The Type-26 frigate HMS Cardiff docked at Govan, near Glasgow, in August 2024 [Photo via Wikipedia]
Earlier in December, the governments of Britain and Norway announced that they had signed a bilateral security deal which would allow for joint operations to monitor regional Russian submarine activity, as well as oversee the construction of as many as thirteen Type-26 anti-submarine frigates, five for Norway and potentially eight for the United Kingdom.
These vessels would patrol the waters between the two countries, including the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is seen as an area increasingly vulnerable to Russian maritime incursions.
In addition to the warships, there would also be UK-Norwegian cooperation in the development of support vessels for mine-hunting and underwater surveillance, missile systems and torpedoes, as well as combined war game operations and opportunities for British forces to receive winter-temperature military training in Norway. The Lunna House Agreement was agreed to by Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his British counterpart, Keir Starmer, in recognition of the two countries’ concerns about expanded Russian maritime activity and espionage in Northern European waters.
This Agreement is the latest example of NATO states seeking to improve their defensive capabilities in the Arctic, as the far north and its adjacent waters become more militarised and contested.
Marc Lanteigne, Chief Editor for Over the Circle, commented [video] on the deal for TVP (Poland) last week.
Election season has begun in earnest in Norway, as the country now faces a host of domestic and foreign issues in the run-up to the 8 September vote. Since the end of last year, the polls have indicated a seesaw effect between the left and right coalitions. The governing centre-left Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) under Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, was facing a slump in support a year ago, largely over economic frustrations. Yet, by this summer it was leading the polls, with the far-right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in second place.
Labour’s comeback had been partially credited to the hiring of popular politician, and former secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg as Minister of Finance, in February this year. He has since been viewed as a steady hand despite ongoing global trade tribulations and chilled relations between American and Europe. As it is extremely difficult for a single party to govern alone under Norway’s proportional representation system, the election will likely lead to a formal or informal coalition.
Local pocketbook concerns, including inflation and price increases, inequality, the value of the krone, and taxation policies, have dominated the discussions. One oddity has been the debate over the fate of Norway’s wealth tax, an especially divisive policy between the country’s left and right-wing political parties. Critics on the right have maintained that this tax, as it stands, was discouraging business expansion and innovation, and prompting the nation’s wealthiest individuals to decamp to Switzerland and elsewhere. As well, the use, or non-use, of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated worth now at US$1.9 trillion (the world’s largest in value), has traditionally been another source of intra-party debate during elections.
Norway is also facing additional economic pressures as a result of being hit with a fifteen percent tariff rate by the United States earlier this month, a rate similar to that of the European Union. Although only about 3.5% of Norwegian exports go to the US, there nonetheless remains concerns about a knock-on effect for Norway’s businesses.
Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre speaking at the UiT Tromsø campus, February 2022 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
The growing instability in world trade has also revived what was thought to be a lost issue in Norwegian political circles, namely EU membership. Norway is not an EU member, but does follow several Union policies, (Norway is a member of the Schengen agreement, for example). However, after two referendums on the subject, the most recent being in 1994, the country remained reluctant to pursue membership out of concerns about economic sovereignty, especially in relation to protecting the country’s keystone petroleum and fishing industries. The country’s participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) has allowed Norway access to Europe’s Single Market, but this arrangement does not give Oslo a say in the crafting of EU policy.
While public opinion is still soft on the matter, concerns about Norway being isolated in global markets has revived low-level discussion of EU membership since last year. The matter is still considered a hot potato by the mainstream political parties however, as illustrated by the fracturing of the minority government in January this year when the traditionally ‘Eurosceptic’ Centre Party (Senterpartiet) left the coalition, (prompting Labour to govern alone, albeit with support from the left bloc, going into this vote), over implementation of EU energy policies.
The Conservative Party (Høyre) has traditionally been more pro-European Union in political stance, while parties on the left such as the Greens (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and the Red Party (Rødt) have been much more skeptical of membership.
Security issues are also a major factor in current Norwegian political debates due to the ongoing attempted Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing spillover of European Russian disputes into the Arctic. In October last year, the Støre government announced that it was seeking an increase in military spending up to just over 110 billion NoK (US$10.9 billion) for 2025, and that it was committed to raising defence spending to five percent of gross national product, in keeping with NATO recommendations.
This month also saw the publication by the Norwegian government of a revised Arctic strategy, ‘Norge i Nord Nordområdepolitikken i en ny virkelighet,’ [in Norwegian], or ‘Norway in the North: High North Policy in a New Reality’, the first such policy upgrade since 2017. The document very much reflects the two biggest changes in Norwegian Arctic security policy in the last eight years, namely the post-2022 invasion of Ukraine and the addition of neighbours Finland and Sweden into NATO.
UiT’s Tromsø campus [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
The five components elucidated in the revised policy included the protection of Norwegian Arctic sovereignty and the elaboration of security policies which reflect military and civilian interests, as well as scientific research needs, and which are compatible with international law and key organisations including the Arctic Council, the European Union, and NATO. These initiatives would take place in cooperation with Sámi and other Indigenous communities. Second, via a ‘total defence’ policy, there would be the development of local economic opportunities, including in key sectors like tourism, and improvements to general infrastructure, as well as improving northern expertise in the country.
Third, there is a call for strengthened northern communities, including through improved housing, better education and connectivity. Related to this area was the announcement earlier this month that the Støre government would support a landmark research initiative, Polhavet 2050 (Arctic Ocean 2050). This programme, worth 1 billion NoK (US$99.3 million) and dedicated to improving the understanding of the Arctic Ocean, would bring together several different research institutions. the programme will be chaired by UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, and would operate, starting next year, until 2036.
Fourth, and related, would be the building of better infrastructure between communities, while improving regional transportation options. Finally, there is a focus on business development which creates a positive multiplier effect for northern populations.
Arendal, Norway, site of the country’s largest annual political event, ‘Arendalsuka‘. [Photo by Marc Lanteigne, August 2025]
The strategy document noted that Norway’s high north had become the country’s ‘most important strategic focus area’, not only due to the winds of geopolitics but also the great impact of climate change including ice erosion. Improved military capabilities as well as strengthened external defence ties, with other Northern European governments and the United States and Canada, were seen as crucial to Norwegian security interests. Russia’s expanded Arctic interests, including maritime capabilities are now posing a challenge to Norwegian monitoring capabilities, and the document explains the country’s commitment to international law in the high north.
Moreover, Svalbard has suddenly found itself caught in the deteriorated security situation in the Arctic. The new Arctic strategy report reiterated that the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) would be the only accepted educational facility on the islands, and that a new research office would be established to regulate international actors. This at a time when Russia has been advocating for the founding of a completely separate Svalbard research facility at its settlement in Pyramiden which would be open to members of the expanded BRICS group, which includes large economies like China, Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates.
Regardless of the outcome of the September election, it is unlikely that there will be dramatic shift in Norwegian foreign and defence policy. However, the dialogues leading up to the vote have underlined how much has changed in the perceptions of Norway as an Arctic state with myriad regional responsibilities.
With record-setting high temperatures being experienced in much of Europe since the month began, the word ‘coolcation’ is making a comeback as more tourists, and cruise liners, seek to take advantage of the temperate conditions of Nordic summers. This effect is being seen throughout northern Norway, including Svalbard, which is becoming a more popular off-the-beaten-path destination. The tourist season on the islands is taking place however at a time when Svalbard remains caught between several developing geopolitical forces, including ongoing attempts by Norway to clarify its sovereignty there in the face of outside pushback, especially from Russia.
Moscow has had a long history of presenting various challenges to the legal structure on Svalbard, starting with the Spitsbergen / Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which came into force five years later. The document stated that Norway would enjoy ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, while other signatories would have the right to engage is scientific and economic activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality’, and that the islands would not be used for ‘warlike purposes’.
However, since that time, Svalbard’s geography within the Atlantic-Arctic region, which is now becoming more open to maritime navigation due to climate change, as well as the worsening relationship between Russia and what is now commonly called the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’, all of which are now NATO members, has resulted in different varieties of tacit challenges to the Treaty, and Norway’s position within it.
Cruise vessel docked at Longyearbyen, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
As a recent comment in the Barents Observer explained, both Russia and the previous regimes of the Soviet Union sought to increase their influence on Svalbard, often through policies consistent with ‘bilateralisation’. This means that that Moscow has sought to engage Norway for one-to-one dialogues on Svalbard’s governance, with the longstanding argument that Russia has special historical rights in the archipelago which Oslo should acknowledge. In other words, Moscow does not see itself as on the same level as the Treaty’s other non-Norway signatories but rather being or close to being equal with Oslo. Yet, with the Arctic now being more widely seen as a place of strategic competition, these pressures have begun to be more visible in nature. The Norwegian government continues to rebuff any Russian calls for direct bilateral talks on Svalbard.
This past March, the Russian government again made an accusation that Norway was tacitly seeking to militarize the islands in contravention of the Treaty. Moscow had previously accused Oslo of attempting to skirt the Treaty by allowing both patrols by the Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as periodic visits by naval vessels.
The Norwegian government has argued that it is within its rights under international law to monitor the islands, including using civilian and military vessels, and in January this year Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre took the unusual step of reiterating Svalbard’s status as Norwegian, on the heels of a renewed, and still ill-conceived, campaign by the incoming Trump administration in the United States to annex Greenland for reasons never articulated.
China’s Yellow River facility at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Another sign of Norway seeking to clarify its authority on Svalbard took place in April this year when it was announced that all edifices in Ny-Ålesund needed to comply with a standardisation protocol which would include the removal of outside decoration, including the famous male and female lions standing guard in front of China’s Yellow River facility.
This decision followed an incident at Yellow River last July when tourists were photographed waving Chinese flags in front of the building, with one person being photographed in full Chinese military uniform. The event, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the building, was seen by Norwegian authorities as in breach of norms which discouraged both overt nationalism and military symbols on the site.
Since the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, displays of Russian patriotism have also been seen at both of the country’s settlements in Svalbard, including the erecting of an Orthodox Cross near Pyramiden in May 2023, flying the flag of the separatist ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in a makeshift military parade in Barentsburg that month, and an ‘Immortal Regiment’ march also in Barentsburg in May this year. Last summer, Soviet-era flags and slogans could also be viewed at both settlements, but this summer all of that appeared to have been removed.
No red flags this time.The Russian settlement at Pyramiden, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Also under the new regulations, in Ny-Ålesund all buildings there could no longer describe themselves as separate ‘stations’, with the argument that there was only one station present, namely the ‘Ny-Ålesund Station’.
In conversations with representatives from Kings Bay, the management body of the Ny-Ålesund site, when the author visited Ny-Ålesund last month, it was stated that the plans to standardize outside décor of the research facilities had been set in motion since 2019. As well, the incident at Yellow River last July did not affect these guidelines or the timeline in any way.
It was also stressed that none of the facilities management, had demonstrated any overt opposition to the new standards, although there had been incidents of previous criticism by Chinese officials about what was seen as Norwegian regulatory overreach. Moreover, the possibility of a Chinese firm possibly purchasing land in Svalbard last year also touched off debate, and ultimately resulted in Oslo’s decision to block any sale.
During the visit, the lions at Yellow River were still very much sitting in place, (along with the sign to the left of the front door identifying the two-floor building as ‘Yellow River Station – China / 中国北极黄河站’). There had been no noticeable changes to the other buildings, including those housing Indian and South Korean polar researchers. One change which was visible on site was that what had previously been ‘Sverdrup Station’, used by the Norwegian Polar Institute, at Ny-Ålesund was being referred to as a ‘unit’.
Sverdrup not-Station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Moscow has since continued to press the issue of Norwegian Svalbard sovereignty, including by recently seeking to expand educational and research projects in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, including possibly in cooperation with the BRICS+ group and countries which Russia considers ‘friendly’ partners. As well, cruise ship arrived in Barentsburg last month from Murmansk, the first in over a decade, in another show of Russian symbolism.
This trip coincided with a visit to Svalbard by Norway’s King Harald V, who also visited another part of the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), located between Svalbard’s main islands and the northern Norwegian coast,* for the first time. For now, the ‘clash of symbols’ in Svalbard shows little sign of abatment as the summer tourist season continues.
* Corrected on 5 July to be more specific about Bear Island’s status.
Although there remains much conventional wisdom which still considers the Arctic to be only loosely situated within international law, and potentially subject to an inevitable competition over influence and resources, like any other body of water the legal framework of the Arctic, (including the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea) or UNCLOS, is extensive and robust. That does not, however, grant these frameworks freedom from complete immunity to challenges or reinterpretation. The islands of Svalbard, north of Norway, are fast becoming a case example of a collision between traditional laws and norms on one side, and modern strategic realities on the other.
The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty of 1920 recognized the islands as part of the Kingdom of Norway, granting the country sovereignty over the archipelago, but also permitting other Treaty signatories to engage in economic and scientific activities there. Actions taken for ‘warlike purposes’ in Svalbard are forbidden under Article IX of the Treaty, including a ban on naval bases. However, the specifics of that article have been open to interpretation, as according to the Norwegian government the need to protect the sovereignty of the islands necessitates defensive policies and civilian policing, including via the Norwegian Coast Guard. Under this legal structure, during the past century the islands have evolved as a hub for various areas of international civilian research on the Arctic and its environment.
There are currently forty-six parties to the Treaty, including the United States, China, Russia, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, Poland, South Korea and the United Kingdom. The government of Türkiye (Turkey) agreed [in Turkish] to become a party as of October 2023, although there were previous signs that local media were overestimating the rights the country had to access resources on the islands, given Norway’s right to regulate economic activities on environmental grounds. North Korea became an unlikely signatory in 2016.
Roughly every decade, of late, the Norwegian government has published a White Paper on Svalbard policy, with the previous document released in 2016. Much has changed, however, in the realm of Arctic security over the past eight years. The deteriorated relations between Russia and the West since the full Russian invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022, the expansion of NATO into the Arctic with the membership of Finland and Sweden, and the slowdown of Arctic Council activities in light of the precarious state of communications with Moscow, have all contributed to concerns about the ‘return’ of hard power politics and zero-sum games in the far north. Thus, the publication of the newest Svalbard White Paper last month was sure to draw both national and international scrutiny.
This revised White Paper [pdf], ‘Meld. St. 26 (2023-2024) – Melding til Stortinget’ (‘Report to Parliament’) acknowledged, without specifics, the changed security milieu surrounding the islands, stating in Section 1.1 that ‘The security policy situation globally and in our immediate area is characterized by greater seriousness and greater unpredictability than when the previous Svalbard report was presented in 2016, and an increased geopolitical tension which originates outside the northern areas are now also felt in local areas.’
Accordingly, the overreaching tone of the document was stressing the need for Norway to strengthen its sovereignty over the islands. The main topics cited were improved government control over infrastructure and energy policies (with a focus on developing renewables), the need for population regulation to prevent further local environmental strains, and the wider issues of climate change threats. As the paper was being released, Norway’s Justice and Public Security Minister, Emilie Enger Mehl, commented that ‘the governance of Svalbard must continue to be predictable and maintain a steady course.’ This at a time when predictability is becoming rare coin in the far north.
Another theme in the latest Svalbard paper which, although seemingly very innocuous, carries a great deal of political weight, is the call for the Norwegian government to exercise greater sovereignty over research activities on the islands. For decades there have been extensive domestic and international research programmes in Svalbard, heavily concentrated in the community of Ny-Ålesund, including via facilities overseen by institutions including those from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The Polar Research Institute of China opened [in Chinese] its Yellow River Station [in Chinese] (Huanghe zhan 黄河站) at the site in late 2003, and India’s Himadri Station has been operational since 2008.
China’s Yellow River Station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
India’s Himadri Station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Although Arctic research in the physical sciences is permitted by Treaty parties, there have been differences between Oslo and other governments over whether research outside of the physical sciences should be allowed, and these rifts have started to become more pronounced.
In early 2019, The Norwegian Research Council, which advises the country’s governments on research strategy and planning, published a research strategy [pdf] for Ny-Ålesund. Amongst the plan’s statements was the point, in Section 4, that ‘research is to be within the natural sciences,’ with the one exception being research into local cultural heritage. This statement has since been interpreted in Norway as an informal rule that research at the site is to be restricted to the natural sciences, implying that Norwegian authorities have the right, based on sovereignty rights granted in the Treaty, to interdict social science research.
This stipulation is only loosely based on the original 1920 Treaty, however. Reflecting the times, Article V in that document affirmed that Treaty parties ‘recognise the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories.’ The Article also stated, ‘Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said territories.’
Some governments, including those of Russia and China, have been critical of these limitations, and have accused the Norwegian government of overstepping the Treaty by setting what they view as artificial restrictions on research parameters. The Norwegian government, for its part, has sought to better supervise research on Svalbard at a time when many questions regarding the rise of ‘dual use’ data gathering, (i.e. research which could be used for both civilian and military purposes, and also could be used in a manner representing a threat to national interests), are proliferating in security policy circles, including in the Arctic.
Flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics flying at the Barentsburg settlement in Svalbard [Photo by Claudia Cheng, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway]
Russian authorities have pushed back on Norway’s stipulations regarding research, and this has been one factor of Moscow’s ongoing complaints that Russia’s legal rights regarding the islands were being curtailed [in Norwegian] by Norway. These differences were only magnified after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with one incident taking place in December last year when the Russian government protested restrictions on research activities by a Murmansk-based research vessel, the Dalniye Zelentsy (Дальние Зеленцы) near Svalbard, which resulted in the vessel being barred from the islands’ territorial waters out of concerns that its research could have dual use implications.
China’s Beijing-based Arctic and Antarctic Administration [in Chinese] (国家海洋局极地考察办公室 Guojia haiyang jujidi kaocha banggongshi) was quick to take exception [in Norwegian] to the de facto ban on social science research at Ny-Ålesund, arguing that this restriction was not compatible with the terms of the 1920 Treaty, especially the preamble which promises an ‘equitable regime’ amongst participating parties. Chinese assertiveness on this matter was seen in Norway as a shift away [in Norwegian] from the country’s more muted approach to Svalbard engagement, and also taking place at a time when Beijing was seeking to expand its own Arctic interests, including by commencing work since 2017 towards constructing a ‘Polar Silk Road’ as the northern tier of Beijing’s Belt and Road economic development initiatives.
As well, as a 2021 article in the journal Marine Policy explained, China’s development as a great power, and its growing presence in the Arctic, have made the country not only more interested in becoming a regional stakeholder, but also in developing as an overall ‘interpretive power’, with the capability to construe international laws more in line with its own interests. China’s pushing back on Norwegian interpretations of the Spitsbergen Treaty is an example of this. A more recent (September 2024) article in Marine Policy described China’s concerns about Norwegian rule-setting over Svalbard as a reaction to Oslo seeking to ‘improve research coordination’ on the islands. However, contemporary Chinese studies have suggested a more specific set of grievances in Beijing regarding Norwegian Svalbard regulations.
For example, a 2020 article in Pacific Journal (太平洋学报) argued that Norway was using its role as guarantor of Svalbard to restrict activities of other signatories, as well as the tendency of Norway to assume a literal interpretation of the 1920 Treaty which restricts activities of other signatories. The study instead called upon Norway to take an ‘evolutionary approach’ (进化解释 jinhua jieshi) to the Treaty which reflects modern concerns. A 2021 study in the journal Contemporary Law Review (当代法学) called into question whether Norway was using environmental regulations as a way of micromanaging economic policies on Svalbard, as well as using restrictions on scientific activities to disadvantage other parties. All of which were seen by this study as contravening the ‘equitable system’ (公平制度 gongping zhidu) structure promised in the original Treaty. China’s 2018 government White Paper on the Arctic also noted that as a Treaty signatory, the country gained ‘the right under conditions of equality,’ to engage in both research and commercial activities.
Entrance to the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), Longyearbyen [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Attempts by the Norwegian government to increase regulation of research activities in Svalbard is not a new phenomenon. Oslo had been concerned about ensuring that it had proper oversight of research on the islands. Article 3.2.6 of the 2016 White Paper stressed that ‘Nationals of the parties to the Treaty have neither a right nor equal right to conduct research activities in the archipelago,’ and that ‘research activities in Svalbard must be conducted in line with relevant Norwegian regulations, including the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act’.
Article 8.2.2 of the document also noted ‘the growing international interest in research in Svalbard contributes to knowledge development in the Arctic. The objective is for this to happen in accordance with Norwegian research policy, which places emphasis on international research and infrastructure cooperation and on open access to data and publications.’
The follow-up 2024 paper only doubled down on these regulations, with the report (Article 5.4.1), stating ‘Research activity and educational provision must be based on the natural advantages that Svalbard’s location provides, i.e. that climate, nature and the environment must be focus areas. The activity must be of such a nature that it can only or best be carried out on Svalbard.’
The paper’s section on research activities [in Norwegian] confirmed that higher education in the islands would be continue to provided solely by the Norwegian state-owned University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS), which has operated in the capital of Longyearbyen since 1993. As well, the White Paper announced the planned creation of a dedicated Svalbard research office directed by the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian Polar Institute in order to facilitate ‘clearer’ research activities on the islands and to provide annual reporting on local research endeavours.
While Norway has been seeking to clarify and assert its rights in Svalbard, since last year Russia has been seeking, as part of its larger plan to develop alternative Arctic partners to potentially open an alternative scientific base at the sparsely populated Russian town of Pyramiden on Svalbard, perhaps as early as the end of 2024 [in Russian], with possible branches elsewhere, including the other main Russian town on Svalbard, Barentsburg.
Moscow has invited its partners within the recently expanded BRICS group to potentially join this project, and it was underscored that education and training would be offered there, thus potentially pushing against Norwegian regulations that UNIS be the sole provider of higher education on the islands, and that disciplines beyond natural sciences could also be studied.
Russian settlement at Pyramiden [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
In addition to the original members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the group added [pdf] new members at the beginning of this year (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and potentially Saudi Arabia), with other governments such as Malaysia and Thailand now also expressing interest in joining. In mid-June, a BRICS+ working group meeting was held in Murmansk, with scientists from member states discussing [in Russian] maritime and polar research, which could act as a precursor to the Pyramiden plans, and Moscow’s turning towards the BRICS group as an alternative set of regional partners is in keeping with the Vladimir Putin regime’s March 2023 foreign policy concept paper, which included [in Russian] a call for ‘mutually beneficial cooperation with non-Arctic states pursuing a constructive policy towards Russia and interested in international activities in the Arctic.’
It is not yet certain which countries will ultimately take part in the Russia research plans from Svalbard, or the eventual timetable for the opening of the facilities. Nonetheless, these potential facilities underscore the fragile nature of the legal and political structures on the islands, and the fact that Svalbard can no longer be as insulated from the growing geopolitical stresses facing the Arctic as it once was.
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