trump – Over the Circle

Canada’s Arctic Choices

April 20, 2025April 20, 2025 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

‘Assume nothing’ has became the de facto catchphrase to best describe the upcoming parliamentary elections in Canada, to be held on 28 April. Political fortunes of the competing parties have shifted rapidly since the beginning of this year, primarily due to one outstanding factor: the aggressive, (and regressive), foreign policies of the country’s southern neighbour, the United States under Donald Trump. As a result of the America’s president’s continuous calls, including on social media, for Canada to be absorbed by the United States, while simultaneously questioning the legitimacy of two states’ mutual borders, bilateral relations have deteriorated. This has resulted in various pro-Canada campaigns and a recent dramatic fall in Canadian visitor numbers to the US.

Canada has also been a frequent target of the Trump administration’s erratic and unfocused tariff policies, prompting a series of countermeasures by Ottawa. Although US-led global trade tensions have since been readjusted, as Washington turns its sights more fully on China, damage has still been done, and it remains to be seen whether the reformed Canada-US-Mexico trade agreement (CUSMA) can be maintained.

The main effect of Trump’s Canada ‘policies’ has been a swift resurgence of support for Prime Minister Mark Carney and the Liberal Party, which late last year had been written off as unsalvageable due to the unpopularity of Carney’s predecessor, Justin Trudeau. Current polling suggested a Liberal lead of more than five percent over the opposition Conservatives led by Pierre Poilievre. At the same time, support for smaller parties, namely the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Bloc Québécois, and the Green Party, has also dropped in recent weeks.

Both of the two leading parties have proposed programmes to address the challenges faced by the Canadian Arctic, reflecting the longer list of the far north’s security threats not only from Russia, and the possibility of greater Sino-Russian military cooperation, but also to a degree from the Trump government, which has not only questioned Canadian sovereignty but has also made repeated calls for the annexation of Greenland on vague ‘international security’ grounds.

In April of last year, the Trudeau government published the most recent governmental Arctic defence policy, ‘Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,’ which received much scrutiny from regional specialists for how the document represented a more diversified set of regional interests, many of which more closely reflected the new geo-strategic realities of the far north.

^{Members of the Advanced Naval Capabilities Unit, based in Victoria, British Columbia, pilot a G15 Sentinel drone to test interoperability in Arctic conditions as part of Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT in Inuvik, Northwest Territories on 27 February 2025. [Photo by Master Corporal Alana Morin, Joint Task Force – North, Yellowknife, via the Canadian Forces Imagery Gallery].}

In December 2024, Global Affairs Canada published its revised Arctic policy statement, a piece which also reflected the cold realism of changed security circumstances in the far north. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy described the pillars of Canada’s renewed northern strategies as the need to ‘assert Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Ottawa’s national interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leading on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.’ The statement pointed to ‘major powers that do not share Canadian interests’ as obstacles to peace in the region, and also referred to non-traditional or ‘grey zone’ Arctic threats in the form of malicious cyber activities, interference in local affairs and economic coercion.

This policy paper also advocated the appointment of an Arctic ambassador and the opening of Canadian consulates in Anchorage and Nuuk, while strengthening communications with like-minded Arctic states, another task since made more complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump.

There was also greater space given for engagement with ‘like-minded’ non-Arctic states to participate in regional dialogues and policymaking, including in the North Pacific as Canada seeks to improve relations with Japan and South Korea, two states with their own Arctic interests. This reflected Canadian concerns over China’s long-term goals in the current and the current challenges presented by Beijing’s ‘dual-use’ scientific interests in the Arctic which critics have argued could serve military purposes.

Within the Liberals’ policy document going into the election, promises included an upgrading of vital Arctic infrastructure, such as the Greys Bay Port and Road Project, as part of the revived local economy, as well as a new airstrip. There were also policies of improved cooperation with local actors to better identify regional risks, and a Canada-Europe agreement specifically tied to mutual Arctic interests.

In March of this year, Prime Minister Carney had previous announced a spending package of C$6.7 billion in spending for the Canadian Arctic, which would focus on infrastructure-building and monitoring, with the latter being bolstered by a radar technology purchase from Australia, further reflecting newfound Canadian unease about US cooperation. All of these policies reflected the underscoring by Ottawa that its Arctic sovereignty would not be challenged.

^{Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney meeting with his UK counterpart, Keir Starmer, in March this year. [Photo via Wikipedia]}

The Conservatives’ updated Arctic policies going into the election got off to a shaky start with a tin-eared posting on X/Twitter last December implying that the appointment of a Canadian Arctic Ambassador was a waste of funding as there was no one to speak to there, save for ‘Santa Claus’. Two months later, Mr Poilievre issued a statement in Iqaluit that his government would seek to open a military facility in the Nunavut capital, as well as bolstering the ranks of the Canadian Rangers in the Arctic and adding two more icebreakers for the Canadian Navy in addition to the ones promised for the country’s Coast Guard.

The previous Conservative government under Stephen Harper had also vowed to develop Arctic military facilities, but the promised base at Nanisivik announced by his government in 2007 remains unfinished and without a confirmed opening date.

Within a September 2023 Conservative policy document were promises of improved consultations with the country’s Arctic territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon), in preparation for greater economic activities prompted by climate change and demand for regional resources. A call for a strengthening of North American Air Defence (NORAD) in Arctic may also however be adversely affected by the current downturn in US-Canada relations. Mr Poilievre underscored the need for military infrastructure in the Canadian north in the candidates’ English language debate last week, saying that it was only a matter of time before Russian vessels would seek to enter Canadian Arctic waters, and therefore monitoring and response capabilities had to be upgraded.

Within the Canadian Arctic, major issues amongst voters included Indigenous rights, healthcare, socio-economic development, dealing with high prices and housing challenges, and also maintaining regional security and sovereignty. The eventual shape of the Canadian Arctic economy, and who would benefit, was another overarching question going into the final days of the campaigns.

^{Conservative Party Leader Pierre Poilievre meets with then-US President Joe Biden, March 2023 [Photo via Wikipedia]}

The next government in Ottawa will have a host of Arctic-related challenges to address in the coming months. On 12 May, the chair of the Arctic Council is due to be transferred from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark, with Greenland taking on a paramount role in the chairship which will last until early 2027.

It had been decided earlier this month that the transfer of the chair would take place completely virtually, sidestepping what could have been an extremely difficult situation based on three factors. The first being the ongoing question of Russia’s downgraded role within the group, in the wake of its illegal 2022 full invasion of Ukraine. The second being the soured relationship between the United States and Canada as well as between Washington and Copenhagen and Nuuk over the Trump government’s land grab policy towards Greenland. The third being the high likelihood that the United States will decline to support any Council initiatives which mention climate change, which is still touted by the current occupant of the White House as fictional, despite mounting evidence to the contrary and it being the central concern in the Arctic.

Other Arctic-related questions facing the next Canadian government includes the future of strategic agreements ranging from NATO and NORAD to the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ‘ICE Pact’, agreement struck between Canada, Finland and the United States in July last year. Since re-assuming office, the Trump government’s icebreaker policy has been mercurial at best, including an odd promise this past February that the US would somehow produce ‘forty’ icebreakers for the American Coast guard, despite a lack of means or infrastructure for doing so. This month, it was reported that the US and Finland may strike a side deal for the American purchase of five Finnish icebreaking vessels, and where Canada might fit into that endeavour was unclear.

After a short (but unusual) election season in Canada, which has greatly galvanised the public thus far, the Arctic will be a major part of local, and regional, scrutiny over the policy directions taken by Ottawa in the coming months.

Greenland’s Vote, Trump, and the Sovereignty Schism

March 24, 2025March 26, 2025 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

It was widely predicted in local and international media that this month’s parliamentary elections in Kalaallit Nunaat / Greenland would be the most widely watched in the island’s history, given the unwelcome spotlight placed on Nuuk after incoming US President Donald Trump not only returned to his hapless 2019 proposal to ‘purchase’ Greenland from Denmark, but also intensified his rhetoric. In speeches and his social media posts since the beginning of this year, he refused to rule out of the use of force in acquiring the island, and vowing during his recent speech to a joint session of the US Congress that ‘one way or the other, we’re going to get it’.

Trump also made vague claims that Greenland as US territory would be essential for ‘national security’, despite the fact that the American military already maintains a military facility at Pituffik with extensive monitoring capabilities. At times, the affair has veered into outright absurdity, with one example being a sycophantic bill introduced in Congress last month which would ‘authorise’ the President to enter into negotiations to acquire Greenland, and to also rename it ‘Red, White, and Blueland’.

Although on the eve of the Greenlandic election Trump appeared to soften his rhetoric, praising the vote but also promising that Greenland could become ‘RICH!’ if it agreed to be transferred to American sovereignty, the damage had more than been done. The renewal of the ‘buy Greenland’ fiasco has placed further strains on Washington’s relationship with Denmark, a NATO ally. Coupled with Trump’s increasing vitriol towards the government and economy of Canada, culminating in an erratic acceleration of the bilateral trade war this month, (which is now being called the ‘dumbest’ ever example of such a conflict), Arctic diplomacy and security, including via the NATO alliances, is now being placed in much greater doubt at a fraught time.

The delicate issue of Greenland’s independence from Denmark was also pushed into the forefront at a time when the legacies of Danish colonialism, which officially ended in the 1950s, were still affecting Greenlandic society. These issues included ongoing revelations surrounding an IUD policy in Greenland from the 1960s-70s, and the release (and subsequent removal) of a controversial documentary ‘Greenland’s White Gold’ / ‘Orsugiak – Grønlands hvide guld’ which detailed the appropriation of funds from the island by Danish cryolite mining in the century leading up the late 1980s.

The now-outgoing previous government coalition in Denmark, the once-unlikely alliance between two previous big party rivals, the centre-left Siumut (‘Forward’) and the left-green Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA – ‘Community of the People’) had the thankless job of trying to respond to this resurgence of American pressure, and it was widely expected that one of both parties would not fare as well in the vote. Outgoing Greenlandic Prime Minister Múte Bourup Egede has repeatedly stressed that the sale of Greenland was a non-starter, including saying that ‘We don’t want to be Americans, nor Danes; We are Kalaallit.’

Siumut had been dealing with internal party divisions long before the election was called, but then had to address, in the runup to the election, with high-profile defections from prominent party members to Naleraq (‘Point of Orientation’), a main opposition party which supports both faster-track independence from Denmark and a greater foreign policy alignment with the United States. Siumut’s chair, Erik Jensen, had called for an activation of Article 21 of the 2009 Greenland Self-Rule Act, which would jump-start the independence process, but that move did not appear to heal party rifts over the issue.

^{Central Nuuk [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Naleraq, headed by Pele Broberg, had appeared to be positioning itself to be the potential kingmaker after this election, fielding 62 candidates, more than any other party, to vie for seats in the Inatsisartut (Parliament). Thirty-one seats were up for contention, and traditionally it has been difficult for a single party to govern alone, so there was also much initial speculation as to what sort of coalition may appear after the results were confirmed.

Initial vote results on 11 March did appear to suggest a commanding lead for Naleraq, with IA appearing to suffer the biggest losses. As the day progressed, however, the numbers began to shift, steadily favouring another opposition party, Demokraatit (‘Democrats’). At the end of the counting, Demokraatit had gathered the most votes, almost thirty percent (obtaining ten seats), with Naleraq finishing second at 24.5% (eight seats), and IA third at just over twenty-one percent (seven seats).

Siumut’s seat count was reduced to four, and after the results were confirmed, Erik Jensen announced that he would be stepping down as chair with former foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt named as his successor. The chair of Demokraatit, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, confirmed after the vote that he was open to coalition talks with any of the other parties, with a stress on political unity after what has been a stressful few months for the island. Coalition talks have continued, with discussions reported between Demokraatit and all of the other parties. On 13 March, all parties released a joint statement opposing ‘the repeated statements about annexation and control of Greenland.’

Demokraatit had experienced a political shift of its own before this election, as it had previous been based on a policy of maintaining the union with Denmark. Then the party’s views gradually shifted to support for independence but in a more measured fashion which would place emphasis on achieving self-determination, including first completing the process of transferring government portfolios from Copenhagen to Nuuk, and a more diverse and robust economy. The party’s platform stresses a combination of social liberalism and fiscal conservativism, with a focus on lower taxes and business promotion but also improving housing, education and family support.

As the largest party in the next government coalition, there will be numerous economic questions ahead facing Demokraatit, including policies involving the ongoing reform of the seafood sector, the question of mining and fossil fuels, which IA was sceptical of on environmental grounds, and emerging industries such as tourism.

These issues likely resonated with the electorate despite the long shadow cast by the American drama. As well, another contributing factor to the results could have been exhaustion with the chaos of American foreign policy since January, and a greater backlash against populism, which is helping the political fortunes of some centrist parties in Europe, and potentially in Canada as well.

As Ottawa prepares for an electi o n on 28 April, Mark Carney was elected earlier this month as Liberal Party chief, replacing Justin Trudeau. The Liberals are currently experiencing an unlikely comeback in the polls, now running even with the opposition Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre, mainly out of concern for who the best leader would be to stand up to Trump.

^{Protests in Nuuk over US President Trump’s ongoing campaign to acquire Greenland [Photo by Maria Ackrén]}

In addition to the economic and domestic policy directions of the next Greenlandic government, what will also be closely watched how the thorny subject of an independence timetable will be addressed. This could likely be a major area of contention should Naleraq join, but either way there are likely to be changes in the relationship with Greenland and a rethinking of US relations, especially as pressure from the Trump administration resumes. Last week saw demonstrations in Greenland’s cities protesting the actions of the American government and reinforcing the fact that a majority of Greenlanders had no interest in becoming US territory, saying Naammaqaaq! (Enough!).

The pushback does not appear to have fazed Washington, as this week, a sudden announcement was made that the US government would shortly be sending another high-level delegation to Greenland. Framed as a ‘private visit,’ amongst the arrivals would be Second Lady Usha Vance, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and, traveling separately, US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz.

The timing of this event was criticised by Greenlandic officials, especially since negotiations to from the next coalition government in Nuuk are ongoing, and that the addition of such a high-level security official to the tour was a telling sign that the Trump government was continuing to wave off objections by Greenlanders to this attempted annexation.

On the eve of the announcement of the latest US delegation, Prime Minister Egede expressed frustration both at the visit, which he saw as American intimidation and that ‘the signal is not to be misunderstood’, and at the tepid responses from Greenland’s neighbours. He called for improved cooperation amongst the Greenlandic government to resist this pressure, and for Greenland’s allies to be more vocal in standing up to American actions. This view was echoed in a recent comment in the Norwegian news service Dagsavisen that Oslo and other Nordic governments needed to do more to show their support for Greenland and their rejection of ongoing US bombast. All of these matters are highly likely to affect the shaping of the next government in Nuuk, and its policy priorities going forward.

[Addendum – 26 March 2025: After an announcement was made yesterday that American Vice-President JD Vance would also be traveling to Greenland, it was then reported that the entire US delegation would no longer travel to Nuuk and Sisimiut as previously planned, and instead the visit would be limited to the US Pituffik Space Base.]

‘Awake, Chaos: We Have Napped’: Security Order and Disorder in the Arctic

February 1, 2025February 1, 2025 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

This year’s Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø began on a hopeful note, (as the city was spared the windstorms which plagued the event last year). The theme of the conference, ‘Beyond Borders’, had multiple meanings, given that many of the challenges facing the far north are not restricted to any one part of it, including climate change and development questions. The title though could also refer to the fact that more security risks in the region are not constrained by national sovereignty, and that boundaries actual and virtual are now being constantly tested and sometimes breached.

It was no surprise that although in previous years the conference had previously focused on business and economic development as well as scientific areas, like the Arctic Circle conference in October last year, this Arctic Frontiers event adopted a greater focus on regional security. Greenland, predictably, was a frequent topic both in panels and in hallway discussions. In late December last year, incoming US President Donald Trump revisited the failed ‘buy Greenland’ proposal from 2019 by posting that ‘the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity’. The statement, which was doubled down in a Christmas post sending greetings to Greenland, ‘which is needed by the United States for National Security purposes,’ further underscored that the island was to be viewed by the incoming American administration solely as a strategic asset.

Moreover, stress levels were raised when the new US president refused to rule out force to take not only Greenland but also the Panama Canal, which was also cited as being unfairly taken from US control in the 1970s. There was also a threat to use tariffs to coerce Denmark into agreeing to a potential transfer, a move which would likely invite a response by the whole of the European Union. The revival of the buy Greenland trope resulted in reminders from both the Greenlandic and Danish governments that the island was not for sale, along with sometimes vitriolic responses from elsewhere in Europe.

Since the prospect of the United States purchasing Greenland was first reported in 2019, the issue had gone on to represent two of the most negative aspects of American foreign policy during the first Trump administration, namely a glaringly transactional approach to diplomacy, at times veering into aggressive zero-sum calculations, and disdain for / ignorance of international laws and norms, (and in this case, Greenlandic history and ontological security concerns). By once again bringing up this hapless policy direction, a third facet of Trumpian foreign policy reappeared in the Arctic: an unwillingness to learn from previous mistakes.

Approaching the Danish government to buy Greenland was and is in contravention of the 2009 Self-Government Act between Copenhagen and Nuuk, which enshrined Greenland’s right of self-determination. Specifically, Section 21(1) in the document states that ‘Decisions regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland’.

As well, a specious but still oft-repeated argument that since Washington had attempted to procure Greenland in the past, by default it can do so again, fails to acknowledge the evolution of international law since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially relating to de-colonisation. This includes the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since the initial 2019 proposal, Greenlandic policymakers and the current government of Prime Minister Múte B. Egede, have frequently used the term ‘nothing about us, without us’ to stress the importance of including Greenlanders in affairs which directly impact them.

There have been numerous reasons mooted as to why the Greenland issue has reappeared, including ersatz imperialism (along with an odd nostalgia for the late nineteenth century expansionist period, aka the ‘Gilded Age’, in American history), an acknowledgement of the resource potential of the island (including strategic materials like rare earths), and a desire to create a strategic buffer zone for US interests in the Arctic to discourage incursions by great power adversaries, with Trump making vague references to ‘Russia and China boats’ in the region.

This latter argument waves aside the fact that the United States already has extensive monitoring capabilities in Greenland, including via the US Space Force base at Pituffik (formerly Thule). This facility has grown in importance given concerns about North Atlantic security, and especially the region’s GIUK Gap, which like during the cold war is seen as a vulnerable space for Russian maritime incursions. As well, NATO, including with the addition of new members Finland and Sweden, has also begun to focus more intensely on observing and securing the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

As Nuuk continues to pursue a policy of eventual independence from the Danish realm, relations with the US were seen as essential for a sovereign Greenland’s foreign policy. The Greenlandic government’s February 2024 foreign and security policy document called for a reduction of trade barriers with the US, enhanced cooperation in several key economic sectors including infrastructure, transportation, mining and tourism, and a revision of the 1951 Defence Agreement between Washington and Copenhagen to allow for a greater say by the Greenlandic government. Nuuk has also sought to diversify its trading partners, including the US, as a precursor to independence.

^{Inuit Circumpolar Council Chair Sara Olsvig speaking at a ‘Big Picture’ session at Arctic Frontiers [Photo via David Jensen / Arctic Frontiers]}

How these proposals will be reconciled with what appears to be an emerging maximalist approach towards Nuuk by the Trump government is now an open question. Unlike in 2019, the Trump government thus far has shown little sign of dropping the matter, with reports of a heated phone conversation between Trump and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen last month over the controversy, the 8 January introduction of a US House of Representatives bill ‘to secure the acquisition of Greenland by the United States,’ with no mention of the interests of Greenland’s 57,000 citizens. In an interview this week by the new Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, he said the plan to obtain Greenland was ‘not a joke’.

Despite arguments by the American leadership to the contrary, a poll released this week suggested that 85% of those surveyed in Greenland did not want to join the United States, and another poll indicated that 46% of Danes surveyed now viewed the US under Trump as a threat, a higher number than North Korea.

During the Arctic Fronters conference, Sara Olsvig, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, reiterated a point made in an ICC statement on 27 January: ‘There is no such thing as the better coloniser’.

Despite not yet taking office, Trump had previously declared that there would be reversals of previous Arctic-related policies, including in Alaska. The incoming administration had already expressed support for oil drilling in the state’s National Wildlife Refuge, (with the Republican governor of Alaska reportedly advocating the removal of fossil fuel extraction restrictions). Trump also called for a reversal of the 2015 decision under President Barack Obama to change the name of Alaska’s highest peak to its traditional Indigenous name, Denali. Trump called for the mountain to be renamed Mount McKinley in honour of the former US president, who was widely known as an avid economic protectionist as well as overseeing a considerable expansion of American overseas territory, (Hawai’i, for example, was annexed during his administration, in 1898).

The revisiting of the ‘buy Greenland’ controversy comes at a fraught time for the Arctic, given the potential for geopolitical spillover of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine into the far north, and the possibility of increased military activity in both the North Atlantic and North Pacific.

There have also been considerable strains between the Trump government and another NATO member, Canada. The US now threatens to implement a 25% tariff on Canadian goods, on unsound policy grounds, including even potentially on petroleum, in the aftermath of a series of taunts by the American leader that Canada should just become the ’51^st state’ of the US.

^{Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre speaking on regional geopolitics at the University of Tromsø campus, January 2025 [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

In May 2025, the Arctic Council chair will be passed from Norway to the Danish Kingdom. Earlier this month, after much debate, the Danish government agreed to appoint an Arctic Ambassador from Greenland, and it was decided that Greenlandic foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt would act as Council chair. Copenhagen has also expressed concern, including via the most recent threat assessment report published in December last year by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, about the deteriorating security situation in the North Atlantic, including Russian maritime incursions, espionage, and the opportunities for closer Sino-Russian cooperation. Cooled relations between the US and two NATO members critical to Arctic security have the potential to spill over into these deliberations.

The Arctic Council is already facing aftershocks from a reduced Russian role in the group’s deliberations, but now there is also the spectre of the US repeating its failed diplomacy at the 2019 Rovaniemi summit, which was effectively scuttled when the US delegation refused to support a final statement which mentioned climate change. In both previous and updated Trump policies, climate change has been falsely described as a fiction. Predictably, upon arrival in office the Trump government announced that it would again withdraw from the Paris global environmental accords.

^{The detained vessel Silver Dania (centre) docked in Tromsø [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

As strains on various areas of Arctic cooperation continue, another reminder of the nebulous nature of regional security, along with ‘grey zone’ threats, appeared in Tromsø just as the conference was wrapping up. In the latest in a string of undersea cable cutting incidents, a Norwegian-owned, Russian-crewed vessel, the Silver Dania, was impounded this week by the Norway Coast Guard on suspicion that it was involved in the recent damage to a fibre-optic cable in the Baltic Sea between the Swedish island of Gotland and the Latvian coast. The ship was briefly held in a Tromsø port before being released after a statement was made that no evidence of the ship’s complicity in the incident was found.

A Sharp Right Turn: The Arctic Faces Trump 2.0

November 9, 2024November 10, 2024 Over the Circle

by Marc Lanteigne

Much of the world is now bracing for yet another period of uncertainty and potential chaos in the wake of the election victory of Donald Trump in the United States last week. The incoming president’s previous foreign policy platforms were based on widespread disengagement and at times isolationism, questioning American multilateralism, while habitually praising autocratic leaders and criticising US friends and allies, while promising a more transactional approach to diplomacy. The twice-impeached President-elect’s return is likely to have global effects certain to spill over into the Arctic in many ways. This at time when the far north is facing some its most complex security challenges since the cold war along with the ongoing threat of climate change.

One of the most visible policy divides between the Democratic and Republican parties has been over climate change policies, especially after Trump became the dominant voice in the latter. Even before becoming a presidential candidate, Trump had derided climate change as a fiction, with efforts to curb carbon emissions framed as being directly against US political and economic interests. During his first term in office, several domestic environmental rules and protocols were overturned, and Trump pulled the United States out of the 2016 Paris Climate Accords. His government essentially derailed the Arctic Council’s now-notorious May 2019 Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi when the American delegation refused to support any joint declaration which even mentioned climate change.

President Joe Biden attempted to reverse these policies, bringing the US back to the Paris agreement upon assuming office in 2021, and making climate change one of four pillars in his administration’s Arctic policies announced in October 2022 (along with security, sustainable development and regional and international cooperation), while appointing Dr Michael Sfraga as the country’s first Arctic Ambassador at Large.

^{Michael Sfraga, US Arctic Ambassador at Large, speaking at the October 2024 Arctic Circle Assembly, October 2024 [Photo via the Arctic Circle]}

However, signs have already appeared that President-elect Trump is again seeking to push forward a denial policy, including once again removing the United States from the Paris agreement, and pursuing a fossil fuel-centred energy policy while downgrading clean energy policies. There are also worries that the incoming government could also pull the US out of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which would further ostracize Washington from global climate change dialogues and likely also diminish American policy voices in the Arctic. These possibilities may affect the dialogue about to begin this week at the COP29 environmental conference in Baku, which is expected to concentrate on climate finance matters, namely the allocation of funds for developing countries to address environmental threats.

Alaska, which voted solidly for Trump in this election, is likely to be another environmental front line, especially oil and gas drilling. After the first Trump government sought to open up protected areas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to fossil fuel extraction. Last week, the Biden administration started taking steps to ‘Trump-proof’ the refuge by complicating any attempts by the next government to open up drilling projects there.

The future of NATO under a Trump presidency is now clouded, given the incoming leader’s history of antipathy towards the alliance and the preference of some within his inner circle to downgrade Europe as an American security priority in favour of the Asia-Pacific. Trump had even weighed the possibility of the United States leaving NATO altogether, an option which may return despite attempts by the US Congress to set up a legal firewall against such a possibility.

In February this year, Trump in a speech openly called for Russia ‘to do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO member seen as lagging behind on increases to national defence spending. This year, six out of the seven NATO states in the Arctic have spent more than the preferred two percent of GDP minimum. Canada is the exception at about 1.34%, and with the Justin Trudeau government calling for the country to reach the two percent threshold only in 2032, a stance sure to raise ire with the incoming US administration.

^{Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels, October 2024 [Photo via NATO]}

A related concern is how the incoming Trump government will shift policies towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a candidate, Trump had vowed that he could end the conflict within twenty-four hours. Critics have worried that this would mean a peace deal which would validate Russian land seizures and possibly keep Ukraine out of NATO and thus perpetually vulnerable to future attacks, especially since Trump has consistently refused to openly condemn the Putin regime for seeking to annex Ukraine. There have also been suggestions that the incoming US government may ease sanctions on Russian Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG) projects. Even if the new administration does not follow through on its threat to leave the alliance, trans-Atlantic relations are likely to become more brittle, at the time when NATO is starting to pay much closer attention to Arctic regional threats.

During the first Trump government, the US sought a more unilateral Arctic policy which dismissed environmental concerns and placed emphasis on assuring great regional security and American economic interests. The results were mixed at best, starting with the tragicomic proposal in 2019 by the Trump government that the US should outright purchase the island of Kalaallit Nunaat – Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark, which would have been in contravention of the 2009 Greenland Self Government Act, especially Section 21(1) – ‘Decisions regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland.’ That affair further illustrated both the transactional and low information aspects of the first Trump administration.

^{The American Corner at Ilisimatusarfik – University of Greenland, Nuuk [Photo by Marc Lanteigne]}

Under Trump, the long-muted disagreement between Ottawa and Washington over the legal status of the Northwest Passage spilled into the open during the Rovaniemi meeting, and there is now the possibility of that dispute again complicating cross-border relations. The Trudeau government is finalising a revised Arctic policy for publication by next month, which would include the naming of a new Canadian Arctic Ambassador.

The icebreaker debate is likely to be revived under the new administration, as well as a resumption of the at best erratic approach to the issue seen during the previous Trump government. In 2020, a memo released by the Trump government included orders for a ‘fleet’ of new icebreakers be in place by 2029. Thus far, no new icebreakers have been deployed, and of the two polar-capable ice vessels the US Coast Guard currently operates, the heavy icebreaker Polar Star was commissioned in the early 1970s, and the Healy had to undergo extensive repairs before resuming its work this October.

^{The nuclear-powered Russian icebreaker Chukotka, November 2024 [Photo via Wikipedia]}

Last July, the Biden government endeavoured to address this shortcoming, and promote greater cross-border Arctic cooperation, by cosigning the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, also known as the ICE Pact, with the governments of Canada and Finland to jointly build icebreakers for their use as well as potentially for sale to other regional allies. Balance of power was very much one goal in mind as Moscow continues to develop its own icebreaker fleet, with Russia’s newest nuclear-powered icebreaking ship, Chukotka (Чукотка) launching last week, and China’s fourth icebreaker, the Jidi (极地) / Polar Region, was completed in June of this year. Whether this agreement will withstand a Trump presidency’s derision for multilateral cooperation, especially in strategic matters, is an open question.

As the Rovaniemi summit illustrated, the incoming Trump government’s relationship with the Arctic Council may also be precarious. In 2025, the chair of the group will rotate from Norway to Denmark, (with debates ongoing as to what degree Greenland should participate), with the Russia question likely hovering over those proceedings. Russia engagement with the Council has been limited since early 2022, and reports surfacing last month that Russian climate change data was being purposefully withheld from elsewhere in the region has been a direct knock on the Council’s main mandate to promote far north environmental protection.

Meanwhile, since its full invasion of Ukraine two years ago, Russia has been more open to closer Arctic cooperation with China, India, and potentially other fellow members of the expanded BRICS group. American disengagement from the Council could place the group in a much weaker position, both in terms of its abilities to address Arctic environmental challenges and to act as a town hall for regional summitry.

There are still many uncertainties as to what degree the incoming US president’s bombastic and often undiplomatic rhetoric will ultimately become policy next year. Based on Trump’s previous tenure, the next term could nonetheless spell a difficult time for the Arctic, on several fronts. How the region, and not just its governments, will respond is a crucial question which will soon need to be answered.