Tag: nato

Norway’s Arctic Policy and a Kaleidoscope Election

Over the Circle
Nordic flags at Stortinget (Norwegian Parliament), in Oslo. [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

Election season has begun in earnest in Norway, as the country now faces a host of domestic and foreign issues in the run-up to the 8 September vote. Since the end of last year, the polls have indicated a seesaw effect between the left and right coalitions. The governing centre-left Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) under Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, was facing a slump in support a year ago, largely over economic frustrations. Yet, by this summer it was leading the polls, with the far-right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in second place. 

Labour’s comeback had been partially credited to the hiring of popular politician, and former secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg as Minister of Finance, in February this year. He has since been viewed as a steady hand despite ongoing global trade tribulations and chilled relations between American and Europe. As it is extremely difficult for a single party to govern alone under Norway’s proportional representation system, the election will likely lead to a formal or informal coalition.

Local pocketbook concerns, including inflation and price increases, inequality, the value of the krone, and taxation policies, have dominated the discussions. One oddity has been the debate over the fate of Norway’s wealth tax, an especially divisive policy between the country’s left and right-wing political parties. Critics on the right have maintained that this tax, as it stands, was discouraging business expansion and innovation, and prompting the nation’s wealthiest individuals to decamp to Switzerland and elsewhere. As well, the use, or non-use, of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated worth now at US$1.9 trillion (the world’s largest in value), has traditionally been another source of intra-party debate during elections.

Norway is also facing additional economic pressures as a result of being hit with a fifteen percent tariff rate by the United States earlier this month, a rate similar to that of the European Union. Although only about 3.5% of Norwegian exports go to the US, there nonetheless remains concerns about a knock-on effect for Norway’s businesses. 

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre speaking at the UiT Tromsø campus, February 2022 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

The growing instability in world trade has also revived what was thought to be a lost issue in Norwegian political circles, namely EU membership. Norway is not an EU member, but does follow several Union policies, (Norway is a member of the Schengen agreement, for example). However, after two referendums on the subject, the most recent being in 1994, the country remained reluctant to pursue membership out of concerns about economic sovereignty, especially in relation to protecting the country’s keystone petroleum and fishing industries. The country’s participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) has allowed Norway access to Europe’s Single Market, but this arrangement does not give Oslo a say in the crafting of EU policy. 

While public opinion is still soft on the matter, concerns about Norway being isolated in global markets has revived low-level discussion of EU membership since last year. The matter is still considered a hot potato by the mainstream political parties however, as illustrated by the fracturing of the minority government in January this year when the traditionally ‘Eurosceptic’ Centre Party (Senterpartiet) left the coalition, (prompting Labour to govern alone, albeit with support from the left bloc, going into this vote), over implementation of EU energy policies.

The Conservative Party (Høyre) has traditionally been more pro-European Union in political stance, while parties on the left such as the Greens (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and the Red Party (Rødt) have been much more skeptical of membership.

Security issues are also a major factor in current Norwegian political debates due to the ongoing attempted Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing spillover of European Russian disputes into the Arctic. In October last year, the Støre government announced that it was seeking an increase in military spending up to just over 110 billion NoK (US$10.9 billion) for 2025, and that it was committed to raising defence spending to five percent of gross national product, in keeping with NATO recommendations. 

This month also saw the publication by the Norwegian government of a revised Arctic strategy, ‘Norge i Nord Nordområdepolitikken i en ny virkelighet,’ [in Norwegian], or ‘Norway in the North: High North Policy in a New Reality’, the first such policy upgrade since 2017. The document very much reflects the two biggest changes in Norwegian Arctic security policy in the last eight years, namely the post-2022 invasion of Ukraine and the addition of neighbours Finland and Sweden into NATO. 

UiT’s Tromsø campus [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

The five components elucidated in the revised policy included the protection of Norwegian Arctic sovereignty and the elaboration of security policies which reflect military and civilian interests, as well as scientific research needs, and which are compatible with international law and key organisations including the Arctic Council, the European Union, and NATO. These initiatives would take place in cooperation with Sámi and other Indigenous communities. Second, via a ‘total defence’ policy, there would be the development of local economic opportunities, including in key sectors like tourism, and improvements to general infrastructure, as well as improving northern expertise in the country. 

Third, there is a call for strengthened northern communities, including through improved housing, better education and connectivity. Related to this area was the announcement earlier this month that the Støre government would support a landmark research initiative, Polhavet 2050 (Arctic Ocean 2050). This programme, worth 1 billion NoK (US$99.3 million) and dedicated to improving the understanding of the Arctic Ocean, would bring together several different research institutions. the programme will be chaired by UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, and would operate, starting next year, until 2036. 

Fourth, and related, would be the building of better infrastructure between communities, while improving regional transportation options. Finally, there is a focus on business development which creates a positive multiplier effect for northern populations. 

Arendal, Norway, site of the country’s largest annual political event, ‘Arendalsuka‘. [Photo by Marc Lanteigne, August 2025]

The strategy document noted that Norway’s high north had become the country’s ‘most important strategic focus area’, not only due to the winds of geopolitics but also the great impact of climate change including ice erosion. Improved military capabilities as well as strengthened external defence ties, with other Northern European governments and the United States and Canada, were seen as crucial to Norwegian security interests. Russia’s expanded Arctic interests, including maritime capabilities are now posing a challenge to Norwegian monitoring capabilities, and the document explains the country’s commitment to international law in the high north. 

Moreover, Svalbard has suddenly found itself caught in the deteriorated security situation in the Arctic. The new Arctic strategy report reiterated that the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) would be the only accepted educational facility on the islands, and that a new research office would be established to regulate international actors. This at a time when Russia has been advocating for the founding of a completely separate Svalbard research facility at its settlement in Pyramiden which would be open to members of the expanded BRICS group, which includes large economies like China, Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates. 

Regardless of the outcome of the September election, it is unlikely that there will be dramatic shift in Norwegian foreign and defence policy. However, the dialogues leading up to the vote have underlined how much has changed in the perceptions of Norway as an Arctic state with myriad regional responsibilities. 

Greenland’s Vote, Trump, and the Sovereignty Schism

Over the Circle
[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

It was widely predicted in local and international media that this month’s parliamentary elections in Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland would be the most widely watched in the island’s history, given the unwelcome spotlight placed on Nuuk after incoming US President Donald Trump not only returned to his hapless 2019 proposal to ‘purchase’ Greenland from Denmark, but also intensified his rhetoric. In speeches and his social media posts since the beginning of this year, he refused to rule out of the use of force in acquiring the island, and vowing during his recent speech to a joint session of the US Congress that ‘one way or the other, we’re going to get it’.

Trump also made vague claims that Greenland as US territory would be essential for ‘national security’, despite the fact that the American military already maintains a military facility at Pituffik with extensive monitoring capabilities. At times, the affair has veered into outright absurdity, with one example being a sycophantic bill introduced in Congress last month which would ‘authorise’ the President to enter into negotiations to acquire Greenland, and to also rename it ‘Red, White, and Blueland’. 

Although on the eve of the Greenlandic election Trump appeared to soften his rhetoric, praising the vote but also promising that Greenland could become ‘RICH!’ if it agreed to be transferred to American sovereignty, the damage had more than been done. The renewal of the ‘buy Greenland’ fiasco has placed further strains on Washington’s relationship with Denmark, a NATO ally. Coupled with Trump’s increasing vitriol towards the government and economy of Canada, culminating in an erratic acceleration of the bilateral trade war this month, (which is now being called the ‘dumbest’ ever example of such a conflict), Arctic diplomacy and security, including via the NATO alliances, is now being placed in much greater doubt at a fraught time. 

The delicate issue of Greenland’s independence from Denmark was also pushed into the forefront at a time when the legacies of Danish colonialism, which officially ended in the 1950s, were still affecting Greenlandic society. These issues included ongoing revelations surrounding an IUD policy in Greenland from the 1960s-70s, and the release (and subsequent removal) of a controversial documentary ‘Greenland’s White Gold’ / ‘Orsugiak – Grønlands hvide guld’ which detailed the appropriation of funds from the island by Danish cryolite mining in the century leading up the late 1980s. 

The now-outgoing previous government coalition in Denmark, the once-unlikely alliance between two previous big party rivals, the centre-left Siumut (‘Forward’) and the left-green Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA – ‘Community of the People’) had the thankless job of trying to respond to this resurgence of American pressure, and it was widely expected that one of both parties would not fare as well in the vote. Outgoing Greenlandic Prime Minister Múte Bourup Egede has repeatedly stressed that the sale of Greenland was a non-starter, including saying that ‘We don’t want to be Americans, nor Danes; We are Kalaallit.’ 

Siumut had been dealing with internal party divisions long before the election was called, but then had to address, in the runup to the election, with high-profile defections from prominent party members to Naleraq (‘Point of Orientation’), a main opposition party which supports both faster-track independence from Denmark and a greater foreign policy alignment with the United States. Siumut’s chair, Erik Jensen, had called for an activation of Article 21 of the 2009 Greenland Self-Rule Act, which would jump-start the independence process, but that move did not appear to heal party rifts over the issue. 

Central Nuuk [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Naleraq, headed by Pele Broberg, had appeared to be positioning itself to be the potential kingmaker after this election, fielding 62 candidates, more than any other party, to vie for seats in the Inatsisartut (Parliament). Thirty-one seats were up for contention, and traditionally it has been difficult for a single party to govern alone, so there was also much initial speculation as to what sort of coalition may appear after the results were confirmed. 

Initial vote results on 11 March did appear to suggest a commanding lead for Naleraq, with IA appearing to suffer the biggest losses. As the day progressed, however, the numbers began to shift, steadily favouring another opposition party, Demokraatit (‘Democrats’). At the end of the counting, Demokraatit had gathered the most votes, almost thirty percent (obtaining ten seats), with Naleraq finishing second at 24.5% (eight seats), and IA third at just over twenty-one percent (seven seats).

Siumut’s seat count was reduced to four, and after the results were confirmed, Erik Jensen announced that he would be stepping down as chair with former foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt named as his successor. The chair of Demokraatit, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, confirmed after the vote that he was open to coalition talks with any of the other parties, with a stress on political unity after what has been a stressful few months for the island. Coalition talks have continued, with discussions reported between Demokraatit and all of the other parties. On 13 March, all parties released a joint statement opposing ‘the repeated statements about annexation and control of Greenland.’

Demokraatit had experienced a political shift of its own before this election, as it had previous been based on a policy of maintaining the union with Denmark. Then the party’s views gradually shifted to support for independence but in a more measured fashion which would place emphasis on achieving self-determination, including first completing the process of transferring government portfolios from Copenhagen to Nuuk, and a more diverse and robust economy. The party’s platform stresses a combination of social liberalism and fiscal conservativism, with a focus on lower taxes and business promotion but also improving housing, education and family support.

As the largest party in the next government coalition, there will be numerous economic questions ahead facing Demokraatit, including policies involving the ongoing reform of the seafood sector, the question of mining and fossil fuels, which IA was sceptical of on environmental grounds, and emerging industries such as tourism.

These issues likely resonated with the electorate despite the long shadow cast by the American drama. As well, another contributing factor to the results could have been exhaustion with the chaos of American foreign policy since January, and a greater backlash against populism, which is helping the political fortunes of some centrist parties in Europe, and potentially in Canada as well. 

As Ottawa prepares for an election on 28 April, Mark Carney was elected earlier this month as Liberal Party chief, replacing Justin Trudeau. The Liberals are currently experiencing an unlikely comeback in the polls, now running even with the opposition Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre, mainly out of concern for who the best leader would be to stand up to Trump. 

Protests in Nuuk over US President Trump’s ongoing campaign to acquire Greenland [Photo by Maria Ackrén]

In addition to the economic and domestic policy directions of the next Greenlandic government, what will also be closely watched how the thorny subject of an independence timetable will be addressed. This could likely be a major area of contention should Naleraq join, but either way there are likely to be changes in the relationship with Greenland and a rethinking of US relations, especially as pressure from the Trump administration resumes. Last week saw demonstrations in Greenland’s cities protesting the actions of the American government and reinforcing the fact that a majority of Greenlanders had no interest in becoming US territory, saying Naammaqaaq! (Enough!).

The pushback does not appear to have fazed Washington, as this week, a sudden announcement was made that the US government would shortly be sending another high-level delegation to Greenland. Framed as a ‘private visit,’ amongst the arrivals would be Second Lady Usha Vance, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and, traveling separately, US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz.

The timing of this event was criticised by Greenlandic officials, especially since negotiations to from the next coalition government in Nuuk are ongoing, and that the addition of such a high-level security official to the tour was a telling sign that the Trump government was continuing to wave off objections by Greenlanders to this attempted annexation. 

On the eve of the announcement of the latest US delegation, Prime Minister Egede expressed frustration both at the visit, which he saw as American intimidation and that ‘the signal is not to be misunderstood’, and at the tepid responses from Greenland’s neighbours. He called for improved cooperation amongst the Greenlandic government to resist this pressure, and for Greenland’s allies to be more vocal in standing up to American actions. This view was echoed in a recent comment in the Norwegian news service Dagsavisen that Oslo and other Nordic governments needed to do more to show their support for Greenland and their rejection of ongoing US bombast. All of these matters are highly likely to affect the shaping of the next government in Nuuk, and its policy priorities going forward. 

[Addendum – 26 March 2025: After an announcement was made yesterday that American Vice-President JD Vance would also be traveling to Greenland, it was then reported that the entire US delegation would no longer travel to Nuuk and Sisimiut as previously planned, and instead the visit would be limited to the US Pituffik Space Base.]

A Sharp Right Turn: The Arctic Faces Trump 2.0

Over the Circle
[Photo by Kevin Doyle via Unsplash]

by Marc Lanteigne

Much of the world is now bracing for yet another period of uncertainty and potential chaos in the wake of the election victory of Donald Trump in the United States last week. The incoming president’s previous foreign policy platforms were based on widespread disengagement and at times isolationism, questioning American multilateralism, while habitually praising autocratic leaders and criticising US friends and allies, while promising a more transactional approach to diplomacy. The twice-impeached President-elect’s return is likely to have global effects certain to spill over into the Arctic in many ways. This at time when the far north is facing some its most complex security challenges since the cold war along with the ongoing threat of climate change. 

One of the most visible policy divides between the Democratic and Republican parties has been over climate change policies, especially after Trump became the dominant voice in the latter. Even before becoming a presidential candidate, Trump had derided climate change as a fiction, with efforts to curb carbon emissions framed as being directly against US political and economic interests. During his first term in office, several domestic environmental rules and protocols were overturned, and Trump pulled the United States out of the 2016 Paris Climate Accords. His government essentially derailed the Arctic Council’s now-notorious May 2019 Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi when the American delegation refused to support any joint declaration which even mentioned climate change. 

President Joe Biden attempted to reverse these policies, bringing the US back to the Paris agreement upon assuming office in 2021, and making climate change one of four pillars in his administration’s Arctic policies announced in October 2022 (along with security, sustainable development and regional and international cooperation), while appointing Dr Michael Sfraga as the country’s first Arctic Ambassador at Large. 

Michael Sfraga, US Arctic Ambassador at Large, speaking at the October 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly, October 2024 [Photo via the Arctic Circle]

However, signs have already appeared that President-elect Trump is again seeking to push forward a denial policy, including once again removing the United States from the Paris agreement, and pursuing a fossil fuel-centred energy policy while downgrading clean energy policies. There are also worries that the incoming government could also pull the US out of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which would further ostracize Washington from global climate change dialogues and likely also diminish American policy voices in the Arctic. These possibilities may affect the dialogue about to begin this week at the COP29 environmental conference in Baku, which is expected to concentrate on climate finance matters, namely the allocation of funds for developing countries to address environmental threats. 

Alaska, which voted solidly for Trump in this election, is likely to be another environmental front line, especially oil and gas drilling. After the first Trump government sought to open up protected areas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to fossil fuel extraction. Last week, the Biden administration started taking steps to ‘Trump-proof’ the refuge by complicating any attempts by the next government to open up drilling projects there. 

The future of NATO under a Trump presidency is now clouded, given the incoming leader’s history of antipathy towards the alliance and the preference of some within his inner circle to downgrade Europe as an American security priority in favour of the Asia-Pacific. Trump had even weighed the possibility of the United States leaving NATO altogether, an option which may return despite attempts by the US Congress to set up a legal firewall against such a possibility.

In February this year, Trump in a speech openly called for Russia ‘to do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO member seen as lagging behind on increases to national defence spending. This year, six out of the seven NATO states in the Arctic have spent more than the preferred two percent of GDP minimum. Canada is the exception at about 1.34%, and with the Justin Trudeau government calling for the country to reach the two percent threshold only in 2032, a stance sure to raise ire with the incoming US administration. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels, October 2024 [Photo via NATO]

A related concern is how the incoming Trump government will shift policies towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a candidate, Trump had vowed that he could end the conflict within twenty-four hours. Critics have worried that this would mean a peace deal which would validate Russian land seizures and possibly keep Ukraine out of NATO and thus perpetually vulnerable to future attacks, especially since Trump has consistently refused to openly condemn the Putin regime for seeking to annex Ukraine. There have also been suggestions that the incoming US government may ease sanctions on Russian Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG) projects. Even if the new administration does not follow through on its threat to leave the alliance, trans-Atlantic relations are likely to become more brittle, at the time when NATO is starting to pay much closer attention to Arctic regional threats. 

During the first Trump government, the US sought a more unilateral Arctic policy which dismissed environmental concerns and placed emphasis on assuring great regional security and American economic interests. The results were mixed at best, starting with the tragicomic proposal in 2019 by the Trump government that the US should outright purchase the island of Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark, which would have been in contravention of the 2009 Greenland Self Government Act, especially Section 21(1) – ‘Decisions regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland.’ That affair further illustrated both the transactional and low information aspects of the first Trump administration. 

The American Corner at Ilisimatusarfik – University of Greenland, Nuuk [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Under Trump, the long-muted disagreement between Ottawa and Washington over the legal status of the Northwest Passage spilled into the open during the Rovaniemi meeting, and there is now the possibility of that dispute again complicating cross-border relations. The Trudeau government is finalising a revised Arctic policy for publication by next month, which would include the naming of a new Canadian Arctic Ambassador. 

The icebreaker debate is likely to be revived under the new administration, as well as a resumption of the at best erratic approach to the issue seen during the previous Trump government. In 2020, a memo released by the Trump government included orders for a ‘fleet’ of new icebreakers be in place by 2029. Thus far, no new icebreakers have been deployed, and of the two polar-capable ice vessels the US Coast Guard currently operates, the heavy icebreaker Polar Star was commissioned in the early 1970s, and the Healy had to undergo extensive repairs before resuming its work this October. 

The nuclear-powered Russian icebreaker Chukotka, November 2024 [Photo via Wikipedia]

Last July, the Biden government endeavoured to address this shortcoming, and promote greater cross-border Arctic cooperation, by cosigning the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, also known as the ICE Pact, with the governments of Canada and Finland to jointly build icebreakers for their use as well as potentially for sale to other regional allies. Balance of power was very much one goal in mind as Moscow continues to develop its own icebreaker fleet, with Russia’s newest nuclear-powered icebreaking ship, Chukotka (Чукотка) launching last week, and China’s fourth icebreaker, the Jidi (极地) / Polar Region, was completed in June of this year. Whether this agreement will withstand a Trump presidency’s derision for multilateral cooperation, especially in strategic matters, is an open question. 

As the Rovaniemi summit illustrated, the incoming Trump government’s relationship with the Arctic Council may also be precarious. In 2025, the chair of the group will rotate from Norway to Denmark, (with debates ongoing as to what degree Greenland should participate), with the Russia question likely hovering over those proceedings. Russia engagement with the Council has been limited since early 2022, and reports surfacing last month that Russian climate change data was being purposefully withheld from elsewhere in the region has been a direct knock on the Council’s main mandate to promote far north environmental protection.

Meanwhile, since its full invasion of Ukraine two years ago, Russia has been more open to closer Arctic cooperation with China, India, and potentially other fellow members of the expanded BRICS group. American disengagement from the Council could place the group in a much weaker position, both in terms of its abilities to address Arctic environmental challenges and to act as a town hall for regional summitry. 

There are still many uncertainties as to what degree the incoming US president’s bombastic and often undiplomatic rhetoric will ultimately become policy next year. Based on Trump’s previous tenure, the next term could nonetheless spell a difficult time for the Arctic, on several fronts. How the region, and not just its governments, will respond is a crucial question which will soon need to be answered. 

Arctic Circle 2024: Days of Insecurity

Over the Circle
Harpa Concert Hall, site of the Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

Since 2022, and arguably even before that, security and ‘hard politics’ issues have been growing in visibility amongst the myriad subjects covered by the Arctic Circle Assembly. This year however marked a watershed, as military affairs dominated many of the plenaries and panels in Reykjavík, with geopolitics and risk assessments being talked about at length in meeting rooms and hallways alike, along with concerns aired about which regional research areas may be ‘dual use’ (civilian / military) in nature. As Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stressed in his keynote speech [video], regional organisations, in the Arctic and beyond, were being severely tested, not least by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as he described the collisions being seen by the effects of Arctic ice loss and growing strategic and economic interests in the region. 

As with last year, there were no representatives from the Russian Federation at the conference, but Moscow was not far from many deliberations, along with questions about spillover of Russia’s regional enmity with the expanded NATO and deepening contacts with China. The joint bomber manoeuvres between Russian and Chinese militaries off the Alaskan coast in July this year, the reported entry of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the Arctic Ocean earlier this month in cooperation with Russian counterparts, with calls for future such initiatives, and the possibility of a BRICS research station, overseen by Russia, on Svalbard, have only amplified questions about how close the two powers were becoming in the Arctic. 

Admiral Robert Bauer of NATO, a returning speaker, nodded to his previous predictions about Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and also pointed to emerging cooperation in ‘minerals and shipping routes’ as potential strategic risks, (despite ongoing policy differences between the two powers which has hampered deeper collaboration, including in energy policy). He also suggested that China’s Arctic agenda remained opaque, and this at a time when Beijing is seeking to re-enter northern discourses after a pause in many regional activities caused by the pandemic and Chinese ‘zero-Covid’ policies. 

Days before the start of the ACA, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) held a small seminar series in the University of Akureyri in Northern Iceland, which included a tour of the China-Iceland Science Observatory (CIAO), specialising in atmospheric and aurora research, in nearby Karhóll. Despite officially opening in 2018, the station remains only under partial operation, with monitoring equipment still to be installed. In recent months, the station has also been named, along with China’s Yellow River Station, as a potential dual use concern. 

China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory, Kárhóll, Iceland [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

The CNARC conference itself placed a major focus on potential research partnerships between Chinese and Nordic sectors, including climate change research, agriculture, energy and tourism. There were numerous calls for improved cross-regional science diplomacy, with criticisms of a ‘cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) on the part of Western governments seen as blocking civilian cooperation, being common themes of the presentations. 

In keeping with previous conference themes, as well as the initial aim of the ACA to open northern affairs to parts of world well beyond the far north, several non-Arctic states were placed in the spotlight, most prominently India and Italy. During an interview with the conference’s host, former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna, outlined Indian interests in the Polar Regions, (the country had published its Arctic governmental policy paper in early 2022, and has been an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013). 

RADM Prasanna noted that the history of India’s interests in the Arctic stretched well back into the last century, with the country signing the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, adding that environmental conditions in the Arctic can and have had effects on local Indian climate, and that steps were being taken to better coordinate governmental offices in understanding the country’s relationships with the Polar Regions. It was confirmed that Delhi will host the next Arctic Circle Forum in April next year, (with Rome confirmed for December 2025).

Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]

India’s fellow BRICS member, Brazil, which has been developing a stronger Arctic research presence in recent years, was also a featured non-Arctic state this year, spearheaded by a panel on ‘Brazil as a Polar Country’ hosted by the Polar and Climatic Centre, Universidad Federal de Río Grande del Sur, in Porto Alegre. One facet of the widening discussions about geopolitics in the Arctic has been that the number of non-Arctic actors seeking a regional presence continues to grow. 

Following on from the Arctic Circle’s 2023 forum in Tokyo, which promised a future focus on Asia-Arctic diplomacy from the conference organisation, senior representatives from China, Japan and Singapore also presented updated policy statements, with Beijing’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, given a prominent spot in the opening keynote speeches. Mr Liu, appointed to the position in January this year, stated that the region was faces two challenges in the form of climate change and ‘geopolitical context’, called for the responsible economic development of the Arctic, including through the Polar Silk Road model, as well as for regional institutions to accelerate their agendas with help from non-Arctic actors.

These presentations by Chinese specialists and officials at both CNARC and the ACA further suggested that Beijing was taking a ‘back to basics’ approach as it returns to the Arctic, stressing the country’s developing scientific capabilities, especially in fields of climate change [in Chinese] research. 

Chinese Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, and Arctic Circle Assembly Chair Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]

The busy schedule of the conference this year also included two adjacent initiatives, namely the Polar Dialogue, created to facilitate dialogues between experts in the Polar Regions and the Himalayas, the latter region being touted as the centrepiece of the ‘Third Pole’ initiative which the ACA has sought to develop, including at last January’s Forum in Abu Dhabi. The second set of concurrent sessions were held under the Business Forum, which featured speeches by regional CEOs and economic leaders and an emphasis on the regional green transition. 

Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a frequent participant in the Assembly and oftentimes critic of Donald Trump, received [video] this year’s Arctic Circle Prize for playing ‘a pivotal role in shaping US national policies that address pressing challenges such as national security, food security, and infrastructure development’. The annual Frederik Paulsen Arctic Academic Action Award was given this year to the Biosink Project, which is seeking ways of reducing methane emissions in the far north, and overseen by AProf Alexander Tøsdal Tveit (UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø), Prof Lisa Stein (University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Fang Qian (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA). 

Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland delivers a keynote speech at the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Political and strategic shifts in the Arctic are not being limited to the effects of the divisions between Russia and the West. In May next year there will be a transfer of the Arctic Council’s chair position from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, (with Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland [in Danish] tapped to take the lead in deliberations, in recognition of the island’s geography). Also significant will be the upcoming elections amongst Arctic states. Icelanders will be going to the polls at the end of this month, with at least ten parties contesting for parliamentary seats. Norway is heading into an election in September next year with the Conservative Party (Høyre) leading [in Norwegian] many polls at it seeks a political comeback. Canada must also hold a federal election by October 2025, (but it could now happen much earlier). 

Finally, the ACA took place in waning days of a divisive election campaign in the United States, the results of which might soon drastically alter American foreign and security policy, including in the Arctic, going forward.