, the station has also been named, along with China’s Yellow River Station, as a potential dual use concern. 

China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory, Kárhóll, Iceland [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

The CNARC conference itself placed a major focus on potential research partnerships between Chinese and Nordic sectors, including climate change research, agriculture, energy and tourism. There were numerous calls for improved cross-regional science diplomacy, with criticisms of a ‘cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) on the part of Western governments seen as blocking civilian cooperation, being common themes of the presentations. 

In keeping with previous conference themes, as well as the initial aim of the ACA to open northern affairs to parts of world well beyond the far north, several non-Arctic states were placed in the spotlight, most prominently India and Italy. During an interview with the conference’s host, former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna, outlined Indian interests in the Polar Regions, (the country had published its Arctic governmental policy paper in early 2022, and has been an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013). 

RADM Prasanna noted that the history of India’s interests in the Arctic stretched well back into the last century, with the country signing the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, adding that environmental conditions in the Arctic can and have had effects on local Indian climate, and that steps were being taken to better coordinate governmental offices in understanding the country’s relationships with the Polar Regions. It was confirmed that Delhi will host the next Arctic Circle Forum in April next year, (with Rome confirmed for December 2025).

Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]

India’s fellow BRICS member, Brazil, which has been developing a stronger Arctic research presence in recent years, was also a featured non-Arctic state this year, spearheaded by a panel on ‘Brazil as a Polar Country’ hosted by the Polar and Climatic Centre, Universidad Federal de Río Grande del Sur, in Porto Alegre. One facet of the widening discussions about geopolitics in the Arctic has been that the number of non-Arctic actors seeking a regional presence continues to grow. 

Following on from the Arctic Circle’s 2023 forum in Tokyo, which promised a future focus on Asia-Arctic diplomacy from the conference organisation, senior representatives from China, Japan and Singapore also presented updated policy statements, with Beijing’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, given a prominent spot in the opening keynote speeches. Mr Liu, appointed to the position in January this year, stated that the region was faces two challenges in the form of climate change and ‘geopolitical context’, called for the responsible economic development of the Arctic, including through the Polar Silk Road model, as well as for regional institutions to accelerate their agendas with help from non-Arctic actors.

These presentations by Chinese specialists and officials at both CNARC and the ACA further suggested that Beijing was taking a ‘back to basics’ approach as it returns to the Arctic, stressing the country’s developing scientific capabilities, especially in fields of climate change [in Chinese] research. 

Chinese Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, and Arctic Circle Assembly Chair Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]

The busy schedule of the conference this year also included two adjacent initiatives, namely the Polar Dialogue, created to facilitate dialogues between experts in the Polar Regions and the Himalayas, the latter region being touted as the centrepiece of the ‘Third Pole’ initiative which the ACA has sought to develop, including at last January’s Forum in Abu Dhabi. The second set of concurrent sessions were held under the Business Forum, which featured speeches by regional CEOs and economic leaders and an emphasis on the regional green transition

Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a frequent participant in the Assembly and oftentimes critic of Donald Trump, received [video] this year’s Arctic Circle Prize for playing ‘a pivotal role in shaping US national policies that address pressing challenges such as national security, food security, and infrastructure development’. The annual Frederik Paulsen Arctic Academic Action Award was given this year to the Biosink Project, which is seeking ways of reducing methane emissions in the far north, and overseen by AProf Alexander Tøsdal Tveit (UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø), Prof Lisa Stein (University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Fang Qian (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA). 

Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland delivers a keynote speech at the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Political and strategic shifts in the Arctic are not being limited to the effects of the divisions between Russia and the West. In May next year there will be a transfer of the Arctic Council’s chair position from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, (with Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland [in Danish] tapped to take the lead in deliberations, in recognition of the island’s geography). Also significant will be the upcoming elections amongst Arctic states. Icelanders will be going to the polls at the end of this month, with at least ten parties contesting for parliamentary seats. Norway is heading into an election in September next year with the Conservative Party (Høyreleading [in Norwegian] many polls at it seeks a political comeback. Canada must also hold a federal election by October 2025, (but it could now happen much earlier). 

Finally, the ACA took place in waning days of a divisive election campaign in the United States, the results of which might soon drastically alter American foreign and security policy, including in the Arctic, going forward.