The Type-26 frigate HMS Cardiff docked at Govan, near Glasgow, in August 2024 [Photo via Wikipedia]
Earlier in December, the governments of Britain and Norway announced that they had signed a bilateral security deal which would allow for joint operations to monitor regional Russian submarine activity, as well as oversee the construction of as many as thirteen Type-26 anti-submarine frigates, five for Norway and potentially eight for the United Kingdom.
These vessels would patrol the waters between the two countries, including the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is seen as an area increasingly vulnerable to Russian maritime incursions.
In addition to the warships, there would also be UK-Norwegian cooperation in the development of support vessels for mine-hunting and underwater surveillance, missile systems and torpedoes, as well as combined war game operations and opportunities for British forces to receive winter-temperature military training in Norway. The Lunna House Agreement was agreed to by Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his British counterpart, Keir Starmer, in recognition of the two countries’ concerns about expanded Russian maritime activity and espionage in Northern European waters.
This Agreement is the latest example of NATO states seeking to improve their defensive capabilities in the Arctic, as the far north and its adjacent waters become more militarised and contested.
Marc Lanteigne, Chief Editor for Over the Circle, commented [video] on the deal for TVP (Poland) last week.
Election season has begun in earnest in Norway, as the country now faces a host of domestic and foreign issues in the run-up to the 8 September vote. Since the end of last year, the polls have indicated a seesaw effect between the left and right coalitions. The governing centre-left Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) under Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, was facing a slump in support a year ago, largely over economic frustrations. Yet, by this summer it was leading the polls, with the far-right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in second place.
Labour’s comeback had been partially credited to the hiring of popular politician, and former secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg as Minister of Finance, in February this year. He has since been viewed as a steady hand despite ongoing global trade tribulations and chilled relations between American and Europe. As it is extremely difficult for a single party to govern alone under Norway’s proportional representation system, the election will likely lead to a formal or informal coalition.
Local pocketbook concerns, including inflation and price increases, inequality, the value of the krone, and taxation policies, have dominated the discussions. One oddity has been the debate over the fate of Norway’s wealth tax, an especially divisive policy between the country’s left and right-wing political parties. Critics on the right have maintained that this tax, as it stands, was discouraging business expansion and innovation, and prompting the nation’s wealthiest individuals to decamp to Switzerland and elsewhere. As well, the use, or non-use, of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated worth now at US$1.9 trillion (the world’s largest in value), has traditionally been another source of intra-party debate during elections.
Norway is also facing additional economic pressures as a result of being hit with a fifteen percent tariff rate by the United States earlier this month, a rate similar to that of the European Union. Although only about 3.5% of Norwegian exports go to the US, there nonetheless remains concerns about a knock-on effect for Norway’s businesses.
Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre speaking at the UiT Tromsø campus, February 2022 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
The growing instability in world trade has also revived what was thought to be a lost issue in Norwegian political circles, namely EU membership. Norway is not an EU member, but does follow several Union policies, (Norway is a member of the Schengen agreement, for example). However, after two referendums on the subject, the most recent being in 1994, the country remained reluctant to pursue membership out of concerns about economic sovereignty, especially in relation to protecting the country’s keystone petroleum and fishing industries. The country’s participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) has allowed Norway access to Europe’s Single Market, but this arrangement does not give Oslo a say in the crafting of EU policy.
While public opinion is still soft on the matter, concerns about Norway being isolated in global markets has revived low-level discussion of EU membership since last year. The matter is still considered a hot potato by the mainstream political parties however, as illustrated by the fracturing of the minority government in January this year when the traditionally ‘Eurosceptic’ Centre Party (Senterpartiet) left the coalition, (prompting Labour to govern alone, albeit with support from the left bloc, going into this vote), over implementation of EU energy policies.
The Conservative Party (Høyre) has traditionally been more pro-European Union in political stance, while parties on the left such as the Greens (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and the Red Party (Rødt) have been much more skeptical of membership.
Security issues are also a major factor in current Norwegian political debates due to the ongoing attempted Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing spillover of European Russian disputes into the Arctic. In October last year, the Støre government announced that it was seeking an increase in military spending up to just over 110 billion NoK (US$10.9 billion) for 2025, and that it was committed to raising defence spending to five percent of gross national product, in keeping with NATO recommendations.
This month also saw the publication by the Norwegian government of a revised Arctic strategy, ‘Norge i Nord Nordområdepolitikken i en ny virkelighet,’ [in Norwegian], or ‘Norway in the North: High North Policy in a New Reality’, the first such policy upgrade since 2017. The document very much reflects the two biggest changes in Norwegian Arctic security policy in the last eight years, namely the post-2022 invasion of Ukraine and the addition of neighbours Finland and Sweden into NATO.
UiT’s Tromsø campus [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
The five components elucidated in the revised policy included the protection of Norwegian Arctic sovereignty and the elaboration of security policies which reflect military and civilian interests, as well as scientific research needs, and which are compatible with international law and key organisations including the Arctic Council, the European Union, and NATO. These initiatives would take place in cooperation with Sámi and other Indigenous communities. Second, via a ‘total defence’ policy, there would be the development of local economic opportunities, including in key sectors like tourism, and improvements to general infrastructure, as well as improving northern expertise in the country.
Third, there is a call for strengthened northern communities, including through improved housing, better education and connectivity. Related to this area was the announcement earlier this month that the Støre government would support a landmark research initiative, Polhavet 2050 (Arctic Ocean 2050). This programme, worth 1 billion NoK (US$99.3 million) and dedicated to improving the understanding of the Arctic Ocean, would bring together several different research institutions. the programme will be chaired by UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, and would operate, starting next year, until 2036.
Fourth, and related, would be the building of better infrastructure between communities, while improving regional transportation options. Finally, there is a focus on business development which creates a positive multiplier effect for northern populations.
Arendal, Norway, site of the country’s largest annual political event, ‘Arendalsuka‘. [Photo by Marc Lanteigne, August 2025]
The strategy document noted that Norway’s high north had become the country’s ‘most important strategic focus area’, not only due to the winds of geopolitics but also the great impact of climate change including ice erosion. Improved military capabilities as well as strengthened external defence ties, with other Northern European governments and the United States and Canada, were seen as crucial to Norwegian security interests. Russia’s expanded Arctic interests, including maritime capabilities are now posing a challenge to Norwegian monitoring capabilities, and the document explains the country’s commitment to international law in the high north.
Moreover, Svalbard has suddenly found itself caught in the deteriorated security situation in the Arctic. The new Arctic strategy report reiterated that the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) would be the only accepted educational facility on the islands, and that a new research office would be established to regulate international actors. This at a time when Russia has been advocating for the founding of a completely separate Svalbard research facility at its settlement in Pyramiden which would be open to members of the expanded BRICS group, which includes large economies like China, Brazil, India, and the United Arab Emirates.
Regardless of the outcome of the September election, it is unlikely that there will be dramatic shift in Norwegian foreign and defence policy. However, the dialogues leading up to the vote have underlined how much has changed in the perceptions of Norway as an Arctic state with myriad regional responsibilities.
With record-setting high temperatures being experienced in much of Europe since the month began, the word ‘coolcation’ is making a comeback as more tourists, and cruise liners, seek to take advantage of the temperate conditions of Nordic summers. This effect is being seen throughout northern Norway, including Svalbard, which is becoming a more popular off-the-beaten-path destination. The tourist season on the islands is taking place however at a time when Svalbard remains caught between several developing geopolitical forces, including ongoing attempts by Norway to clarify its sovereignty there in the face of outside pushback, especially from Russia.
Moscow has had a long history of presenting various challenges to the legal structure on Svalbard, starting with the Spitsbergen / Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which came into force five years later. The document stated that Norway would enjoy ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, while other signatories would have the right to engage is scientific and economic activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality’, and that the islands would not be used for ‘warlike purposes’.
However, since that time, Svalbard’s geography within the Atlantic-Arctic region, which is now becoming more open to maritime navigation due to climate change, as well as the worsening relationship between Russia and what is now commonly called the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’, all of which are now NATO members, has resulted in different varieties of tacit challenges to the Treaty, and Norway’s position within it.
Cruise vessel docked at Longyearbyen, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
As a recent comment in the Barents Observer explained, both Russia and the previous regimes of the Soviet Union sought to increase their influence on Svalbard, often through policies consistent with ‘bilateralisation’. This means that that Moscow has sought to engage Norway for one-to-one dialogues on Svalbard’s governance, with the longstanding argument that Russia has special historical rights in the archipelago which Oslo should acknowledge. In other words, Moscow does not see itself as on the same level as the Treaty’s other non-Norway signatories but rather being or close to being equal with Oslo. Yet, with the Arctic now being more widely seen as a place of strategic competition, these pressures have begun to be more visible in nature. The Norwegian government continues to rebuff any Russian calls for direct bilateral talks on Svalbard.
This past March, the Russian government again made an accusation that Norway was tacitly seeking to militarize the islands in contravention of the Treaty. Moscow had previously accused Oslo of attempting to skirt the Treaty by allowing both patrols by the Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as periodic visits by naval vessels.
The Norwegian government has argued that it is within its rights under international law to monitor the islands, including using civilian and military vessels, and in January this year Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre took the unusual step of reiterating Svalbard’s status as Norwegian, on the heels of a renewed, and still ill-conceived, campaign by the incoming Trump administration in the United States to annex Greenland for reasons never articulated.
China’s Yellow River facility at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Another sign of Norway seeking to clarify its authority on Svalbard took place in April this year when it was announced that all edifices in Ny-Ålesund needed to comply with a standardisation protocol which would include the removal of outside decoration, including the famous male and female lions standing guard in front of China’s Yellow River facility.
This decision followed an incident at Yellow River last July when tourists were photographed waving Chinese flags in front of the building, with one person being photographed in full Chinese military uniform. The event, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the building, was seen by Norwegian authorities as in breach of norms which discouraged both overt nationalism and military symbols on the site.
Since the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, displays of Russian patriotism have also been seen at both of the country’s settlements in Svalbard, including the erecting of an Orthodox Cross near Pyramiden in May 2023, flying the flag of the separatist ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in a makeshift military parade in Barentsburg that month, and an ‘Immortal Regiment’ march also in Barentsburg in May this year. Last summer, Soviet-era flags and slogans could also be viewed at both settlements, but this summer all of that appeared to have been removed.
No red flags this time.The Russian settlement at Pyramiden, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Also under the new regulations, in Ny-Ålesund all buildings there could no longer describe themselves as separate ‘stations’, with the argument that there was only one station present, namely the ‘Ny-Ålesund Station’.
In conversations with representatives from Kings Bay, the management body of the Ny-Ålesund site, when the author visited Ny-Ålesund last month, it was stated that the plans to standardize outside décor of the research facilities had been set in motion since 2019. As well, the incident at Yellow River last July did not affect these guidelines or the timeline in any way.
It was also stressed that none of the facilities management, had demonstrated any overt opposition to the new standards, although there had been incidents of previous criticism by Chinese officials about what was seen as Norwegian regulatory overreach. Moreover, the possibility of a Chinese firm possibly purchasing land in Svalbard last year also touched off debate, and ultimately resulted in Oslo’s decision to block any sale.
During the visit, the lions at Yellow River were still very much sitting in place, (along with the sign to the left of the front door identifying the two-floor building as ‘Yellow River Station – China / 中国北极黄河站’). There had been no noticeable changes to the other buildings, including those housing Indian and South Korean polar researchers. One change which was visible on site was that what had previously been ‘Sverdrup Station’, used by the Norwegian Polar Institute, at Ny-Ålesund was being referred to as a ‘unit’.
Sverdrup not-Station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Moscow has since continued to press the issue of Norwegian Svalbard sovereignty, including by recently seeking to expand educational and research projects in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, including possibly in cooperation with the BRICS+ group and countries which Russia considers ‘friendly’ partners. As well, cruise ship arrived in Barentsburg last month from Murmansk, the first in over a decade, in another show of Russian symbolism.
This trip coincided with a visit to Svalbard by Norway’s King Harald V, who also visited another part of the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), located between Svalbard’s main islands and the northern Norwegian coast,* for the first time. For now, the ‘clash of symbols’ in Svalbard shows little sign of abatment as the summer tourist season continues.
* Corrected on 5 July to be more specific about Bear Island’s status.
Since 2022, and arguably even before that, security and ‘hard politics’ issues have been growing in visibility amongst the myriad subjects covered by the Arctic Circle Assembly. This year however marked a watershed, as military affairs dominated many of the plenaries and panels in Reykjavík, with geopolitics and risk assessments being talked about at length in meeting rooms and hallways alike, along with concerns aired about which regional research areas may be ‘dual use’ (civilian / military) in nature. As Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson stressed in his keynote speech [video], regional organisations, in the Arctic and beyond, were being severely tested, not least by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as he described the collisions being seen by the effects of Arctic ice loss and growing strategic and economic interests in the region.
As with last year, there were no representatives from the Russian Federation at the conference, but Moscow was not far from many deliberations, along with questions about spillover of Russia’s regional enmity with the expanded NATO and deepening contacts with China. The joint bomber manoeuvres between Russian and Chinese militaries off the Alaskan coast in July this year, the reported entry of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the Arctic Ocean earlier this month in cooperation with Russian counterparts, with calls for future such initiatives, and the possibility of a BRICS research station, overseen by Russia, on Svalbard, have only amplified questions about how close the two powers were becoming in the Arctic.
Admiral Robert Bauer of NATO, a returning speaker, nodded to his previous predictions about Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation, and also pointed to emerging cooperation in ‘minerals and shipping routes’ as potential strategic risks, (despite ongoing policy differences between the two powers which has hampered deeper collaboration, including in energy policy). He also suggested that China’s Arctic agenda remained opaque, and this at a time when Beijing is seeking to re-enter northern discourses after a pause in many regional activities caused by the pandemic and Chinese ‘zero-Covid’ policies.
Days before the start of the ACA, the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) held a small seminar series in the University of Akureyri in Northern Iceland, which included a tour of the China-Iceland Science Observatory (CIAO), specialising in atmospheric and aurora research, in nearby Karhóll. Despite officially opening in 2018, the station remains only under partial operation, with monitoring equipment still to be installed. In recent months, the station has also been named, along with China’s Yellow River Station, as a potential dualuse concern.
China-Iceland Joint Arctic Observatory, Kárhóll, Iceland [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
The CNARC conference itself placed a major focus on potential research partnerships between Chinese and Nordic sectors, including climate change research, agriculture, energy and tourism. There were numerous calls for improved cross-regional science diplomacy, with criticisms of a ‘cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei 冷战思维) on the part of Western governments seen as blocking civilian cooperation, being common themes of the presentations.
In keeping with previous conference themes, as well as the initial aim of the ACA to open northern affairs to parts of world well beyond the far north, several non-Arctic states were placed in the spotlight, most prominently India and Italy. During an interview with the conference’s host, former Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, Rear Admiral TVN Prasanna, outlined Indian interests in the Polar Regions, (the country had published its Arctic governmental policy paper in early 2022, and has been an observer in the Arctic Council since 2013).
RADM Prasanna noted that the history of India’s interests in the Arctic stretched well back into the last century, with the country signing the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1920, adding that environmental conditions in the Arctic can and have had effects on local Indian climate, and that steps were being taken to better coordinate governmental offices in understanding the country’s relationships with the Polar Regions. It was confirmed that Delhi will host the next Arctic Circle Forum in April next year, (with Rome confirmed for December 2025).
India’s fellow BRICS member, Brazil, which has been developing a stronger Arctic research presence in recent years, was also a featured non-Arctic state this year, spearheaded by a panel on ‘Brazil as a Polar Country’ hosted by the Polar and Climatic Centre, Universidad Federal de Río Grande del Sur, in Porto Alegre. One facet of the widening discussions about geopolitics in the Arctic has been that the number of non-Arctic actors seeking a regional presence continues to grow.
Following on from the Arctic Circle’s 2023 forum in Tokyo, which promised a future focus on Asia-Arctic diplomacy from the conference organisation, senior representatives from China, Japan and Singapore also presented updated policy statements, with Beijing’s Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, given a prominent spot in the opening keynote speeches. Mr Liu, appointed to the position in January this year, stated that the region was faces two challenges in the form of climate change and ‘geopolitical context’, called for the responsible economic development of the Arctic, including through the Polar Silk Road model, as well as for regional institutions to accelerate their agendas with help from non-Arctic actors.
These presentations by Chinese specialists and officials at both CNARC and the ACA further suggested that Beijing was taking a ‘back to basics’ approach as it returns to the Arctic, stressing the country’s developing scientific capabilities, especially in fields of climate change [in Chinese] research.
Chinese Special Envoy for Climate Change, Liu Zhenmin, and Arctic Circle Assembly Chair Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson [Photo via the Arctic Circle Assembly]
The busy schedule of the conference this year also included two adjacent initiatives, namely the Polar Dialogue, created to facilitate dialogues between experts in the Polar Regions and the Himalayas, the latter region being touted as the centrepiece of the ‘Third Pole’ initiative which the ACA has sought to develop, including at last January’s Forum in Abu Dhabi. The second set of concurrent sessions were held under the Business Forum, which featured speeches by regional CEOs and economic leaders and an emphasis on the regional green transition.
Alaska Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a frequent participant in the Assembly and oftentimes critic of Donald Trump, received [video] this year’s Arctic Circle Prize for playing ‘a pivotal role in shaping US national policies that address pressing challenges such as national security, food security, and infrastructure development’. The annual Frederik Paulsen Arctic Academic Action Award was given this year to the Biosink Project, which is seeking ways of reducing methane emissions in the far north, and overseen by AProf Alexander Tøsdal Tveit (UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø), Prof Lisa Stein (University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Fang Qian (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA).
Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland delivers a keynote speech at the 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
Political and strategic shifts in the Arctic are not being limited to the effects of the divisions between Russia and the West. In May next year there will be a transfer of the Arctic Council’s chair position from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, (with Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland [in Danish] tapped to take the lead in deliberations, in recognition of the island’s geography). Also significant will be the upcoming elections amongst Arctic states. Icelanders will be going to the polls at the end of this month, with at least ten parties contesting for parliamentary seats. Norway is heading into an election in September next year with the Conservative Party (Høyre) leading [in Norwegian] many polls at it seeks a political comeback. Canada must also hold a federal election by October 2025, (but it could now happen much earlier).
Finally, the ACA took place in waning days of a divisive election campaign in the United States, the results of which might soon drastically alter American foreign and security policy, including in the Arctic, going forward.
For Germany, debates about the evolution of the country’s foreign and security policies are hardlynew, and the ‘modern’ era of those deliberations can readily be traced to the end of the cold war in Europe, and the completion of German reunification in 1991. Since then, there have been numerous Wendepunkte (turning points) in Germany’s European and international policies. However, as with the rest of Europe, and indeed the entire Euro-Atlantic region, the full Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had been widely seen in Germany as the start, or at least a start, of the ‘post-post-cold war’ era in the region.
After decades of concentrating on economic and political cooperation as the vanguard of German foreign affairs, then-incoming Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in the wake of Moscow’s aggression that there would be a stronger focus on bolstering German security. This would later include a stronger commitment to NATO, with the protection of the alliance’s eastern borders, military assistance for Kyiv, and reaching the Alliance’s spending target of two percent of GDP in February of this year.
Zeitenwende is likely to become another example of a German word which is difficult to directly translate into English but nonetheless enters mainstream discourses. Meaning literally ‘times-turn’, the word more specifically refers to an historic turning point. Chancellor Scholz used the term in his February 2022 speech, and since that time the word has dominated discussions about the directions in which German international concerns should turn.
Germany has a long history of polar engagement, and was one of the first observer governments in the Arctic Council, signing on in 1998, only two years after the group was formed. The country also co-maintains a research station (AWIPEV), with France, via the Alfred Wegener Institute, in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard. As with other observers, Germany’s activities in the Arctic were dominated by scientific inquiry, including on matters related to local climate change. The two previous Arctic policy documents published by the German government, in 2013 and then in 2018-19, detailed the country’s commitments to addressing climate change, developing scientific and research expertise in the far north, as well as fostering stronger regional cooperation both via the Council and the European Union.
Mention of security in the 2013 paper was light, including a call for the Arctic to be used for peaceful purposes only. The 2018 document did go further in that area, however, by noting the environmental changes in the Arctic which were leading to greater possibility of competition for resources and access to regional sea lanes. In other words, promoting ‘non cooperative behaviour’ by some governments, which were not named. That paper also stressed its opposition to the militarization of the Arctic, while also calling for ‘quiet zones’ in the region with restrictions on human activity.
At that time, this document was an outlier, as other like government policy papers by non-Arctic states tended to eschew direct mention of local security concerns in favour of detailing support for environmental, scientific, and developmental cooperation.
(Japan’s 2015 Arctic policy document was also somewhat of an anomaly at the time, as the far north was specifically cited in that paper as a matter of national security. This inclusion reflected Japan’s status as a maritime state, with distinct sensitivities over whether emerging Arctic sea routes would be subject to military interdiction).
Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz, 19 June 2023 [Photo via NATO]
As relations between the West and Russia deteriorated since the release of the 2018 paper, debates over the hardening of Arctic security, and potential German responses, soon emerged. The 2024 Arctic policy paper cemented this shift in thinking by directly identifying Russia as having ‘fundamentally changed the geopolitical environment of Germany’s Arctic policy’, upending regional exceptionalism, and challenging regimes and laws. While the two previous papers placed the challenges of climate change in the Arctic first, this new policy document left no doubt that climate change and military threats were assuming equal importance in German Arctic strategies.
Reflecting shifts in thinking within NATO itself, Germany no longer sees the Arctic as being on Europe’s strategic periphery. Instead, the far north is perceived as an area of geopolitical contestation by Russia as well as China, with concerns expressed in the new document about the possibilities and consequences of closer northern cooperation by both powers.
The ‘international rules-based order’ in the Arctic was portrayed as a framework which needs urgent defending via Germany efforts with NATO and the EU, in addition to the United Nations and its relevant agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Acknowledging that the Council is facing a considerable slowdown in its efforts due to the distanced relationship between Russia and the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’ (all of which are now NATO members), the 2024 paper called for deeper German engagement within the Council, and a strengthening of regional cooperation initiatives.
From an environmental viewpoint, the document describes links between Arctic security and the issue of ‘resilience’, including the need to maintain local environmental regimes and to combat specific threats not limited to methane emissions, black carbon deposits, and sea ice erosion. Human security both within the Arctic and in adjacent regions such as continental Europe were also viewed as being affected by altered Arctic weather patterns, links which were also elucidated in the German government’s June 2023 National Security Strategy. Applying German research capabilities to addressing these challenges in the Arctic was also a major theme [video] of the Arctic Circle’s Berlin forum in May this year.
Germany will be heading into an election next year, and it is likely that much of the debate will be centred on domestic issues such as economic uncertainty, immigration debates, and voter discontent leading to a lurch to the right in recent state elections. However, the upcoming vote will likely also include much debate about Germany’s strategic concerns, reflecting the country’s moves away from a traditional ‘civilian power’ (Zivilmacht) stance which had prioritised multilateralism, the promotion of democracy and civil society, and positive change through trade, and towards a foreign policy more closely aligned with the Atlantic security environment. The Arctic, and its own geopolitical changes, are now being acknowledged in German government circles as a part of this new turning point.
Over the Circle 