‘Yet the Place is Fair Enough, Doubt it Not!’ Svalbard in a Tumultuous Arctic

Spitsbergen’s western coastline, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

With record-setting high temperatures being experienced in much of Europe since the month began, the word ‘coolcation’ is making a comeback as more tourists, and cruise liners, seek to take advantage of the temperate conditions of Nordic summers. This effect is being seen throughout northern Norway, including Svalbard, which is becoming a more popular off-the-beaten-path destination. The tourist season on the islands is taking place however at a time when Svalbard remains caught between several developing geopolitical forces, including ongoing attempts by Norway to clarify its sovereignty there in the face of outside pushback, especially from Russia. 

Moscow has had a long history of presenting various challenges to the legal structure on Svalbard, starting with the Spitsbergen / Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which came into force five years later. The document stated that Norway would enjoy ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, while other signatories would have the right to engage is scientific and economic activities ‘on a footing of absolute equality’, and that the islands would not be used for ‘warlike purposes’.

However, since that time, Svalbard’s geography within the Atlantic-Arctic region, which is now becoming more open to maritime navigation due to climate change, as well as the worsening relationship between Russia and what is now commonly called the ‘seven like-minded Arctic states’, all of which are now NATO members, has resulted in different varieties of tacit challenges to the Treaty, and Norway’s position within it. 

Cruise vessel docked at Longyearbyen, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

As a recent comment in the Barents Observer explained, both Russia and the previous regimes of the Soviet Union sought to increase their influence on Svalbard, often through policies consistent with ‘bilateralisation’. This means that that Moscow has sought to engage Norway for one-to-one dialogues on Svalbard’s governance, with the longstanding argument that Russia has special historical rights in the archipelago which Oslo should acknowledge. In other words, Moscow does not see itself as on the same level as the Treaty’s other non-Norway signatories but rather being or close to being equal with Oslo. Yet, with the Arctic now being more widely seen as a place of strategic competition, these pressures have begun to be more visible in nature. The Norwegian government continues to rebuff any Russian calls for direct bilateral talks on Svalbard.

This past March, the Russian government again made an accusation that Norway was tacitly seeking to militarize the islands in contravention of the Treaty. Moscow had previously accused Oslo of attempting to skirt the Treaty by allowing both patrols by the Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as periodic visits by naval vessels. 

The Norwegian government has argued that it is within its rights under international law to monitor the islands, including using civilian and military vessels, and in January this year Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre took the unusual step of reiterating Svalbard’s status as Norwegian, on the heels of a renewed, and still ill-conceived, campaign by the incoming Trump administration in the United States to annex Greenland for reasons never articulated

China’s Yellow River facility at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Another sign of Norway seeking to clarify its authority on Svalbard took place in April this year when it was announced that all edifices in Ny-Ålesund needed to comply with a standardisation protocol which would include the removal of outside decoration, including the famous male and female lions standing guard in front of China’s Yellow River facility.

This decision followed an incident at Yellow River last July when tourists were photographed waving Chinese flags in front of the building, with one person being photographed in full Chinese military uniform. The event, to mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the building, was seen by Norwegian authorities as in breach of norms which discouraged both overt nationalism and military symbols on the site. 

Since the full invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, displays of Russian patriotism have also been seen at both of the country’s settlements in Svalbard, including the erecting of an Orthodox Cross near Pyramiden in May 2023, flying the flag of the separatist ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in a makeshift military parade in Barentsburg that month, and an ‘Immortal Regiment’ march also in Barentsburg in May this year. Last summer, Soviet-era flags and slogans could also be viewed at both settlements, but this summer all of that appeared to have been removed.

No red flags this time. The Russian settlement at Pyramiden, June 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Also under the new regulations, in Ny-Ålesund all buildings there could no longer describe themselves as separate ‘stations’, with the argument that there was only one station present, namely the ‘Ny-Ålesund Station’. 

In conversations with representatives from Kings Bay, the management body of the Ny-Ålesund site, when the author visited Ny-Ålesund last month, it was stated that the plans to standardize outside décor of the research facilities had been set in motion since 2019. As well, the incident at Yellow River last July did not affect these guidelines or the timeline in any way.

It was also stressed that none of the facilities management, had demonstrated any overt opposition to the new standards, although there had been incidents of previous criticism by Chinese officials about what was seen as Norwegian regulatory overreach. Moreover, the possibility of a Chinese firm possibly purchasing land in Svalbard last year also touched off debate, and ultimately resulted in Oslo’s decision to block any sale. 

During the visit, the lions at Yellow River were still very much sitting in place, (along with the sign to the left of the front door identifying the two-floor building as ‘Yellow River Station – China / 中国北极黄河站’). There had been no noticeable changes to the other buildings, including those housing Indian and South Korean polar researchers. One change which was visible on site was that what had previously been ‘Sverdrup Station’, used by the Norwegian Polar Institute, at Ny-Ålesund was being referred to as a ‘unit’.

Sverdrup not-Station, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

Moscow has since continued to press the issue of Norwegian Svalbard sovereignty, including by recently seeking to expand educational and research projects in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, including possibly in cooperation with the BRICS+ group and countries which Russia considers ‘friendly’ partners. As well, cruise ship arrived in Barentsburg last month from Murmansk, the first in over a decade, in another show of Russian symbolism.

This trip coincided with a visit to Svalbard by Norway’s King Harald V, who also visited another part of the Svalbard archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), located between Svalbard’s main islands and the northern Norwegian coast,* for the first time. For now, the ‘clash of symbols’ in Svalbard shows little sign of abatment as the summer tourist season continues.  

* Corrected on 5 July to be more specific about Bear Island’s status.

‘Can’t Keep My Mind From the Circling Sky’: The Take-off of Arctic Air Routes 

Air Greenland plane at Nuuk Airport [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

by Marc Lanteigne

It was in 1954, after two years of test flights, when Scandinavian Airline Systems (SAS) successfully began a Copenhagen to Los Angeles route over the north polar region (with stops in Kangerlussuaq, Greenland and Winnipeg), using DC6 aircraft. These trips opened up the possibility of shorter transits between Europe and North America, making use of potential new ‘great circle’ flightpaths closer to the North Pole. In 1983, Finnair, which had begun to expand its business to include Asia travel options, started the first nonstop flights via the Arctic, between Helsinki and Narita Airport in Tokyo.

With improved technology and navigational capabilities, the airspace within the Arctic Circle is being looked at with much interest by aviation businesses, especially as the far north  continues to open to expanded economic activities, including tourism.

At the same time, post-cold war air routes between Europe and Asia, which made frequent use of Russian airspace, have now been closed to numerous Western airlines since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while the United States, Canada, and most of Europe have all banned Russian aircraft from their airspaces. The security situation over the past two years has thus made the Arctic Circle an even more attractive alternative for transcontinental flights. 

For example, since early 2022, Finnair’s Helsinki-Tokyo routes now circumvent Russia, and include flights well into the central Arctic Ocean region, (passengers along that route receive a diploma testifying that they have flown over the North Pole). This northern route takes about thirteen hours to complete, compared with nine to ten hours the pre-2022 flightpath required. 

Finnair’s 2023 ‘Northern Route Diploma’ [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

There have also been significant changes in the past year which have affected flights to Arctic destinations, responding to both consumer demand as well as closer economic cooperation between far northern governments. In Greenland, the island’s largest airport in Nuuk is currently under expansion, along with an enlargement of its runway. 

This process caused a brief political stir in 2018 when the governments of Denmark and the United States worked to thwart a planned bid by a Beijing-based firm (the China Communications Construction Company, or CCCC), to finance the refurbishment of Nuuk’s airport and others on the island. Denmark would ultimately take the lead in assuming those expenses, prompting a backlash within Greenland’s coalition government at the time. 

The enlargement of Nuuk Airport, as well as the facilities at Ilulissat, will affect the status of the airport at Kangerlussuaq, which has been Greenland’s main transportation hub for many years. The small town was originally the site of the American Sondrestrom Air Force Base before the site was transferred to the government of Greenland in 1992. 

In April 2023, it was confirmed that the Danish military would continue to make use of Kangerlussuaq, and civilian flights would also go there, details had yet to be confirmed. It had been agreed [in Danish] by Copenhagen in Nuuk in September 2019 that the Danish Armed Forces could continue to use Kangerlussuaq. In November this year, an announcement was made that Kangerlussuaq would also be the site of a new Arctic basic training programme for Greenland residents, set to launch in 2024. 

The improved facilities at Nuuk Airport are expected to be fully opened by late 2024, and carrier Air Greenland is planning new routes in anticipation of a growing number of visitors. In October 2023, the airline announced a new summer route between Aalborg and Kangerlussuaq for next year, as well as additional Greenland to Denmark flights. As well, in the wake of new interline agreements announced the same month with Canadian North, Icelandair and SAS, Air Greenland will tap into a wider array of routes connecting Europe and North America. 

The Greenlandic government is hopeful that the updated airports and new routes will bolster the island’s nascent tourism industry as interest in the Arctic continues to grow, as evidenced by the visitor boom in next-door Iceland over the past two decades which was only briefly interrupted by the global pandemic. 

Another Arctic air route announced this past October would be Air Greenland flights during summer months between Nuuk and Iqaluit, Nunavut. This routing had previously been attempted in 2012, at a time when there was still much regional enthusiasm about Greenland being at the centre of an Arctic economic and resource boom, prompted by changed weather conditions and growing demand for raw materials in the region. However, the flights at the time proved to be financially unsustainable, and were suspended in 2015. 

Nuuk Airport [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]

It was hoped, however, that the improved air facilities at Nuuk could help make the Iqaluit run viable, and that a revival of the link could also build upon improved national and local level links between Canada and Greenland, which had included in the long-awaited settlement of the political status of Hans Island / Tartupaluk in June 2022, (resulting in a 1.28km land border between the two nations), and the demarcation of the nearby maritime boundary.

As well, Nuuk and Ottawa had announced last October that they would be working together on projects to conserve the ecosystem of Pikialasorsuaq (North Water Polynya) in the waters separating Greenland and Canada’s Ellesmere and Devon Islands. 

The Iqaluit-Nuuk flights are scheduled to commence, using De Havilland (Canada) Dash-8 planes, in June 2024, with tickets being available next month. Canadian North is also planning flights from Ottawa via Iqaluit to Nuuk from June to October of next year. The challenge now, as then, will be competition with traditional regional airlinks including via Keflavik and Copenhagen. 

The proliferation of new air routes and destinations within the Arctic Circle has become another key factor in the economic opening of the Arctic, as well as political and development cooperation between regional governments. Next year may be a significant one for Arctic travel and its social, financial and economic effects on local communities. 

[The author would like to thank Mikkel Schøler for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.]