Elsewhere…

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A look at Arctic news from around the region.

The Arctic has Entered an “Unprecedented State,” Researchers Warn,’ [World Economic Forum]

At the Edge of the Ice: Deep inside the Arctic Circle, Inuit Hunters Embrace Modern Technology but Preserve a Traditional Way of Life,’ [Smithsonian]

Costs and Reality of Reforming the Arctic Council,’ [The Arctic Institute]

How Permafrost Scientists Discovered Yukon Summers are Hottest in Nearly 14,000 Years,’ [CBC News North]

Canadian Arctic Report Urges Stronger Ties with NATO, Indigenous Communities, but Weak on Science, say Experts,’ [Eye on the Arctic]

Iceland is a Bitcoin Miner’s Haven, but Not Everyone is Happy,’ [Al-Jazeera]

 

New Article: China’s Emerging Strategies in the Arctic

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[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
A new article by Marc Lanteigne, editor at OtC, has been published this week by the online journal High North News, which looks at the growing strategic dimension of China’s Arctic policies in the wake of the country’s first governmental White Paper on the region which was released in January last year.

The paper argues that despite Beijing having to play a great deal of catch-up in developing its Arctic diplomacy, especially at a time when the region is assuming a higher place on the agendas of many non-Arctic states, China has quickly established a strong political, economic and scientific presence in the region, via a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements with Arctic governments. As well, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which was initially not expected to make much of an impact in the Arctic, has now firmly established itself in the region in several ways.

Snow Fort or Ice Path? China’s Emerging Strategies in the Arctic,’ High North News, 19 April 2019.

格陵兰知多少二十问: 答案 (20 Questions about Greenland: Answers)

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以下是上期题目的答案及解析

 

1. 格陵兰人口数量为多少?

A 约16,000;B 约56,000; C 约350,000;  D 约570万

答案是 B

 

2. 格陵兰首府在哪里?

A 努克(Nuuk); B 纳萨克(Narsaq);C 以卢利萨特(Ilulissat);D 雷克雅未克(Reykjavik)

答案是 A;B、C 均为格陵兰其他城镇;D 是冰岛首都

 

3. 以下哪个是格陵兰大学的格陵兰语名称?

A Kayak  B Uummannaq C Inatsisartut D Ilisimatusarfik

答案是 D;A 是格陵兰语的’独木舟’;B 是格陵兰的一座东北小镇 (可读作’乌玛纳克’); C 是格陵兰议会名称

 

4. 以下哪种动物并不栖息在格陵兰?

A 北极熊; B 企鹅;C 环斑海豹;D 驯鹿

答案是 B,因为企鹅栖息在南极,而不是北极。

 

5. 格陵兰国旗的白色和红色分别代表什么?

A 冰雪和太阳;B 白云和太阳;C 北极熊和火焰;D 冰雪和火焰

答案是 A

 

6. 在格陵兰要从一个镇到另一个镇,以下哪种交通方式在目前最不可能使用?

A 坐船;B 坐飞机;C 坐火车;D 坐雪橇犬队

答案是 C,格陵兰目前并无铁路、地铁,城镇之间也无公路连接。

 

7. Kaffemik 指的是?

A 喝咖啡要加牛奶;B 咖啡销售效益好;C 咖啡有益于身心健康;D格陵兰人与亲友的社交活动

答案是 D

 

8. 格陵兰人拥有哪国国籍?

A  丹麦王国;B 格陵兰;C 冰岛;D 丹麦王国及格陵兰双重国籍

答案是 A,格陵兰于1953年成为丹麦王国的一部分,目前是自治地,尚未成为独立国家。

 

9. 除丹麦外,格陵兰最大的少数族裔来自何处?

A 冰岛;B 菲律宾;C 瑞典;D 法罗群岛

答案是 B;据统计,2017年格陵兰有204名菲律宾裔居民。

 

10. 一千年前,格陵兰因哪个人物而得名?

A 红胡子海盗埃里克 (Erik the Red);B Hans Egede;C 普罗米修斯;D Kim Kielsen

答案是 AHans Egede 是18世纪20年代到达格陵兰的传教士;普罗米修斯是希腊神话的神明之一;Kim Kielsen 则是格陵兰现任总理。

 

11. 如何用格陵兰语表达“谢谢”?

A Takk fyrir;B Tēnā koe;C Qujanaq;D ᓇᑯᕐᒦᒃ

答案是 C;A 是冰岛语;B 是新西兰毛利语;D 是伊努克缇图特语 ( Inuktitut),是加拿大、阿拉斯加以及少部分在格陵兰的因纽特人的语言。

 

12. 目前格陵兰有多少人口依然住在冰屋 (igloo)?

A 0%;B 4%;C 10%;D 24%

答案是 A

 

13. 目前占格陵兰出口份额最大的行业是?

A 采矿业;B 渔业;C 猪肉;淡水资源

答案是 B;渔业是格陵兰经济收入的支柱之一,采矿业尚未带来大规模收益,淡水资源出口目前还处于调查研究阶段;猪肉、牛肉、鸡肉等主要从丹麦进口。

 

14. 以下哪种啤酒是格陵兰牌子?

A  嘉士伯;B Viking;C Brennivín;D Godthaab Bryhus

答案是 D; A 是丹麦牌子;B、C 均为冰岛品牌。

 

15. 以下何种是格陵兰目前正在开采的宝石?

A 祖母绿;B  红宝石;C 紫水晶;D 钻石

答案是 B,除渔业资源外,格陵兰也拥有丰富的矿藏和金属,比如黄金、稀土、铜、铁、红宝石和蓝宝石等。

 

16. 格陵兰人口以哪个原住民群体为主?

 A 涅涅茨人(Nenets);B 爱斯基摩人(Eskimo);C 因纽特人(Inuit);D 萨米人(Saami)

答案是 C,Inuit 是Inuk 的复数形式,’因纽特’的意思即是’人’; ‘爱基斯摩’意即’吃生肉的人’ (含贬义),在过去也指代以纽特人;涅涅茨人主要分布在俄罗斯,而萨米人分布在俄罗斯、芬兰、挪威和瑞典。

 

17. 以下哪位是格陵兰首位女性总理?

A Sara Olsvig    B Aleqa Hammond C Aki-Matilda Hoegh-Dam D Ida Heinrich

答案是BSara Olsvig 是  Inuit Ataqatigiit 政党的前党魁,于2018年10月宣布无限期退出政坛;Aki-Matilda Hoegh-Dam 是格陵兰政治活动家之一;Ida Heinrich 是格陵兰歌剧演唱家,于2019年2月病逝。

       

18. 以下哪座城市并未与努克结为友好城市

A 特罗姆瑟;B 雷克雅未克;C 广州;D 长春

答案是 C

 

19. 以下哪种动物制品禁止普通游客携带出境?

A 艺术品店出售的画作; B 带有Great Greenland 标志的海豹皮;C 北极熊皮毛;D 商店出售的虾干

答案是 C

           

20. 以下哪项关于2009年生效的 Self-rule Agreement 是错误的?

A 格陵兰有权谋求独立;B 格陵兰可单独管理防务安全;C 丹麦向格陵兰提供年度财政补助;D 丹麦有权负责与格陵兰有关的外交事务

答案是 B,根据 Self-rule Agreement,丹麦王国依然负责格陵兰的外交、防务安全等事宜。

 

Lars Villadsen 对答案解析亦有贡献,在此表示感谢。

[未经允许,请勿转载]

格陵兰知多少二十问 (20 Questions about Greenland)

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[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
[This is the second in a series of Chinese language articles about Greenland by Mingming Shi for OtC.]

本篇含20道关于格陵兰知识的单项选择题,部分答案可参考《格陵兰概览》一文。:)

 

1. 格陵兰人口数量为多少?

A 约16,000;B 约56,000; C 约350,000;  D 约570万

 

2. 格陵兰首府在哪里?

A 努克(Nuuk); B 纳萨克(Narsaq);C 以卢利萨特(Ilulissat);D 雷克雅未克(Reykjavik)

 

3. 以下哪个是格陵兰大学的格陵兰语名称?

A Kayak;  B Uummannaq; C Inatsisartut; D Ilisimatusarfik

 

4. 以下哪种动物并不栖息在格陵兰?

A 北极熊; B 企鹅;C 环斑海豹;D 驯鹿

 

5. 格陵兰国旗的白色和红色分别代表什么?

A 冰雪和太阳;B 白云和太阳;C 北极熊和火焰;D 冰雪和火焰

 

6. 在格陵兰要从一个镇到另一个镇,以下哪种交通方式在目前最不可能使用?

A 坐船;B 坐飞机;C 坐火车;D 坐雪橇犬队

 

7. Kaffemik 指的是?

A 喝咖啡要加牛奶;B 咖啡销售效益好;C 咖啡有益于身心健康;D格陵兰人与亲友的社交活动

 

8. 格陵兰人拥有哪国国籍?

A  丹麦王国;B 格陵兰;C 冰岛;D 丹麦王国及格陵兰双重国籍

 

9. 除丹麦外,格陵兰最大的少数族裔来自何处?

A 冰岛;B 菲律宾;C 瑞典;D 法罗群岛

 

10. 一千年前,格陵兰因哪个人物而得名?

A 红胡子海盗埃里克 (Erik the Red);B Hans Egede;C 普罗米修斯;D Kim Kielsen

 

11. 如何用格陵兰语表达“谢谢”?

A Takk fyrir;B Tēnā koe;C Qujanaq;D ᓇᑯᕐᒦᒃ

 

12. 目前格陵兰有多少人口依然住在冰屋 (igloo)?

A 0%;B 4%;C 10%;D 24%

 

13. 目前占格陵兰出口份额最大的行业是?

A 采矿业;B 渔业;C 猪肉;D 淡水资源

 

14. 以下哪种啤酒是格陵兰牌子?

A  嘉士伯;B Viking;C Brennivín;D Godthaab Bryhus

 

15. 以下何种是格陵兰目前正在开采的宝石?

A 祖母绿;B  红宝石;C 紫水晶;D 钻石

 

16. 格陵兰人口以哪个原住民群体为主?

A 涅涅茨人(Nenets);B 爱斯基摩人(Eskimo);C 因纽特人(Inuit);D 萨米人(Saami)

 

17. 以下哪位是格陵兰首位女性总理?

A Sara Olsvig;  B Aleqa Hammond; C Aki-Matilda Hoegh-Dam; D Ida Heinrich

       

18. 以下哪座城市并未与努克结为友好城市?

A 特罗姆瑟;B 雷克雅未克;C 广州;D 长春

 

19. 以下哪种动物制品禁止普通游客携带出境?

A 艺术品店出售的画作; B 带有Great Greenland 标志的海豹皮;C 北极熊皮毛;D 商店出售的虾干

           

20. 以下哪项关于2009年生效的 Self-rule Agreement 是错误的?

A 格陵兰有权谋求独立;B 格陵兰可单独管理防务安全;C 丹麦向格陵兰提供年度财政补助;D 丹麦有权负责与格陵兰有关的外交事务

 

答案将在下一篇文章公布。:)

Over the Circle 总编辑 Marc Lanteigne 对题目设计亦有贡献,在此表示感谢。

[未经允许,请勿转载]

 

China and Finland: The Ice Road Cometh?

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[Photo by Marc Lanteigne]
As China began to expand its Arctic diplomacy over the past decade, there was much speculation [pdf] as to when the Arctic Ocean might be officially added to Beijing’s ever-expanding Belt and Road (yidai yilu一带一路) trade projects. The inclusion of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as Africa, Eurasia and South Asia within this initiative had begun to take form in 2013. Ultimately, it was in June 2017 that the initial connection between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Arctic was made via a policy document, ‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative’, co-written by Beijing’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the then-State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The Arctic Ocean was cited as a ‘blue economic passage’ (lanse jingji tongdao 蓝色经济通道) which China would help build in order to enhance maritime commerce and trade.

The importance of the Arctic to Chinese trade, and its links to the BRI, were further underscored in Beijing’s January 2018 Arctic White Paper. The document affirmed that China sought to deepen cooperation with Arctic actors ‘to advance Arctic-related cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, so as to build a community with a shared future for mankind and contribute to peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic.’ Beyond these goals, however, it remained to be seen what sorts of infrastructure projects, a cornerstone of the BRI, would be planned for the Arctic regions.

Until recently, it had been Russia which had seen the concentration of actual and prospective Chinese investment in infrastructure related to the Belt and Road, including plans announced in June of last year for as many as seventy such joint projects, including within the Russian Arctic. This degree of policy coordination between Beijing and Moscow has begun to raise concerns in the United States, with American officials starting to sound the alarm over potential security challenges to a closer Sino-Russian partnership in the Arctic, and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is expected to attend the upcoming Arctic Council summit in Rovaniemi, Finland in May as a counterweight to China and Russia. It was also reported this week that the Trump administration was drafting a new Arctic defence strategy which would emphasise the growing ‘China challenge’ in the region.

Other Russian infrastructure projects, including the proposed deep-water port at Arkhangelsk and accompanying Belkomur rail link connecting the White Sea with the Ural region, mooted in late 2017, (although with little follow-up news since then), may also form a more physical part of the BRI trade infrastructure in the Arctic. Beyond Russia, in December 2018 the Hålogaland suspension bridge in Norway, connecting the Narvik region with Øyjorda, near Tromsø and the northern Swedish border, was completed in partnership with the Sichuan Road and Bridge Group (Sichuan Luqiao 四川路桥 / SRBG), based in Chengdu.

However, another actor in China’s Arctic link building, Finland, is also starting to gain visibility in light of recent potential transportation and communications initiatives. This month, it was reported that a Chinese firm may be in a position to underwrite the long- discussed tunnel between Helsinki and the Estonian capital of Tallinn. China’s Touchstone Capital Partners was named [In Finnish] as expressing interest in investing €15 billion (US$17 million) for the watershed 100km tunnel’s construction. Although there has been little comment thus far from the Chinese government on the project, this link could form another element of the BRI’s far northern tier. Under the terms of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Touchstone and the FinEst Bay Area Development concern, Touchstone would receive a minority stake in the would-be construction project. (Even though a date for the state of construction has yet to be announced, it was reported in December of last year that tickets were already for sale for tunnel trips.)

The possibility of a rail link between Kirkenes, Norway, and Rovaniemi, possibly with Chinese support, has also not faded, despite the publication of a report last month stating the project was not commercially viable in its present form. There remains enthusiasm in both cities about the possibility of the rail link eventually hooking up with Russia and perhaps the Chinese rail systems, thus completing an additional land component to the growing maritime shipping potential of the Russian and European Arctic regions.

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February 2019 Report to the Government of Finland on China’s developing Arctic policies.

It was also announced in early 2018 that China and Finland were seeking to cooperate on the laying down of a fibre-optic cable to improve internet connectivity and data-sharing in the Arctic. If successful, this endeavour would further cement the ‘virtual’ aspect of the BRI in the Arctic. However, this plan may be tempered by the ongoing global debate over the Chinese firm Huawei and its attempts to set the standard for a nascent fifth generation (5G) mobile communication service, especially given that one of Huawei’s major competitors is Finland’s Nokia.

Nonetheless, cooperation in the Arctic may be developing as a significant cornerstone of Sino-Finnish relations, as demonstrated by the meeting in Beijing this January between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Finnish Prime Minister Sauli Niinistö which culminated in the release of a Joint Action Plan [pdf] including plans to deepen bilateral research partnerships in the Arctic and to increase Finnish presence in the Belt and Road. A Finnish firm, Aker Arctic Technology, had teamed with the Beijing-based China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), to design China’s second icebreaker, the Snow Dragon II (Xuelong 2), which launched in September of last year.

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Helsinki, Finland [Photo by Pixabay]
As well, a Finnish government report [pdf] on China and the Arctic was published in February this year, spearheaded by Timo Koivurova, professor and director of the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland, Rovaniemi. (noteOtC editors / writers Marc Lanteigne and Mingming Shi were contributors to this report). Another opportunity for Sino-Finnish Arctic dialogue will likely also appear at the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in May. The document detailed both Finland’s current cooperation with China as well as possible new areas of joint dialogue, including in the areas of technical cooperation, energy, data centres, tourism and transportation. Although Russia will likely continue to be the focal point of much BRI planning on China’s part, Finland is fast becoming another principal player as the Belt and Road moves from paper to reality.